Sterba libertarian critique

[wilderness]

@Donny with an A

Wilderness, I’m not reading six pages of forum discussion by people who almost always disagree with each other in order to try to figure out which side you think was right. I’ve read Hoppe’s book on argumentation ethics, so if you want to make a point built on it, I’ll probably understand.

My point is repercussions take up six pages of discussion.

@Donny with an A

The issue of repercussions, as I’ve said, is entirely separate from the issue of whether Klemm is right or wrong in breaking into the cabin.

So you do recognize a property violation, “breaking into the cabin”. So now it’s about, ‘What are we going to do about this?’ (repercussions, if any)

@Donny with an A

It is still wrong, for example, to rape and kill someone even if no one will ever find out and you will never be held to account for it.

Yeah, so? It’s wrong. Never said it wouldn’t be.

@Donny with an A

It is still permissible, for another example, to speak your mind even if you live in an oppressive society where you will be punished for it.

What’s this have to do with natural rights? You’re reaching now.

@Donny with an A

Repercussions often are constructed to enforce morality, but they are not morality itself and they do not determine what is right or wrong.

Correct, but Tom can determine via free-will repercussions or not. Just like you are doing now.

As long as you continue to say it was a break in, then it is just that - a break in - a property rights violation. Repercussions or not come after the fact.

[wilderness]

@Brainpolice

I think Danny is correct to categorically separate the initial question of right/wrong with the separate question of restitution or liability. To completely reduce the question to the latter seems to misunderstand the nature/purpose of morality.

Of course it’s a question of morality, but this has nothing to do with natural rights existing or not. Donny recognizes the cabin is Tom’s. Hopefully Tom is like Donny and will apply a moral repercussion, but also hopefully Klemm is not waiting for apples to fall from the tree and roll into his mouth either.

[Donny_with_an_A]

Brainpolice, I agree that the flagpole situation is effective as well.

Thedesolateone:

(a) (I thought Klemm was a boy!) If Klemm is just trying to protect him/herself from the blizzard, it seems reasonable for her to think that the cabin will provide her with what he/she needs. I’m not sure how Tom’s circumstances are relevant here.

(b) The most obvious response is that defending “In at least one case involving extreme need, it is permissible to infringe upon rights” does not commit me to defending “In all cases involving extreme need, it is permissible to infringe upon rights.” But I agree that the example you offer is an interesting one. Things always get complicated when you talk about money, since it’s not the money itself that would be saving the cancer victim but the drug that would be bought with the money. You’re bringing in a third party who is now benefitting from the situation (along with all the producers who benefitted from bringing the good in question to the seller).

To simplify, then, what if Bill Gates had the $10 billion drug sitting in a locked box on his porch? Could you justly break into the box? It’s sort of hard to think about this because of how valuable we think $10 billion is. Maybe Bill Gates, with all his money, doesn’t think those $10 billion are that important to him. Would it be wrong to break in to take the drug if Bill Gates didn’t really value it that strongly?

Another part of the problem comes from the fact that we’re talking about a $10 billion drug in the first place. How could such a thing ever come into existence? As we know, the price of a good is a market phenomenon, built on the subjective values of the participants. So who was willing to pay $10 billion for this drug? Was it Bill Gates? If so, then he probably needs it, right? Otherwise, why have it?

Examples like this one are tough; I agree. And we might run into a Sorites paradox. If you were having a heart attack and Bill Gates’ asprin were in the box, would you be justified in taking it? I think obviously yes. As the stolen object becomes more valuable, it becomes less clear that you would be justified, and surely eventually it would become unjustified. But it doesn’t seem like there’s ever going to be a non-arbitrary point where you can draw the line. This is a problem, I agree, but it doesn’t seem like the proper response is to say that it’s always permissible or always impermissible, just as it isn’t right to say “there’s no such thing as a heap” or “any amount of sand is a heap.”

[liberty_student]

Danny, one of my least favorite debate tactics on this forum, and it’s for some reason mostly used by people who identify as left libertarians, is to respond to a post with few or no specific quotes and simply providing a wall of text in return. I don’t know if it is coincidence, unimportant or what, but it seems like there is a tendency to be excessively verbose instead of concise and specific.

It frequently leads to dialogue that does not advance, and a greater tendency for strawmen (you said this, but without a source).

@Donny with an A

Liberty student, first of all, your counterargument, “Put simply, Klemm can’t have an absolute right to life, unless rights are absolutes” is at least not necessarily true. Klemm can have an absolute right to life if only some rights are absolute – namely, the right to life – even if other rights are not absolute – namely the right to property. There is no logical problem with that – to imply otherwise would be to imply that there’s a logical problem with saying, “Not all cats are black, but some are.”

It doesn’t matter what game we play, ultimately you are placing Klemm’s positive (not negative) right to life above Tom’s negative right to property. But really, it comes down to the lowest common denominator. Klemm violating Tom’s property is aggression, and you are making a claim that faced with death, aggression is acceptable. I don’t see the difference between someone breaking into a hospital for drugs, or someone breaking into a store to get food.

I don’t know if everyone read back, but Danny’s position is that it is morally just for Klemm to break into Tom’s home.

@Donny with an A

But in any case, I’m not sure that I agree that Klemm has an absolute right to life. If Klemm were attacking me, I might think myself justified in infringing his right, or if he were attacking someone else, or if he were falling on me from on top of a cliff and I had a rocket launcher, or if he were strapped to the front of a tank that was coming to run me over and I had an anti-tank gun (h/t to Judith Thomson for the preposterous examples).

That’s a negative right to life Danny. Your example is predicated on a positive right to life.

@Donny with an A

Your last resort seems to be to deny that “lifeboat” situations have any bearing on moral thinking.

This is a strawman. They do have an effect on moral thinking. I am imminently concerned that you are making a case for aggression against Tom. Your assumption is that in lifeboat situations, one agent is more important than the other, and the entire discussion is based around requests for you to prove how this is so.

@Donny with an A

I think that the moral importance of Tom’s property rights in the backpacker example so clearly pale in comparison to the moral importance of Klemm’s saving his life that the choice is clear: break into the cabin.

Which is finally a clear and sincere statement from you. Moral importance to who? Klemm or Tom? You haven’t resolved a dispute, you have merely eliminated one agent from consideration. And frankly, Klemm’s justification is entirely based on his emotions, his value of his own life over the value of Tom’s property. There is no standard here but Klemm’s own desires.

I also think you are overlooking the very important fact you brought up early as a non-sequitur. Klemm has the choice to not break in. This isn’t a situation where he has no choice, this is a situation where you claim Klemm gets to do anything to save his life and will necessarily do so.

[Donny_with_an_A]

Liberty student, if Tom were home, then it becomes very much less clear whether Klemm would be justified in entering without permission. As I’ve said all along, as the costs to Tom become more substantial, it becomes less clear that we would be justified in infringing upon his rights. Tom may not have a very critical interest in having his cabin’s pristine structural integrity kept intact, but he certainly does have a strong interest in not having people barge into his cabin uninvited, and he also has a strong interest in having the final say about whether someone is allowed to come in or not. Would it be indecent for him to refuse Klemm entry? I’m not unsympathetic to that sentiment. And if it would be indecent enough for him to refuse Klemm entry, it seems to me that it becomes odd to say that Klemm would be wrong to enter without permission (though perhaps Tom would nevertheless be justified in defending himself – “A stranger was intruding into my cabin when I expressly told him he could not come in, and I feared for my safety” seems like a good reason for infringing Klemm’s right not to be attacked, even if Klemm was not actually posing a threat to Tom’s safety). But what’s important is not that we can create situations where Klemm wouldn’t be justified in breaking in; of course we can do that. The important thing is that in at least some situations, we can say that he would be justified.

[nirgrahamUK]

@Donny with an A

Nirgraham, rights are shorthand for the notion that people deserve to be respected and to be treated as separate and valuable individuals with their own lives to lead. We say that Tom has the right to not have his cabin broken into because normally, we would disrespect Tom if we broke into his cabin.

thats your problem there. rights arent short hand for notions of respect. i dont think that they are short hand for anything. libertarianism isnt a theory of mutual respect. you have a theory which goes people ‘should be left to their own devices until we need them put to use for our better purposes’. how this is not socialism and the enslavement of our fellow man i dont know?!?

@Donny with an A

But in some situations, there are more important things than Tom’s right to his cabin

more important to who? more important how? whats more important? i dont buy it. you are making an argument of sympathy not of morality.

[liberty_student]

@JackCuyler

Who determines if the circumstances are extreme? The would-be trespasser. Who determines if the circumstances were extreme enough? The property owner. So even though Tom’s cabin is locked, Klemm may gamble that Tom would allow him to beak the lock to save his life. He may be wrong, but it’s not our call; it’s Tom’s, and only Tom’s.

I agree completely. Unfortunately, Danny has not allowed Tom to have any rights or power in his lifeboat. Klemm has complete moral control of the situation as the party under duress. An easy way to avoid conflict resolution is to remove (or render powerless) one party from the equation.

[nirgrahamUK]

@Donny with an A

As I’ve said all along, as the costs to Tom become more substantial, it becomes less clear that we would be justified in infringing upon his rights

costs? objective costs? subjective ones? what costs do you have in mind? sounds like you have a sliding scale of intuitive empathy, “well breaking into a cabin doesnt sounds so bad to me, and losing my life cause i couldnt get into a cabin seems horrid to me”, ergo, you choose what subjectively appeals to you. this wont do as far as moral talk goes.

[Donny_with_an_A]

Wilderness, your position seems to be based on the idea that infringing upon property rights is inherently wrong, and so the only question that remains is about repercussions. Is this a correct interpretation? If so, then this clearly begs the question, doesn’t it?

[JackCuyler]

@liberty student

Whether Tom is home or not is irrelevant to the issue of violating property rights. Just because Klemm cannot ask for consent, doesn’t mean there was never an issue of consent.

This is correct, as far as it goes. However, it would be an error for us, as outsiders, to make a judgement on whether Tom’s property rights were violated without asking Tom. We can only guess.

@liberty student

Danny, if Tom was home, could Klemm enter the cabin without consent, or would he have to ask first?

This is irrelevant. Tom is not home, so asking for consent is impossible. Klemm is faced with two choices, break in and hope Tom is okay with that, given the circumstances, or die. If Klemm chooses the former, and Tom decides his property was violated, Klemm will need to face the consequences.

That’s a big if to gamble ones life on, however. Our assuming, as outsiders, that the break-in is automatically a property rights violation is remove Tom’s right to chose how his property is used. There can never be a violation of Tom’s property rights unless Tom says there is.

[wilderness]

@liberty student

@JackCuyler

Who determines if the circumstances are extreme? The would-be trespasser. Who determines if the circumstances were extreme enough? The property owner. So even though Tom’s cabin is locked, Klemm may gamble that Tom would allow him to beak the lock to save his life. He may be wrong, but it’s not our call; it’s Tom’s, and only Tom’s.

I agree completely. Unfortunately, Danny has not allowed Tom to have any rights or power in his lifeboat. Klemm has complete moral control of the situation as the party under duress. An easy way to avoid conflict resolution is to remove (or render powerless) one party from the equation.

Exactly!

[liberty_student]

@Donny with an A

In assessing moral blameworthiness, it seems like we would want to focus only on the decision that Klemm made.

Tom isn’t making a decision. You are the one claiming that Klemm has the ultimate moral authority because he is under duress.

I’m still asking, could Klemm enter Tom’s home without consent if he was not under duress?

And if not, then wouldn’t this indicate that Klemm’s duress is the determining factor?

Which would mean… … … … Klemm gets to decide when he can enter Tom’s home, based on his perception of his circumstances. If his tummy hurts and he is a hypochondriac, then he can enter Tom’s house for medicine. If it gets dark and he is terrified of darkness, then he can enter Tom’s house and turn on a light. And so on and so forth.

[Jon_Irenicus]

Jon, I agree that the conceptions of strong rights are most unproblematic when they are the products of contractual agreements. But I’m not sure I agree that involuntary strong rights would necessarily violate (or infringe) negative rights – a right doesn’t need to be enforced in order to be a right, no?

No, but it is an enforceable claim nonetheless…

[liberty_student]

@Jack, I agree almost completely with your post.

But Danny’s position is that Klemm is morally just regardless of what Tom thinks. It’s not irrelevant to establish that Tom has consent, because Danny is making a very fluid argument that has already shifted in definition since it first began (now Tom is not home). It seems to me that if Tom has a power of consent, then Klemm’s claim to the highest moral authority is not a given.

[wilderness]

@Donny with an A

Wilderness, your position seems to be based on the idea that infringing upon property rights is inherently wrong, and so the only question that remains is about repercussions. Is this a correct interpretation? If so, then this clearly begs the question, doesn’t it?

Infringing upon property rights, is yet again, something you recognize. You recognize it’s Tom’s cabin. Now what repercussions, if any, are to come of this? It is a repercussion question, not a question of property rights for even you keep insisting it’s Tom’s cabin (property).

[liberty_student]

@Donny with an A

Liberty student, if Tom were home, then it becomes very much less clear whether Klemm would be justified in entering without permission. As I’ve said all along, as the costs to Tom become more substantial, it becomes less clear that we would be justified in infringing upon his rights. Tom may not have a very critical interest in having his cabin’s pristine structural integrity kept intact, but he certainly does have a strong interest in not having people barge into his cabin uninvited, and he also has a strong interest in having the final say about whether someone is allowed to come in or not. Would it be indecent for him to refuse Klemm entry? I’m not unsympathetic to that sentiment. And if it would be indecent enough for him to refuse Klemm entry, it seems to me that it becomes odd to say that Klemm would be wrong to enter without permission (though perhaps Tom would nevertheless be justified in defending himself – “A stranger was intruding into my cabin when I expressly told him he could not come in, and I feared for my safety” seems like a good reason for infringing Klemm’s right not to be attacked, even if Klemm was not actually posing a threat to Tom’s safety). But what’s important is not that we can create situations where Klemm wouldn’t be justified in breaking in; of course we can do that. The important thing is that in at least some situations, we can say that he would be justified.

Danny, is that a yes or a no to my question?

[wilderness]

@JackCuyler

Our assuming, as outsiders, that the break-in is automatically a property rights violation is remove Tom’s right to chose how his property is used. There can never be a violation of Tom’s property rights unless Tom says there is.

I agree to an extent cause as outsiders we see Klemm went onto Tom’s property, but yes, the consent, even after the fact, can absolve any repercussions by another virtue called mercy.

So I can see the fine line between violation or not rests on Tom’s decision, meaning, if violation automatically means repercussion without Tom’s choice in the event, then violation should be reserved until Tom does have a choice/say in the event. But mercy is another act of justice that brings harmony to a situation and therefore it doesn’t matter if we call it violation or not, as long as, Tom has the final word.

Thus this is still has nothing to do with recognition of Tom’s property (recognition makes property a right). It’s more a question of repercussion or not.

[Donny_with_an_A]

Liberty student, I personally find quote-bombing to be obnoxious, which is why I don’t write my own posts that way. But if you prefer it, I’ll make an effort to be more specific about exactly what I’m responding to. You’ll have to excuse me for not quoting you directly

In this post, you suggested that I provided a quotation of your position without a source, with the implication that I had set up a straw man. The quotation was cut and pasted from this post.

You then suggest that it’s on the basis of Klemm’s “positive right” to his life that he would be justified in breaking into Tom’s cabin. You write:

…ultimately you are placing Klemm’s positive (not negative) right to life above Tom’s negative right to property.

But I don’t see why this is true. A positive (or “strong”) right suggests that other people have a duty to ensure that the right is fulfilled – if Klemm had a positive right to life, then the implication would be that people would have a duty to do something for him. But in breaking into Tom’s abandoned cabin, it’s not clear how anyone is doing something for Klemm. It seems more like it’s the negative right to do whatever you want unless you’re violating some moral requirement that justifies Klemm’s actions.

You bring up an interesting point in the case of people breaking into hospitals to steal drugs or breaking into stores to steal food. You write:

I don’t see the difference between someone breaking into a hospital for drugs, or someone breaking into a store to get food.

In order to make the examples equivalent, we would need to imagine that the hospital, or the store, were abandoned, and that someone would die if they didn’t break in. It seems clear that as a society, we would want to protect hospitals and stores from being targeted in this way, and that those institutions would want to defend themselves. But could we really blame someone for trying to get in, knowing full well that they would likely be forced to pay for the damages later? I’m having trouble getting to that conclusion. It seems to me like almost anyone would try to break in to save their life.

Your next point is that my argument is predicated on the idea that Klemm is more valuable than Tom. You write:

Your assumption is that in lifeboat situations, one agent is more important than the other, and the entire discussion is based around requests for you to prove how this is so.

I don’t think that I assume this. My point is that by focusing only on Tom’s property rights, we don’t take into account the fact that Klemm is a person too. The point is that they’re both important, not that Klemm is more important. So you next say:

You haven’t resolved a dispute, you have merely eliminated one agent from consideration. And frankly, Klemm’s justification is entirely based on his emotions, his value of his own life over the value of Klemm’s property. There is no standard here but Klemm’s own desires.

But I would say that in fact, it’s your resolution that’s eliminating one agent from consideration: Klemm. Your justification is entirely based on the importance of Tom’s property rights, without any consideration of anything else. But this position seems clearly implausible, and thus far has not been defended in any way that I can recognize.

[Donny_with_an_A]

Nirgraham, it’s not clear to me on what basis you think rights are justified, if you don’t believe that they are shorthand for the respect that people are due. Could you elaborate on this idea? This seems like it would be a pretty obvious basis for our disagreement.

[Donny_with_an_A]

Liberty student, you wrote:

@liberty student

@Donny with an A

In assessing moral blameworthiness, it seems like we would want to focus only on the decision that Klemm made.

Tom isn’t making a decision. You are the one claiming that Klemm has the ultimate moral authority because he is under duress.

I’m still asking, could Klemm enter Tom’s home without consent if he was not under duress?

And if not, then wouldn’t this indicate that Klemm’s duress is the determining factor?

Which would mean… … … … Klemm gets to decide when he can enter Tom’s home, based on his perception of his circumstances. If his tummy hurts and he is a hypochondriac, then he can enter Tom’s house for medicine. If it gets dark and he is terrified of darkness, then he can enter Tom’s house and turn on a light. And so on and so forth.

You bring up an issue that becomes important when discussing the ethical implications of insanity. To illustrate the problem, imagine that a schizophrenic person comes to truly believe that a fellow subway passenger is secretly Hitler in disguise, and that he is about to release poison gas in the subway unless he is immediately stopped. Troublingly, the schnizophrenic person has a gun, and is sitting on the far side of the subway; in her mind, the only way to stop Hitler’s plan will be to shoot him in the head. Would she be justified in doing so?

The person who is utterly terrified of the dark in your example takes the place of the insane person. It’s probably true that her fears are irrational, and that if she were made to see this, then she would understand why she shouldn’t break into Tom’s cabin. But she doesn’t see this; so what can we say? I think it’s a hard question, but it doesn’t mean that Klemm wouldn’t be justified in breaking into the cabin to save his life.