Sterba libertarian critique

[liberty_student]

Quote bombing as you put it, is an honest way to debate. It is very hard to generate strawmen when responses are directed to specific test included next to the response. This is relevant, because we find a strawman in this response.

@Donny with an A

A positive (or “strong”) right suggests that other people have a duty to ensure that the right is fulfilled – if Klemm had a positive right to life, then the implication would be that people would have a duty to do something for him. But in breaking into Tom’s abandoned cabin, it’s not clear how anyone is doing something for Klemm. It seems more like it’s the negative right to do whatever you want unless you’re violating some moral requirement that justifies Klemm’s actions.

First, I believe you brought up positive liberty earlier in the thread.

Second, Tom does have to do something. He has no claim against Klemm breaking into his property, because you have said that Klemm is just for doing so. If the door is locked, necessarily, Klemm will have to circumvent that. It’s not hard to imagine in this most hypothetical of scenarios that Klemm will cause some property damage. You can’t really argue against this based on your previous statements, because that would be an acknowledgement of restitution, which would imply a transgression.

@Donny with an A

In order to make the examples equivalent, we would need to imagine that the hospital, or the store, were abandoned, and that someone would die if they didn’t break in.

Tom’s cabin is not abandoned. It is Tom’s. You have already made this clear.

@Donny with an A

My point is that by focusing only on Tom’s property rights, we don’t take into account the fact that Klemm is a person too.

Sure we are. Klemm can do anything in his power that doesn’t aggress against Tom. No one is saying Klemm is not a person we’re saying that Klemm is a not more of a person than Tom.

@Donny with an A

But I would say that in fact, it’s your resolution that’s eliminating one agent from consideration: Klemm. Your justification is entirely based on the importance of Tom’s property rights, without any consideration of anything else.

How am I not considering anything else? Klemm can do anything he wants, but there is no justification for aggression against Tom. Tom has a single negative right not to be aggressed against. Klemm can do everything short of aggression, which is a lot IMO.

[Jon_Irenicus]

Liberty student, I personally find quote-bombing to be obnoxious, which is why I don’t write my own posts that way. But if you prefer it, I’ll make an effort to be more specific about exactly what I’m responding to. You’ll have to excuse me for not quoting you directly

I’d also prefer it if you quoted that way as it makes it easier for participants to figure out who is responding to what ( though I share your distaste for it, especially with the “replied on” function being available - but it still makes it easier to read posts in a self-contained fashion.)

[Donny_with_an_A]

Liberty student, as to your question about whether Klemm would be justified in breaking in if Tom were home, I’d say that I’m not sure how I feel about it; I would think that reasonable people could disagree in that scenario. My inclination is to say that because Klemm would know that he meant Tom no harm, it would be okay for him to do it, though he should expect that Tom would probably try to resist and that it would be wrong of him to inflict any serious damage on Tom in doing so. If, for example, Klemm barged in, threw himself at Tom’s feet, and begged him to not force him to die in the cold, offering to let Tom tie him up so that he couldn’t possibly do any harm, I wouldn’t think that Klemm was evil.

[Sage]

@Donny with an A

Nirgraham, it’s not clear to me on what basis you think rights are justified, if you don’t believe that they are shorthand for the respect that people are due. Could you elaborate on this idea? This seems like it would be a pretty obvious basis for our disagreement.

Right. So liberty student, how do you justify rights being absolute in the first place? Rothbard’s argument by elimination? Argumentation ethics? A Randian argument?

[nirgrahamUK]

I suppose if rights are a shorthand. then they are sort-hand for the following

‘i have negative rights over my property’ = "it is impermissable for others to agress against my property’

‘i do not have positive rights over your cabin’ = ‘it is not impermissable for you to deny me your cabin’ = ‘it is permissable for you to deny me use of your cabin’

morality is a system which agents use to classify actions into permissable and impermissable, rights are the best way to do this, rights are justified in so far that if we are discussing possible moralities, rights based ones can ‘do the job’ of what moralities need to do, and i find they do it better than other devices, other moral theories

[Donny_with_an_A]

Liberty student, in responding to my point that I was not defending positive rights, you noted:

I believe you brought up positive liberty earlier in the thread.

And indeed I did. But positive liberty and positive rights are two different things. I believe that Tom is justified in exercising his positive liberty to break into Tom’s cabin, but I don’t believe that this is justified on the basis that he has a positive right to his life. My point was that a positive right to life would suggest that someone has to do something for Klemm, and this is not argued at any point in my statements. You, however, disagree with this contention:

Tom does have to do something. He has no claim against Klemm breaking into his property, because you have said that Klemm is just for doing so. If the door is locked, necessarily, Klemm will have to circumvent that. It’s not hard to imagine in this most hypothetical of scenarios that Klemm will cause some property damage. You can’t really argue against this based on your previous statements, because that would be an acknowledgement of restitution, which would imply a transgression.

There are several components to this statement. The first is that in order to have a claim against someone, you need to have a moral claim that they shouldn’t have done what they did. But it seems clear that a moral claim is not the only sort of claim that there is, and indeed you seem to have a legal claim in mind here. According to a legal standard of strict liability, though, which has been defended by a number of libertarians including Rothbard, moral blameworthiness is not a necessary condition for liability. By this standard, Tom would indeed have a claim against Klemm, even if Klemm did not act wrongly.

You then take exception to my use of the word “abandoned,” and that’s fair; I spoke loosely. I should have said “empty” or “unattended.”

You then write:

Klemm can do anything he wants, but there is no justification for aggression against Tom. Tom has a single negative right not to be aggressed against. Klemm can do everything short of aggression, which is a lot IMO.

But this is just an argument by assertion. You haven’t actually defended this position.

[Donny_with_an_A]

Nirgraham, I’m still not understanding why you think we’re supposed to respect people’s rights. That is, why are certain ways of treating people immoral?

[JackCuyler]

@Donny with an A

if Tom were home, then it becomes very much less clear whether Klemm would be justified in entering without permission.

I think it becomes perfectly clear, then. Tom’s property rights trump Klemm’s so-called right to life. I can’t see a way around it, unless, as Liberty Student pointed out, your argument is that the right to life is a positive right. If it is a negative right, as you assert, then Tom would have no duty to protect it, only refrain from behavior that would end it. It is nature, not Tom’s behavior, that is the cause of Klemm’s situation. Tom has no obligation to open his doors to anyone, under any circumstances.

@Donny with an A

Would it be indecent for him to refuse Klemm entry? I’m not unsympathetic to that sentiment.

I guess one could say it was rude or mean, perhaps indecent.

@Donny with an A

And if it would be indecent enough for him to refuse Klemm entry, it seems to me that it becomes odd to say that Klemm would be wrong to enter without permission

It’s not odd to say at all. Of course it’s wrong. Once asked and told no, it’s wrong to do it anyway. Unless, of course, you’re asserting that Tom has an obligation to be decent and use his property to save Klemm’s life…

@Donny with an A

But what’s important is not that we can create situations where Klemm wouldn’t be justified in breaking in; of course we can do that. The important thing is that in at least some situations, we can say that he would be justified.

The only situation in which he would be justified is when Tom gives his consent. Then, and only then, is the action justified. The gray area is when Tom is unable to give consent at the moment. In that case, we must wait to see what Tom thinks of the matter when he finds out.

[JackCuyler]

@Donny with an A

Liberty student, as to your question about whether Klemm would be justified in breaking in if Tom were home, I’d say that I’m not sure how I feel about it; I would think that reasonable people could disagree in that scenario. My inclination is to say that because Klemm would know that he meant Tom no harm, it would be okay for him to do it, though he should expect that Tom would probably try to resist and that it would be wrong of him to inflict any serious damage on Tom in doing so. If, for example, Klemm barged in, threw himself at Tom’s feet, and begged him to not force him to die in the cold, offering to let Tom tie him up so that he couldn’t possibly do any harm, I wouldn’t think that Klemm was evil.

I, too, would not think that Klemm was evil. I may even think Tom evil for putting him out. However, it is Tom’s, and only Tom’s decision. It doesn’t really matter if Tom feels threatened or not. His reason for allowing Klemm to stay or putting Klemm out is not at issue. It is his decision to make as he sees fit, using any or no rationale. Would I blame Clemm? Probably not. Would I allow him to stay? Possibly. It doesn’t matter, though, as I am Jack, not Tom, and though I have opinions on how others should behave, I have no authority, moral or otherwise, to force others to behave in any manner unless the others in question are directly affecting me or my property, or are on or using my property.

[wilderness]

@JackCuyler

The only situation in which he would be justified is when Tom gives his consent. Then, and only then, is the action justified. The gray area is when Tom is unable to give consent at the moment. In that case, we must wait to see what Tom thinks of the matter when he finds out.

Exactly and unfortunately Donny want’s to provide the consent and not allow Tom any say, thus, violating Tom’s rights cause Donny said so. And the only entity that overrides rights without, say, Tom’s consent, is the State. Donny is the State. That’s my logical conclusion.

Now if Donny can respond where others and I apparently stumped him, which is this isn’t a question if it’s Tom’s property or not, but rather this is a question of repercussions, then Donny might be able to stop being the State, admit he recognizes it’s Tom’s cabin/property (thus a natural right), and quit deciding on everybody’s behalf for the “common good”.

[Sage]

@Donny with an A

Sage, that’s fair; it’s just not how people normally use the terms. If it helps make sense of things, Thomson’s point was built on Nozick’s language of “boundary crossings.” The idea is that you infringe a right if you cross the boundary, and you violate it if you are wrong in doing it. If you’re morally in the clear, we’d say that you “merely infringed” the right – you didn’t violate it.

OK, that makes sense. But even if “negate” is the wrong word, I think there should be a term to replace the clunky phrase “Tom has the right that X be the case, and Klemm actively makes it so not-X is the case.”

If “Tom has the right that X be the case, and Klemm actively makes it so not-X is the case.” = Y

Then, rights infringement = “Y where we do not act wrongly”, and rights violation = “Y where we do act wrongly.”

[JackCuyler]

@liberty student

@Jack, I agree almost completely with your post.

But Danny’s position is that Klemm is morally just regardless of what Tom thinks. It’s not irrelevant to establish that Tom has consent, because Danny is making a very fluid argument that has already shifted in definition since it first began (now Tom is not home). It seems to me that if Tom has a power of consent, then Klemm’s claim to the highest moral authority is not a given.

Actually, the way I read it initially was that Tom was not home. Ahh well.

I agree with you that Danny is off in the Life is a positive right realm. I initially replied to your post as I’ve noticed that you generally take the absolute property rights stance in these save a life vs. property rights scenarios. The point I wanted to bring up is that we cannot know if there is a propery rights violation until the owner claims there is. Given a set of dire circumstances, a burning house or a child drowning (examples from previous threads), or one freezing in the woods, one may not be violating property rights by breaking down a fence, ignoring a “No Trespassing” sign or breaking a lock. It depends on how the owner of the property sees it.

[liberty_student]

@JackCuyler

The point I wanted to bring up is that we cannot know if there is a propery rights violation until the owner claims there is.

Absolutely. This is the moral outlet. It is a rights violation if I do not consent, but it is not if I do. This seems to me to be a perfectly rational way to deal with a conflict based on aggression predicated on some higher moral purpose.

[liberty_student]

@Donny with an A

Liberty student, as to your question about whether Klemm would be justified in breaking in if Tom were home, I’d say that I’m not sure how I feel about it; I would think that reasonable people could disagree in that scenario. My inclination is to say that because Klemm would know that he meant Tom no harm, it would be okay for him to do it, though he should expect that Tom would probably try to resist and that it would be wrong of him to inflict any serious damage on Tom in doing so. If, for example, Klemm barged in, threw himself at Tom’s feet, and begged him to not force him to die in the cold, offering to let Tom tie him up so that he couldn’t possibly do any harm, I wouldn’t think that Klemm was evil.

Sighs

For the third time, is that a yes or a no?

I’ll repeat the question again. Is Klemm justified to break into Tom’s cabin if Tom is home?

[Donny_with_an_A]

Jack, you say:

I, too, would not think that Klemm was evil. I may even think Tom evil for putting him out. However, it is Tom’s, and only Tom’s decision. It doesn’t really matter if Tom feels threatened or not. His reason for allowing Klemm to stay or putting Klemm out is not at issue. It is his decision to make as he sees fit, using any or no rationale. Would I blame Clemm? Probably not. Would I allow him to stay? Possibly. It doesn’t matter, though, as I am Jack, not Tom, and though I have opinions on how others should behave, I have no authority, moral or otherwise, to force others to behave in any manner unless the others in question are directly affecting me or my property, or are on or using my property.

This is an interesting way to phrase the point, and I’m not sure how it makes sense. Most deontological conceptions of morality are built around the idea that wrongness is a property we ascribe to the decisions that people make; when we call something “wrong,” we mean that someone made a decision that they ought not to have made – they didn’t think things through properly, and they did something that they shouldn’t have done. To make the wrongness of an action contingent on someone else’s opinion of the action (when that opinion couldn’t possibly be known by the actor) seems like it leads to the odd conclusion that if a month later Tom decides that Klemm was wrong, then a month ago Klemm should have chosen not to break into the cabin, but if Tom later decides that it was okay, then a month ago Klemm was perfectly in the right in choosing to break in. But it’s the same choice!

Now, if you’re talking about legal justification, and you accept the doctrine of strict liability, then this makes sense. If the question is about what should be done with Klemm – whether he should have to pay compensation to Tom or suffer some other consequence – then it seems rather uncontroversial that Tom should be the one to decide. But that legal convention doesn’t alter the character of the decision itself; it’s just an artifact of the notion of “no harm, no foul” which is embodied in the legal system. The law doesn’t seek to enforce morality; it seeks to repair damages. This can be seen in an illustration where two shooters fire their guns negligently into the woods, and one of their bullets strikes a bird watcher. It seems clear that each shooter was equally to blame morally for her actions, but that only the one who actually shot the bird watcher will be held to account.

Also, I never argued that we have a positive right to life. I might be inclined to think that we have a moral duty to save lives in certain situations, but I would think that these duties are non-correlative (that is, they do not correlate with rights held by the people whose lives we may come to have a duty to save). The idea of a positive right without a contract is a bit troubling to me since, well…what about the guy on the deserted island? What of his right to life?

[liberty_student]

Danny, this related question is also still unanswered. If you did answer it, and I missed it, please let me know and I will go back and look for it.

@liberty student

Danny, if Tom was home, could Klemm enter the cabin without consent, or would he have to ask first?

[Sage]

@liberty student

I’ll repeat the question again. Is Klemm justified to break into Tom’s cabin if Tom is home?

@Donny with an A

I’d say that I’m not sure how I feel about it; I would think that reasonable people could disagree in that scenario. My inclination is to say that because Klemm would know that he meant Tom no harm, it would be okay for him to do it, though he should expect that Tom would probably try to resist and that it would be wrong of him to inflict any serious damage on Tom in doing so.

Looks like the answer to your question is a qualified “yes”.

[Donny_with_an_A]

@liberty student

Sighs

For the third time, is that a yes or a no?

I’ll repeat the question again. Is Klemm justified to break into Tom’s cabin if Tom is home?

I don’t think there’s a clearly right answer. I think people could reasonably disagree, and small details about the situation would seem to become relavent in searching for an answer. But let’s say I say “No,” for the sake of discussion. What do you think you’re proving here?

[Donny_with_an_A]

@liberty student

Danny, this related question is also still unanswered. If you did answer it, and I missed it, please let me know and I will go back and look for it.

@liberty student

Danny, if Tom was home, could Klemm enter the cabin without consent, or would he have to ask first?

I think it would clearly be appropriate for Klemm to knock on the door and first ask Tom if he would please let him in.

[liberty_student]

@Donny with an A

What do you think you’re proving here?

Observe.

@Donny with an A

I don’t think there’s a clearly right answer. I think people could reasonably disagree, and small details about the situation would seem to become relavent in searching for an answer.

But you clearly think he would be justified to break in if Tom was not home. That much you have made clear, correct?

So that leads to the question, what is the difference between Tom being home or not? What has changed with regards to the needs of Klemm by Tom being in or out of the cabin?

@Donny with an A

But let’s say I say “No,” for the sake of discussion.

It’s either no or it is not Danny. It’s becoming disingenous for you to claim absolute surety and absolute unsurety on two sides of the same coin. Surely the criteria you are using to determine Klemm is just either passes or fails if Tom is home, since it you claim it clearly passes when he is not home.