Subjectivism and indifference

Miscellaneous General
1

I was reading Rejoinder to Hoppe on Indifference (http://mises.org/journals/scholar/block16.pdf):

“Nozick (1977) criticized praxeologists for this viewpoint, maintaining the indifference was necessary for the concepts of supply, goods, marginal utility, all of which, he claimed correctly, Austrians relied upon. Thus, they were guilty of contradicting themselves.”

As I was reading, I had the feeling that Block neither Hoppe could really address the problem in Nozick’s reasoning.

I think that the concept of commodity, or good, is a subjective one, so there indifference does not really exist in action. A person may think that a piece of butter may satisfy himself very much the same as other piece of butter, but there is no strict (or objective) classification whatsoever. He always is in the position of deciding of “objects” which can possibly satisfy his needs according to some personal criteria, and then he performs a choice, which is revealed by his action. There is no absolute indifference, just some level of indifference, according to his personal criteria (one should also notice that indifference, always applies at some object in regard to the end that the person wants to achieve, for example, a person is indifferent to strawberry or vanilla ice cream, but the end of the person is really to eat something cold, something that we, as praxeologists, can’t know). He may even consider using poison in his breakfast, just as he uses butter, and have a great level of indifference between this two “commodities”, which are, according to some epistemological criteria, of a different class. So then, my conclusion is that people, in order to achieve his ends, can possibly have different classes of objects for whom he can experience some level of indifference in regard to an end, which is not absolute as long as action is performed. So, the “concept of good or commodity”, is just subjective, and I think this is fully compatible with Austrianism.

Any ideas?

2

Austrians simply deny that indifference can be demonstrated in action. i.e. there can be no evidence for it. people are free to have faith in things for which there are no evidence, but we know opinions differ on such matter [;)]

We might all have had internal self-experiences that we described as indifference, but the interesting question is whether such notions have any bearing on economic questions, I think Misesians do the right thing as simply writing them off as irrelevant psychological experiences.

3

Agreed with NUK. While indifference is a valid psychological concept, it doesn’t apply to praxeology. Preferences, in the praxeological sense, can only be demonstrated by action.

4

If there were numerous pieces of butter and you chose one at random you’re demonstrating you’re preference for butter. However, you may be indifferent which butter you choose at the end of the day, that can never be a part of praxeology and economic science because it cannot be demonstrated through action.