I’ve always heard of the term tautology in the pejorative sense. However, it seems using axioms and deductive logic fits the second of these definitions:
Tautology
• a phrase or expression in which the same thing is said twice in different words.
• Logic a statement that is true by necessity or by virtue of its logical form.
How do you perceive the term tautology in relation to praxeology, axioms, and deductive reasoning?
Has your use of praxeology, axioms, and deceptive reasoning been ridiculed as pejoratively tautological? If so, how do you counter such attacks?
What term describes praxeology and its method better than the second sense of tautology?
Tautology and Axioms
I’ve always heard of the term tautology in the pejorative sense. However, it seems using axioms and deductive logic fits the second of these definitions:
Tautology
• a phrase or expression in which the same thing is said twice in different words.
• Logic a statement that is true by necessity or by virtue of its logical form.
How do you perceive the term tautology in relation to praxeology, axioms, and deductive reasoning?
Has your use of praxeology, axioms, and deceptive reasoning been ridiculed as pejoratively tautological? If so, how do you counter such attacks?
What term describes praxeology and its method better than the second sense of tautology?
“Tautology” in the pejorative sense is unnecessary repetition of the same thing by definition in a figure of speech. Something like “that wife is married.” However, it is only unnecessary if there are no substantive, tangential implications of the phrasing. Furthermore, it is only a tautology if the repetition is due to definition and not fact. So “inefficient government” is not a tautology as the inefficiency of government, though universal, is a matter of fact and not definitional (a praxeologist might disagree). By deductive logic, all derivations from a given axiom are tautologies in the sense of being true by definition, by logical form. It makes little sense to attack a deduction as tautology per se as the same attack would apply to the derivation of basic mathematics, etc. For someone to dispute deductive logic, they need to (A) dispute the applicability of the axiom to the real world (i.e. dispute the axiom), (B) show an error in derivation (i.e. show that it is not in fact tautological), or (C) show that the tautological derivation or tangential implication was unnecessary insofar as it tells you nothing substantive.
For example, 2+2 = 4 = 2+2 may be unnecessary tautology whereas 2+2 = 4 = 1+3 may not be.
There is also question as to whether any given axiom itself is synthetic a priori or tautology or induction, which is controversial.
There’s a difference between tautologies and truisms. For example, A=A is a tautology, but the fact that individuals, all other things equal, always prefer goods now rather than later is a truism. It is my belief that all knowledge takes the form of either a tautology or a truism, and that which can be falsified cannot be true, and that which is true can be verified (though the methods of verification may be imperfect).
Verification is practically an impossible endeavor, for the social sciences, because you cannot hold the ceteris paribus condition (there are no constants when it comes to human action). Also, when you add the appropriate number of dimensions/variables (in order to test real world phenomena), the experiment (formalized models) become too complicated to deal with and breakdown (Cambridge capital “controversy”). As far as the natural sciences are concerned, one needs to have a theory, identify all the relevant variables, and test the viability of the theory through experimentation while holding all other variables constant.
But I don’t believe that one shouldn’t attempt to verify ones theory; the facts either support your theory or they don’t.
Would my understanding be correct then to say that Austrians believe no empirical data is relevent to a social science such as economics, and that the only measure of ‘truth’ for an assertion is to seek the presence of one’s axioms in the process, not the results?
First, I’m neither an Austrian economist nor do I speak for the Austrian community. Next, I said that empirical data is useful and should be perused mainly because it gives you an idea about the viability of your theory. Finally, truth is obtained, again according to my views, only through discursive reasoning which begins with a correct premise (should be self-evident). If the conclusion clearly doesn’t correspond to the facts, then your premise, assuming that you were logically consistent, is likely incorrect.
Discursive reasoning is strict and unbiased. It cannot be arbitrarily altered in order to fit ones agenda. Either way, the Austrian framework is the only framework which corresponds to the empirical facts, so so much for that “critique.”
Well, sure, but I was asking your opinion. All the same, I believe I understand what you are saying, and would agree with it. But then, as a result I am still wary of theory based in a prori knowledge, for aside from premises of a lingual or mathematical nature I remain unconvinced that a priori can be anything other than subjective.
This is not to dismiss it, as consensus of subjective reasoning can be declared ‘generally true’ enough to serve as a priori knowledge, but I feel this limitation deserves to be recognized when determining or analyzing action. The level of consensus, surely, is proportional to the utility of the premise?
The reason I asked, really, is because I seek education from Austrians on how they consider the a priori knowledge assumed by fellows such as Mises can be held as any more ‘true’ than opposing claims. I assumed you were an Austrian, due to your post count (my mistake!) and thought it was worth throwing out there.
Philosophy is not my strong point, but the vast majority of people here are into epistemology/methodology. I’m sure they can help you. Speak to Adam Knott (that’s his user name).
Also, I don’t entirely agree. The Marxian framework is logically consistent, but because its conclusions clearly don’t correspond to the facts (namely that wages and profit tend to move in opposite directions, and that capital intensive goods demand higher market values relative to labor intensive goods) means that we can safely (not surely) dismiss its central premise (the labor theory of value) and therefore the entire framework.
But I see your point. The a priori method does not grantee truth either, but it’s the soundest method. If the premise is correct, and if you’re logically consistent, then you have discovered truth (but that doesn’t mean that all premises are correct).
Understood. But then, that is the charge I would levy against Mises, and my current (quite possibly flawed) impression of Austrian theory.
If the central tenets of theory can be argued against, which I believe they can, as far as I understand them, then the validity of the theory can be called into question.
Anyway, as you said, it is not for you to broaden my grasp of Austrian thought, so I’ll quit badgering you. Just making my position clearer for anyone would might choose to educate me further. Thanks for the insight thus far.
Especially in marketing, such as “Good luck and good fortune”. I also detest anthropomorphisms in marketing such as “Luck lives here”. How about panglossian appeal such as “Aint life grand”. No kidding these are real marketing slogans in Black Hawk Colorado. It’s as if these marketers believe everyone is an idiot and they can be led around. I also so hate elitism!
All the same, I believe I understand what you are saying, and would agree with it. But then, as a result I am still wary of theory based in a prori knowledge, for aside from premises of a lingual or mathematical nature I remain unconvinced that a priori can be anything other than subjective.