I’m interested to know how to understand this? and what backs it up? Do other scholars have their own praxeology?
Nir:
Misesian praxeology, as I understand it, is not simply pure logical reasoning from a single axiom, e.g., that “humans act.”
Misesian praxeology is built around a central “reference phenomenon” that Mises refers to as action. The logical reasoning in Misesian praxeology is not simply reasoning from two words “man acts,” but more accurately, conceiving consistently the means/ends relationship as that is experienced in action by means of logical reasoning, so that the formal construct that captures the phenomenon of action is consistent and not contradictory.
In Misesian praxeology, the reference phenomenon of action is central, and logical reasoning, with reference to the phenomenon of action, adjusts and corrects the formal construct, rendering it consistent and free of contradictions.
First, there is the consciousness of the phenomenon of action:
“The starting point of experimental knowledge is the cognition that an A is uniformly followed by a B. The utilization of this knowledge either for the production of B or for the avoidance of the emergence of B is called action. The primary objective of action is either to bring about B or to prevent its happening.” (Ultimate Foundations, p.20)
Then there is contemplation on the nature of action:
“The starting point of praxeology is not a choice of axioms and a decision about methods of procedure, but reflection about the essence of action.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.39)
“The only way to a congnition of these theorems is logical analysis of our inherent knowledge of action. We must bethink ourselves and reflect upon the structure of action.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.64)
Thus, Misesian praxeology is based on a “reference phenomenon” which is essentially the regular patterns that we come to notice in our action, and try to formulate into exact laws with the aid of logical reasoning. This is the general science that Mises is describing. It is based on the recognition of regular patterns of human action that we come to be conscious of as acting beings, and that we try to formulate, by means of discursive reasoning and logic, as exact laws. Any regular pattern then, in action, where an A is uniformly followed by or is co-present with a B, is a pattern that is the subject matter of praxeology in Mises’s conception, and this includes things outside the scope of economics proper (the study of market phenomena). If every time a person lies for example (an action), he/she experiences a distinct feeling, then assuming this is the case, it is the task of praxeology to conceive this phenomenon in an “If X, then Y” format as an exact law of human action. This is the general science of action of which Mises speaks, and of which economics is merely the best elaborated part.
By contrast, the Rothbardian and Rothbardian influenced interpretation of praxeology generally omits or diminishes reference to the “reference phenomenon” of action (the repeated patterns of action experienced by an actor), and generally omits or diminishes reference to exact laws of human action–clear and explicit reference to the notion that in action an A is uniformly followed by or is co-present with a B. This conception of things either results in, or is the result of, a further conception that praxeology is a kind of “reasoning” approach to specifically market phenomenna, as opposed to a general science that tries to conceive the regular patterns in all forms of human actions including non-market-related human actions (helping someone, harming someone, trying to figure out a problem, trying to overcome one’s fears, etc…).
Regarding the idea that the Rothbardian conception of praxeology is by and large synonymous with supposition/counter-supposition reasoning, here is an example taken from his essay “Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics”.
Let us consider some of the immediate implications of the action
axiom. Action implies that the individual’s behavior is purposive, in
short, that it is directed toward goals. Furthermore, the fact of his action
implies that he has consciously chosen certain means to reach his goals.
Since he wishes to attain these goals, they must be valuable to him;
accordingly he must have values that govern his choices. That he
employs means implies that he believes he has the technological
knowledge that certain means will achieve his desired ends. Let us note
that praxeology does not assume that a person’s choice of values or goals
is wise or proper or that he has chosen the technologically correct
method of reaching them. All that praxeology asserts is that the
individual actor adopts goals and believes, whether erroneously or
correctly, that he can arrive at them by the employment of certain means.
All action in the real world, furthermore, must take place through
time; all action takes place in some present and is directed toward the
future (immediate or remote) attainment of an end. If all of a person’s
desires could be instantaneously realized, there would be no reason for
him to act at all.3 Furthermore, that a ma n acts implies that he believes
action will make a difference; in other words, that he will prefer the state
of affairs resulting from action to that from no action. Action therefore
implies that man does not have omniscient knowledge of the future; for
if he had such knowledge, no action of his would make any difference.
Hence, action implies that we live in a world of an uncertain, or not fully
certain, future. Accordingly, we may amend our analysis of action to say
that a man chooses to employ means according to a technological plan in
the present because he expects to arrive at his goals at some future time.
3 In answer to the criticism that not all action is directed to some future point of time,
see Walter Block, “A Comment on ‘The Extraordinary Claim of Praxeology’ by
Professor Gutierrez,” Theory and Decision 3 (1973): 381-82.
Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics
60
The fact that people act necessarily implies that the means
employed are scarce in relation to the desired ends; for, if all means were
not scarce but superabundant, the ends would already have been attained,
and there would be no need for action. Stated another way, resources that
are superabundant no longer function as means, because they are no
longer objects of action. Thus, air is indispensable to life and hence to
the attainment of goals; however, air being superabundant is not an
object of action and therefore cannot be considered a means, but rather
what Mises called a “general condition of human welfare.” Where air is
not superabundant, it may become an object of action, for example,
where cool air is desired and warm air is transformed through air
conditioning. Even with the absurdly unlikely adve nt of Eden (or what a
few years ago was considered in some quarters to be an imminent
“postscarcity” world), in which all desires could be fulfilled
instantaneously, there would still be at least one scarce means: the
individual’s time, each unit of which if allocated to one purpose is
necessarily not allocated to some other goal. 4
Such are some of the immediate implications of the axiom of
action. We arrived at them by deducing the logical implications of the
existing fact of human action, and hence deduced true conclusions from
a true axiom. Apart from the fact that these conclusions cannot be
“tested” by historical or statistical means, there is no need to test them
since their truth has already been established. Historical fact enters into
these conclusions only by determining which branch of the theory is
applicable in any particular case. Thus, for Crusoe and Friday on their
desert island, the praxeological theory of money is only of academic,
rather than of currently applicable, interest. A fuller analysis of the
relationship between theory and history in the praxeological framework
will be considered below.
There are, then, two parts of this axiomatic-deductive method:
the process of deduction and the epistemological status of the axioms
themselves.
I underlined a few brief passages that are characteristic of Rothbard’s approach. With the above as reference, I would summarize the general difference between the Misesian conception and the Rothbardian conception of praxeology thusly:
In the Misesian conception, the “If X, then Y” propositions are propositions of the theory that refer to the regular pattern(s) in the phenomenon.
In general, Mises is concerned with the regular patterns in human action, and the supposing of an “X” is the supposing of a phenomenon X, which is followed by or is co-present with, a phenomenon Y.
As you can see, the Rothbardian conception is subtly different. Rothbard tends to conceive the “if X, then Y” propositions as parts of the theoretical reasoning process. His “if X, then Y” ‘s are “discursive suppositions.” arguing or building towards a kind of final “proof.” The "X-Y’ suppositions are “X-Y” “hypotheticals” that belong to the “praxeological” reasoning process in Rothbard’s conception of praxeology.
And as you can see, he plainly states: “There are, then, two parts of this axiomatic-deductive method: the process of deduction and the epistemological status of the axioms themselves.”
He leaves out mention of or reference to the phenomenon of action, regular patterns, exact laws, etc…
So he is not describing exactly the same thing Mises is. Mises is focused on the phenomenon of action, its regular patterns, and the conception of those regular patterns as exact laws of human action. Rothbard is focused on a process of “if-then” logical deduction from a so-called “action axiom” largely without reference to the phenomenon of action, regular patterns, and exact laws.
(I’m not aware of Mises ever referring to the “axiom of action” or an “action axiom” though he may possibly have. I believe Mises thought in terms of a “category of action” meaning, that as opposed to mechanistic nature, there is another phenomenon bringing about change in the world; man’s conscious aiming at ends. This refers to the phenomenon of consciously aiming at ends, and this phenomenon, and conceiving it consistently in terms of means and ends, was Mises’s chief concern)
Regarding your question whether other scholars have their own praxeology, I believe that followers of Rothbard including Hoppe and Long have tended to view praxeology more along the lines of “conceptual analysis” and less along the lines of regular patterns of human action conceived as exact laws.
Here is Long’s definition:
“Praxeology is the study of those aspects of human action that can be grasped a priori; in other words, it is concerned with the conceptual analysis and logical implications of preference, choice, means-end schemes, and so forth.”
“The basic principles of praxeology were first discovered by the Greek philosophers, who used them as a foundation for a eudaimonistic ethics. This approach was further developed by the Scholastics, who extended praxeological analysis to the foundations of economics and social science as well.”
“In the late nineteenth century, the praxeological approach to economics and social science was rediscovered by Carl Menger, founder of the Austrian School. The term praxeology was first applied to this approach by the later Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises (portrait at left). Along with his students (including Friedrich Hayek and Murray Rothbard), Mises employed praxeological principles to show that much existing economic and social theory was conceptually incoherent.” (emphasis added)
Thus, Rothbard conceives praxeology as supposition/counter-supposition reasoning, and Long believes that the import of Mises is his demonstration that other economic theories were conceptually incoherent.
This isn’t accurate. Mises demonstrated that resorting to definite policy means X, must necessarily result in a definite “economic” consequence Y. His point was, for example, that attempts to artificially lower the voluntary or natural rate of interest X, must have a necessary consequence Y. His concern was definitely the phenomena. His concern and focus was on the results that our attempts to influence events must necessarily produce, or what those attempts could not possibly produce. He wasn’t concerned with “conceptual coherence” per se, he was concerned with economic phenomena and the phenomena of human action.
I would speculate that Long is accessing Mises as many American libertarian scholars do, through a Rothbardian lens. And that is how he comes to the conclusion that the import of Mises and praxeology is conceptual analysis. But, paraphrasing Long, doing this “just is” interpreting Mises according to a Rothbardian view of things. To understand Mises as someone who’s chief concern is logical deduction and conceptual analysis “just is what it means” to be a Rothbardian (or someone heavily influenced by him).
If a person wants to understand Mises by reference to another scholar, they can get a better idea of what Mises is doing by reading Book 1, chapters 1 through 5 of Menger’s “Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences.” (40 pages in total)
There, a person will see the general blueprint for Misesian praxelogy, what Menger referred to as theoretical exact science.
One who reads these five chapters by Menger will realize that what Menger and Mises have as their aim is exact laws of human or social phenomena. Their conception of exact science or praxeology cannot be accurately characterized without referring to the idea of exact laws.
As Mises writes:
“Theory as distinct from history is the search for constant relations between entities, or, what means the same, for regularity in the succession of events.” (UF, p.16)
“Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty the outcome of various modes of action.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.117)
As illustrated by the appeal these prolonged high flying debates hold to them in comparison to other topics, the length of their posts in them, and the propensity to throw around super-duper smartypants philosophical terms.
So? This is supposed to be profound?
Where does Rothbard deny there is no such thing as a scientific ought?
Claiming that there is a morality independent of peoples’ attitudes is claiming that there is a scientific ought? How do you make that jump?
As far as I can see the whole line of reasoning presented here by the subjectivists consists of assigning positions to Rothbard and likeminded people that they do not hold and then riling up against those. The starting point of the subjectivist critics here is the notion that objectivists are motivated by the desire to lend greater validity to the values they hold. So the very starting point of theirs is a smearful insinuation that objectivists are not intellectually honest.
It is also a notion that is clearly absurd. If a natural law proponent were to actually claim that his own values and the prism of natural law are in perfect sync then he would be making a claim that he is a saintly man. Obviously that is not the case. Every natural law proponent will freely admit that actually it is a struggle to live up the tenants of the unbiased ethic and many will admit that in a certain situation they can see themselves transgressing against it. So no, actually no imperialism of values is taking place.
The reality is that ethicists ask whether there is such a thing as morality that exists independently of personal biases. Subjectivists answer in the negative and then tries to prove this is the case. Objectivist similarly answers in the affirmative and then tries to prove this by discovering this independent morality by extrapolating it through sound reasoning from scratch or from a few common-sensical postulates.
The fact that natural law theory has been developed to such a point where it can offer a point of view on whether any action imaginable is precisely one of right or of wrong without entering into internal inconsistencies is proof enough that yes, actually there exists a way to judge the world free of personal biases.
This is all that objectivist morality states. There is no “ought” involved in it. The idea that people “ought to” act in accordance with morality independent of human biases is not a part of this independent morality. Natural law theory does not state people ought to live up to it. It merely proclaims that there exists a lens through which it is possible to judge their actions free of bias whatever course they chose to follow.
What course they actually take depends on their own values. It is entirely possible for someone to be a moral absolutist and recognize that truth in matters of morality exists jet decide he does not value right a great deal, or even decide he values wrong and knowingly follow a deeply immoral path of action. To such a person (akin to evilfolk in D&D) a moral absolutist who values doing the right thing would be totally powerless to explain why he “ought to” change his ways.
Tell me whether this restatement of your argument is fair:
- Because the explanation A exists, produces the result of either 1 or 0, “right” or “wrong”, and is consistent, the explanation, A, is correct.
The reason why I am asking this is that I do not know whether, by “there exists a way to judge the world free of personal biases”, you meant that “there exists a [correct!] way [via “natural law theory”!] to judge the world free of personal biases” or not.
First of all, I’ve written extensively on Paul Krugman, Ben Bernanke, and other practical, present-day issues. And I’ve written much more on economics and history than on philosophy. So your characterization is way off.
Secondly, that universal, absolute, and objective ethics is chimerical is of great practical importance. In terms of guiding the movement toward effecting change, I believe it demonstrates the relative strength of the Misesian project (using praxeology to analyze means: particularly to demonstrate the inefficacy of interventionist means regarding the VAST preponderance of ends that are held) over the Rothbardian project (doing the former PLUS spending a great deal of intellectual resources on trying to prove universal ends. Many of the faults that make universal, absolute, and objective ethics incoherent as a science are also what makes such arguments as Eudaimonism and Argumentation Ethics fail to resonate with people who aren’t already libertarian, and thereby don’t already rigorously hold libertarian ends anyway. The movement for truth, freedom, and prosperity would be much better served if its sharpest minds weren’t occupied with such ultimately unfruitful questions, and if instead they focused on unresolved or unclarified issues in economic theory and history.
‘Bewildered’ ‘stupefaction’- sounds like cheap rhetoric, not ‘value-free’ science. And what “people” is Mises talking about ? A bunch of amoralist utilitarians like himself ?
Also, the “interdependence of market phenomena” is something that lots of libertarian economists were aware of and yet they didn’t choose amoral utilitarianism as their moral system. It seems as if Mises is rewriting history…
But isn’t Mises censoring people who don’t conform to his amoral utilitarianism ?
One must ? Because Mises the positivist says so ?
Amoralism was a revolution ? And is Mises using the term ‘revolution’ in a ‘value-free’ manner ? Or is it just more utilitarian propaganda and self-promotion ?
lol.
Juan,
In addition to mockingly laughing at Mr. Knott’s highly admirable scholarly enthusiasm, you have accused Ludwig von Mises of having been a self-promoting positivist who uses cheap rhetoric. That is in DIRECT contravention of forum rules:
This, combined with your long history of attacking other members, is proof that you have no place in a venue for learning and civil discussion. Therefore, I am permanently banning you. You have been given a multitude of chances, so this is a measure that is long overdue.
This has nothing to do with the fact that you disagree with my position in this thread. As can be seen earlier in this thread, I will just as readily defend the memory of Rothbard as I will the memory of Mises, even when it is disparaged by people on my “side” in this debate. But obviously zefreak’s indiscretion was out of the ordinary for him, while yours is par for the course.
In fact, this measure will probably help the objectivist position you espouse, because if anything, your incivility has probably turned people off from it. Justin, Conza, Marko, and other objective rights advocates who don’t feel the need to coat their arguments with spite will have a much easier time convincing people without your input.
I hope some day you will mellow out and be able to promote your ideas regarding libertarianism in a respectful manner. But this forum can no longer wait for that day.
I’m very sad for Juan’s permaban. I’ve lurked this forums a lot for the past months and sympathized with his indecent posts somewhat. He certainly deserved it, but I wish he would have been able to hold his inner anger back a bit more.
On topic, I have not much to add, but to ask for a clarification here. It seems the moral relativists, amoralists, subjetctivists, whatever you call them (I’m probably one as well) aren’t really in conflict with the “objectivists” here, because as I see it, most objectivists here aren’t attempting to break the is-ought dichotomy but working inside that which “is”. They seem to want to prove only that there exist, may exist, or may be built a moral code very akin to objective facts.
Shouldn’t you refrain from calling yourselves “objectivists”?
I know it’s a matter of semantics, but am I right to say that… these “objectivists” shouldn’t be using the word “objectivist”, because that is NOT what an objective moralist normally is or says, in my opinion. A moral objetivist in my experience will infer that you ought to adopt his moral code based on some observational condition. Most “objectivists” here don’t seem to be doing anything of the sort.
There needs to be a new term I feel, to dicern between this breed of “objectivism” with the more traditional one, and I’m not the best here to offer a solution since I barely even grasp all the terms thrown around (wikipedia doesn’t help either as it seems the people there don’t quite understand them either lol)
So far, as I see it, it’s been like this:
amoralists (there are no oughts) //// “objectivists” (oughts if you accept certain axioms or whatever) //// objectivists (oughts regardless of what you say or do)
I think this type of “objetivist” is way more of an amoralist than a true objectivist since what’s the point of having a moral code if you can’t “impose” it on others… and I don’t think amoralists deny that there can’t be contractual or interpersonal codes for people to follow, there certainly can be, it’s just that they’re not binding as in themselves. So.. why not just call yourselves amoralists already,I just don’t understand, but I don’t think I’m the only one here. Juan for example was trying to say that all along 
Maybe it should be called… “interpersonal objetivism”, idk.
Under which category do you classify me? I can’t really tell.
I think you’re in the middle. But you can answer that yourself.
Could a moral code (any you can come up with) be binding to everyone? or every rational agent..
I think that oughts exist because of certain axioms. One doesn’t need to accept the axioms, but that doesn’t falsify them. So, in other words, based on certain axioms which I find to be self-evidently true, there are “oughts regardless of what you say and do.” Which is why I found your spectrum confusing.
In a discussion like this, there’s more for both parties to gain in the form of calm, rational debate. It means nothing to the other posters here if I say, “My morals are the correct ones regardless of what you say or do,” without trying to explain why I think that they can be objectively correct.
Oh ok 
So you are pretty much a moral objectivist.
But you do see that others may have different rationalizations and axioms and that screws up the universality of it?
Perhaps the diagram doesn’t apply to you, but I just wanted to point out that to be a true moral objectivist, you’d have to assert that people ought to use certain axioms, and if you don’t, then… it’s all interpersonal interpretations and not universal.
Yuberries:
You make good points. But I think you are willing to go farther than those who you are referring to.
Regarding #1, if someone isn’t attempting to overcome the is-ought dichotomy, all one has to do is explicitly state that he/she accepts it. You imply that most objectivists accept “Hume’s Law.” I don’t think this is accurate. Can you substantiate the proposition that moral objectivists accept Hume’s law, and Mises’s insistence that there is no such thing as a scientific (universally valid) ought ? That doesn’t square with my experience.
Regarding #2, can you point us to an explicit and elaborated exposition of this theory of objectivism you refer to?
Explicit: Explicitly stating that all oughts are contingent on the subjective acceptance (acceptance by the subject) of a given end?
I don’t think that is their argument. I think their argument is that the end is inherent in your nature, and not based on your acceptance of it.
Elaborated Exposition: An essay, paper, book chapter. Not blog posts.
If you know of such arguments, can you please provide a few links or references ?
Here is probably the most cogent statement of the is-ought dichotomy in the libertarian literature:
If you read this article, you will see that O’Neil is asserting Hume’s Law as against the objectivist ethical theories of Rand, Rothbard, Rasmussen and Den Uyl. Most objective ethicists on this forum are followers or students of one or several of these scholars.
It is clear to me that all four would have strongly denied what O’Neil is asserting in this article.
You are implying that there are now objective ethicists that by and large accept O’Neil’s argument; that in this debate O’Neil was right and those arguing against his position were wrong.
Do you know of any articles, essays, or books, written by objective ethicists, where something to this effect is explicitly acknowledged ?
Please provide links or references if you can.
My point is that while I am sympathetic to the gist of your point, which is that traditional objective ethics can be modified by accepting Hume’s Law and trying to go the route of “intersubjective objectivity,” I’m still not aware of the explicit recognition by objective ethicists of the reasons for having to make this change, which is obviously not part of the original program of objective ethics.
In other words, the change in conceptions you are noticing, advocating, or recommending, is based on the implicit recognition of problems with the older paradigm, which problems center around the failed attempt to overcome Hume’s Law. Then why do these problems have to remain implicit?
Can you refer us to an explicit, clear, and concise analysis of these problems and the reason for having to make the change to a new concept of intersubjective objectivity?
No. Just because it’s objective doesn’t mean that our understanding of it is perfect. In the same way that physicists work to expand our knowledge of the universe, philosophers and ethicists can work to expand our knowledge of an objective ethical code.
In fact, this forms the basis for the (admittedly relatively few) objections I have against Rand’s specific conclusions.
No, I meant, objectivists in general are just like you describe. However the way I read some of the posts in this thread, it seemed some were trying to assert that it was possible to have universal moral standards while using descriptive declarations alone. That is, circumventing the is/ought. But maybe I misread!
I apologize, there is no formal elaboration on this, I just started spouting it at that moment. It makes no sense now since it’s no different than amoralism or moral nihilism. Maybe I was tripping. Now allow me to go back to my basement and lurk some more until the time perhaps I have something useful to share that is not bottled up and smelling like urine. Ouch that was harsh, bad bad me.
I wish you the best of luck on that, but so far, I remain nihilistically unconvinced [:)]
Yuberries:
Actually, Kinsella recently posted something similar to what you posted. He said that Ayn Rand’s oughts were conditional upon the acceptance of a given end. Basically what you wrote:
“objectivists” (oughts if you accept certain axioms or whatever)
I believe he wrote that, as you wrote your post, somewhat in the spirit of a reconciliation between objectivist and subjectivist value theories.
The way I read this is that it is Kinsella’s and perhaps your contention, that the two theories could be reconciled, if one accepts that oughts are conditional on the subject’s acceptance of a given end. “If you want X, then you ought to do Y.” (O’Neil covers this in detail)
The problem is, I believe, that this is still the issue in contention, whereas what you and Kinsella are/were seeming to say or imply, is that the conditional nature of oughts was to some extent granted by objectivists or some objectivists.
If the oughts are dependent on subjective ends (ends of individual subjects), then we’re headed towards means/ends analysis, subjective value, methodological individualism, etc. As regards ethics specifically, the rejection of this approach (a rejection of Misesian/Humean means/ends analysis) constitutes part of the foundation of objective ethics.
Maybe the group you and Kinsella have in mind consists in those who are philosophically and temperamentally comfortable with objective ethics, but who nonetheless perceive that human values, including moral and ethical values, are relative to the purpose(s) of the individual(s) concerned ?
Whether or not someone values cooperation with others is still a matter of individual (subjective) preference, even if we grant that the value of one’s own life is axiomatic (which itself seems at the very least non-obvious). It’s easy to imagine someone who doesn’t value cooperation - consider a dictator deciding how to deal with a rebel. The fact that the dictator values his/her own life doesn’t mean that the dictator “must” or “should” value the rebel’s life.
1: What do you mean by “ought”? And 2: given that definition, how can you separate “ought” from morality? It’s all well and good to have a complete and consistent criterion by which to evaluate actions (e.g., all actions that move matter away from the Earth are “foo”, and everything else is “nonfoo”), but there must be something more to this criterion (beyond completeness and consistency) if it is to be a “moral system”, rather than just a free-floating set of statements.