Hi,
What do you think of the neo-nihilist account on morality below?
Looks logical to me, and it’s in line with subjectivism of the Austrians I guess.
As far as I understand things Rothbard would argue for natural rights, so where would he put the logical error in this video/text?
Video
Transcript of video
http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/metaethics-neo-nihilism-37641.html
I don’t know what Rothbard would say, but here is my question:
He says, “If we want to be rational, then we must…” Why “ought” we be rational?
“Looks logical to me, and it’s in line with subjectivism of the Austrians I guess.”
No, it isn’t logically consistent. The subjective theory of value within economics is objective.
“As far as I understand things Rothbard would argue for natural rights, so where would he put the logical error in this video/text?”
Well for starters I’d imagine he’d point out that there is a difference between political philosophy & personal ethics / morality. Something a ton of people fail to fully recognise & understand.
“It is not the intention of this book [The Ethics of Liberty] to expound or defend at length the philosophy of natural law, or to elaborate a natural law ethic for the personal morality of man. The intention is to set forth a social ethic of liberty, i.e., to elaborate that subset of natural law that develops the concept of natural rights, and that deals with the proper sphere of ‘politics’, i.e. with violence and nonviolence as modes of interpersonal relations. In short, to set forth a political philosophy of liberty.” - MNR, ETOL p.25
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“Libertarianism, then, is a philosophy seeking a policy. But what else can a libertarian philosophy say about strategy, about “policy”? In the first place, surely-again in Acton’s words-it must say that liberty is the “highest political end,” the overriding goal of libertarian philosophy. Highest political end, of course, does not mean “highest end” for man in general. Indeed, every individual has a variety of personal ends and differing hierarchies of importance for these goals on his personal scale of values. Political philosophy is that subset of ethical philosophy which deals specifically with politics, that is, the proper role of violence in human life (and hence the explication of such concepts as crime and property). Indeed, a libertarian world would beone in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own ends-to “pursue happiness,” in the felicitous Jeffersonian phrase.” - TEOL, chp 30
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“Libertarianism is logically consistent with almost any attitude toward culture, society, religion, or moral principle. In strict logic, libertarian political doctrine can be severed from all other considerations; logically one can be - and indeed most libertarians in fact are: hedonists, libertines, immoralists, militant enemies of religion in general and Christianity in particular - and still be consistent adherents of libertarian politics. In fact, in strict logic, one can be a consistent devotee of property rights politically and be a moocher, a scamster, and a petty crook and racketeer in practice, as all too many libertarians turn out to be. Strictly logically, one can do these things, but psychologically, sociologically, and in practice, it simply doesn’t work that way.” - MNR
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"I came across an exchange between Mr. Halliday, Walter Block and an editors note by Murray. The Libertarian Forum pdf from 1973_06. I agree with Blocks rebuttal, and Murray’s note:
“How about Professor Block’s second premise, that evil is only the initiation of violence? Here I think it is possible to partially reconcile the Block and Halliday positions. It is a question of what context we are dealing with. I would agree with Block that within the context of libertarian theory, evil must be confined to the initiation of violence. On the other hand, when we proceed from libertarianism to the question of wider social and personal ethics, then I would agree with Halliday that there are many other actions which should be considered as evil: lying, for example or deliberately failing to fulfill one’s best potential. But these are not matters about which liberty - the problem of the proper scope of violence - has anything to say. In short, qua libertarian there is nothing wrong or evil about breaking dates, being gratuitously nasty to one’s associates, or generally behaving like a cad: here not only do I join Professor Block, but I would expect Mr. Halliday and all other libertarians to do the same. On the other hand, qua general ethicist, I would join Mr. Halliday in denouncing such behavior, while Professor Block would not.”
Recently; “Block: I’m shocked that I ever wrote it. I don’t think I meant it. I agree, fully, with Murray.”
As far as I know of his feelings towards nihilism / where he has mentioned it;
“The essential message of deconstructionism and hermeneutics can be variously summed up as nihilism, relativism, and solipsism. That is, either there is no objective truth or, if there is, we can never discover it. With each person being bound to his own subjective views, feelings, history, and so on, there is no method of discovering objective truth. In literature, the most elemental procedure of literary criticism (that is, trying to figure out what a given author meant to say) becomes impossible. Communication between writer and reader similarly becomes hopeless; furthermore, not only can no reader ever figure out what an author meant to say, but even the author does not know or understand what he himself meant to say, so fragmented, confused, and driven is each particular individual. So, since it is impossible to figure out what Shakespeare, Conrad, Plato, Aristotle, or Machiavelli meant, what becomes the point of either reading or writing literary or philosophical criticism?” - The Hermeneutical Invasion of Philosophy and Economics - MNR
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"The beginning stage of nihilism, Rothbard maintains, occurred in art. “First, the left-liberals preached l’art pour l’art in aesthetics, and, as a corollary in ethics, trumpeted the new view that there is no such thing as a revealed or objective ethics, that all ethics are ‘subjective,’ that all of life’s choices are only personal, emotive ‘preferences’” (p. 296).
The denial of objective standards in the name of freedom led to death and destruction. Rothbard maintains that ethical nihilism results in the overthrow of the most basic human rights, including the right not to be murdered. He has not the slightest sympathy for the rampant pro-euthanasia movement. “No, the mask is off, and Doctor Assisted Death and Mr. Liberal Death with Dignity, and all the rest of the crew turn out to be Doctor or Mister Murder. Watch out Mr. And Ms. America: liberal humanists, lay and medical, are . . . out to kill you” (p. 303)." - David Gordon reviewing The Irrepressible Rothbard.
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The following is Chapter 44 of The Irrepressible Rothbard.
“How can anyone, finding himself surrounded by a rising tide of evil, fail to do his utmost to fight against it? In our century, we have been inundated by a flood of evil, in the form of collectivism, socialism, egalitarianism, and nihilism. It has always been crystal clear to me that we have a compelling moral obligation, for the sake of ourselves, our loved ones, our posterity, our friends, our neighbors, and our country, to do battle against that evil.”
I’d recommend you check this out. Post already too long, here is the part of interest: "The combination of an objective personal ethics with a political system of freedom is, then, logically consistent." …
The authors’ version of ethics excludes this suggestion. They embrace “individualistic perfectionism.” There is no fixed pattern to which every individual, in his pursuit of eudaimonia, must conform. Rather, "the generic goods and virtues that constitute human flourishing only become actual, determinate, and valuable realities when they are given particular form by the choices of flesh-and-blood persons. The importance or value of these goods and virtues is rooted in factors that are unique to each person, for it is not the universal as such that is valuable. . . Human flourishing is not simply achieved and enjoyed by individuals, but it is individualized."(pp.132-33)
Lewis S., you don’t have to be rational but most of us prefer to be rational
I guess I fall in line here. A good book I’d recommend is Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong by J.L. Mackie. Basically it seems to me that the idea of morality is that your feelings and intuitions about what you feel you think you want to do somehow have to be justified. I take the approach that it just “is”. Humans evolved to value fairness, kindness, justice, etc. in relation to brutality, extortion, etc. You can pose an argument that says, “if you want to be consistent with your own personal values, then non-aggression is the way to go…” or “you might approve of non-aggression when you stop to think about it…” without appealing to any sort of ethical normativity.
Basically what I think is that it suffers from the same problem religion poses: square pegs in round holes. It is an attempt to stuff every worldview, every thought, every emotion, and every person into a box and slap a “'right” or “wrong” answer on it. If you want to argue how to best achieve human fulfillment, that is one thing. To say one ought to value human fulfillment is another and really is just an opinion (that 99.99% of us happen to share, but that doesn’t change it from subjective to objective).
And on the other point, I guess I don’t differ Nietzsche and folks such as that because I do believe in our ability to apprehend objective reality in some form. As I see it, we all experience this reality from different perspectives. So some statements about reality I believe are more reliable and accurate than others and I don’t disown epistemology. Yes, the subjective theory of value is objective. A moralizing Austrian would have to say that STOV is a description about values but there is some vague, transcendental moral realm that is floating in the ether that computates all action and spits out a binary right or wrong answer. Not really buying that.
Let the rational concern itself with the rational.
"Action is, by definition, always rational. One is unwarranted in calling goals of action irrational simply because they are not worth striving for from the point of view of one’s own valuations. "
~ Epistemological Problems of Economics, p. 35, Mises
“A moralizing Austrian”
No such thing. Austrian economics is value free.
“Not really buying that.”
That’s good, because that isn’t what is being sold.
@Eric080: You can put the need for justification of one’s actions on less squishy ground by incorporating the potential for one’s actions to involve oneself in conflict with other humans. In general, this is what we mean by moral consideration as opposed to, say, simple planning. If morality is just calculating the consequences of one’s actions, then there is no difference between cutting down a tree and shooting someone… the prudent person will simply calculate the consequences of his or her actions either way. But non-sociopaths naturally find this kind of idea revolting - might does not make right and murdering someone is wrong even if you can get away with it.
The difference is that, while cutting down a tree might be risky, the tree’s relatives will not try to take revenge on you for cutting it down. If you cut it down without incident, then you are home free. The tree is just an inanimate object with no social context or ability to calculate and act. But if you murder my brother, I might just hunt you down and kill you. There is published literature that goes over how we can expect that morality-like social norms would emerge from this (evolutionary ethics). Humans think about right and wrong for a reason.
But this is all purely descriptive at this point. It won’t help you sort through a moral problem like “should I get an abortion?” To get to the normative side of things involves opening a whole other can of worms.
Clayton -
Yes there is such a thing as a moralizing Austrian, one who adheres to Austrian economic theory and moralizes at the same time! The moralizing bit doesn’t have anything to do with Austrian econ per se.
Okay but Clayton, if I did murder your brother I would feel bad. That is my internal reaction. So this feeling (evolved due to natural selection) factors into the cost/benefit analysis. It sounds cold and logical because it is, but I think this is toned down by saying something to the effect of “I respect human life, therefore I do not kill.”
@Eric080: Right, but we mean something stronger than “you’ll feel bad if you murder someone” when we say “murder is (morally) wrong” because there is no contradiction in saying that it is wrong to murder even when a sociopath (who feels no more guilt than if he were felling a tree) does it. So, we are passing a judgment on someone’s actions regardless of their own assessment of their actions. I am working on this subject in my spare time and I think there is some confusion in moral philosophy because, on first instinct, we try to evaluate normative assessments on the basis of the assessment of the acting individual himself or herself. In reality, moral judgments are aesthetic evaluations (or expressions of valuation, however you want to look at it) made by others regarding the actions of an individual. When I say, “murder is wrong” I mean that when someone else murders, I find that action disgusting, revolting, angering, upsetting, etc. The thought of one person murdering another brings me dissatisfaction, whereas the thought of people not murdering each other brings me satisfaction. The murderer’s own feelings about his actions are irrelevant.
Looked at in this way, moral norms can be thought of in the same kind of category as market prices: an objective criterion that emerges from the uncoordinated, independent, subjective valuations of many individuals. Just like you can’t buy a brand new Ferrari for $1 even though your subjective valuation of a Ferrari may be no higher than $1 (you are bid out of the market so that your valuation is irrelevant) so you cannot change the definition of murder by simply becoming a sociopath and refusing to agree that killing an innocent human being is wrong. Your valuations are so far removed from the “going price” - that is, ordinary social norms - that they are irrelevant.
This is my own theory and I’m still hammering it out.
Clayton -
"Action is, by definition, always rational. One is unwarranted in calling goals of action irrational simply because they are not worth striving for from the point of view of one’s own valuations. "
That’s fine; I agree 101%. All actions to the individual are always rational all the time. But there is no need to concern oneself with being “rational for rational’s sake”, in fact it is impossible to do so, it’s a ghost.
I’d disagree with that statement. To me there are actions (of humans) that are rational and other that are not. The distinction isn’t however always clear.
If someone is walking in his sleep, is that considered rational or merely a vegetative response? Asked differently would sleepwalking be considered an action at all?
I believe Mises defines action as purposeful behavior. Purposeful behavior implies planning and reasoning capacity, therefore the only irrational behavior is reflexive or instinctive, like breathing or sneezing. That is, if I understand correctly.
EDIT: as far as sleepwalking goes, one cannot purposefully sleepwalk, so it seems it would not be considered “action” in the Misesean sense? Someone help me with this please…?
BTW: When I posted my question, I interpreted the speaker’s use of the term through this lense, though he seems to be using the term (rational) to mean “consistent.”
Exceptional video, and one which I feel I agree with almost wholeheartedly (this may be a good description of my position). It fairly thoroughly debunks the lie of objective morality, something which so many libertarians are unfortunately whole heatedly attached to. Rothbard’s otherwise exceptional and monumentous career was marked again and again with his attempts to prescribe an objective, atheistic, and non-utilitarian ethic by which he could denounce all those who disagreed with him as evil, yet he never truly confronted the fundamental problems with morality. Truly his ethics were far more logical and non contradictory, but such is irrelevant to the fact that this undertaking was, in the end, a failure.
My understanding of the video is: “There are no objective values, so operate according to your subjective values.” To me this seems so obvious as to be hardly worth stating. Is there any affirmative tenet advanced by “neo-nihilism,” or is it simply a rejection of other ideas?
So they objectively value subjective ethics?
You should consider the fact that different people’s moral norms are unlikely to be “uncoordinated” and “independent” of each other; in fact, moral norms are inherently a multi-person affair. To take a simple example: driving on the right (or left) side of the road. It’s not that every person, taken individually, overwhelmingly prefers to drive on the right, but they each make their decision based on others’ prior and expected future decisions, resulting in a “norm” that you should drive on the right (and that anyone who doesn’t is reckless and dangerous).
They’re not literally commanding anyone to do anything; they say “if we want to be rational…”. When I say “so operate according to your subjective values,” this isn’t literally a command either. In fact, since it’s impossible to operate under anything other than your subjective values, this “command” is entirely devoid of content, and so the substance of the video’s message is just “There are no objective values, so.” Which is why I’m having trouble figuring out what “neo-nihilism” actually advances.