No, I understand that. My point was that the end result will mean his extermination (or getting voted out of office, or whatever). I’m not looking at individual motives, but rather the system as a whole, which consists of many individuals, all trying to better their position. The king who debases his currency is infringing on the property of his citizens, and diminishing their wealth arbitrarily. This act is immoral, and there will be consequences. Lilburne is saying that we can’t really call the king immoral, and I reject this position.
I don’t think you actually fully understand the Rothbardian position.
Got a better analogy? Anyway..
“Even in the finest works of economics, including Human Action, the concept of property had attracted little attention before Rothbard burst onto the intellectual scene with Man, Economy, and State. Yet, as Rothbard pointed out, such common economic terms as direct and indirect exchange, markets and market prices, as well as aggression, invasion, crime, and fraud, cannot be defined or understood without a prior theory of property. Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without an implied notion of property and property rights. A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems.[4]” - Hoppe
And what is your definition and theory of property?
The difference is the second pillar (first being economics) of the Rothbardian system deals with political philosophy, eg. Ethics of Liberty.
“For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression.”
I believe, you were charging that he was trying to do what Plato and others had tried? You don’t see the difference here?
Have you ever made a policy suggestion?
But resolving conflicts over scarcity isn’t about property or ethics…[:P]
Is there any value in abandoning methodological individualism? Is it possible to utilize praxeology collectively?
Again, Praxeology says that all action is rational to the actor. Whether we can show apodictically that his means did not reach his ends, doesn’t mean any praxeological laws have been broken.
Is and ought.
I’m not sure that is what he is saying, but I agree with him on quite a bit, and I can tell you I believe it is immoral. But that cannot be objectively proven, it is my subjective value judgment.
"In our view the major task of “political science” or better, “political philosophy” is to construct the edifice of natural law pertinent to the political scene. That this task has been almost completely neglected in this century by political scientists is all too clear. Political science has either pursued a positivistic and scientistic “model building,” in vain imitation of the methodology and content of the physical sciences, or it has engaged in purely empirical fact-grubbing. The contemporary political scientist believes that he can avoid the necessity of moral judgments, and that he can help frame public policy without committing himself to any ethical position. And yet as soon as anyone makes any policy suggestion, however narrow or limited, an ethical judgment—sound or unsound—has willy-nilly been made.[1] The difference between the political scientist and the political philosopher is that the “scientist’s” moral judgments are covert and implicit, and therefore not subject to detailed scrutiny, and hence more likely to be unsound. Moreover, the avoidance of explicit ethical judgments leads political scientists to one overriding implicit value judgment-that in favor of the political status quo as it happens to prevail in any given society. At the very least, his lack of a systematic political ethics precludes the political scientist from persuading anyone of the value of any change from the status quo.
In the meanwhile, furthermore, present-day political philosophers generally confine themselves, also in a Wertfrei manner, to antiquarian descriptions and exegeses of the views of other, long gone political philosophers. In so doing, they are evading the major task of political philosophy, in the words of Thomas Thorson, “the philosophic justification of value positions relevant to politic.”[2]
[2]Hence, as Thorson points out, political philosophy is a subdivision of the philosophy of ethics, in contrast to “political theory” as well as positivistic analytic philosophy. See Thomas Landon Thorson, “Political Values and Analytic Philosophy” Journal of Politics (November 1961): 712n. Perhaps Professor Holton is right that “the decline in political philosophy is one part of a general decline,” not only in philosophy itself, but also “in the status of rationality and ideas as such.” Holton goes on to add that the two major challenges to genuine political philosophy in recent decades have come from historicism—the view that all ideas and truths are relative to particular historical conditions—and scientism, the imitation of the physical sciences. James Holton, “Is Political Philosophy Dead?” Western Political Quarterly (September1961): 75ff.
I dunno, this kind of sounds familiar? No? [:p]
Methodological individualism starts with the individual and abstracts (this is what historicism rejects). I haven’t abandoned it at all.
I’m saying that individuals who seek to better their own situations will destroy systems which prevent them from doing so and which violate their property rights. Is this so controversial?
Just is.
It is objectively proven when the citizens hang him upside down and stab him repeatedly.
Conza, great post. Mises saves the day.
indeed
very good post Esuric
I don’t want to give ammunition to the Juan’s of this forum, but to the extent that a ‘moral statement’ is an expression of facts of preference, is ceases to be a moral statement.
Do you believe that the preferences that people ascribe to morality, such as empathy, generosity and filial devotion are distinct from ‘mere’ aesthetic preferences? Do you think that the ‘moral’ urge that wells within your stomach at the sight of the poor and downtrodden varies from the reaction you would get from dropping a vase or breaking your laptop in kind as well as degree?
Obviously the term itself is functional in the same way that the term ‘hand’ is functional while still being entirely collapsible into fundamental quantum elements (which is not very practical in everyday matters which occur at a high level of abstraction).
If this is indeed the case, then you are indeed a moral nihilist (which I take to mean rejecting moral realism). Not that it’s anything to be ashamed of 
AJ and Liberty Student, this question is for you as well.
And 2+2 = 4 and A = A. Great, empty tautologies.
I think it’s important to distinguish between order and purpose. Telos is greek for both “purpose” and “end”. Often, when one finds order, it is evidence of telos on the same level: a watch is evidence for a watchmaker and a watch-user. But that can mislead one to think that such is always the case; although it’s not. In both evolutionary phenomena via natural selection and market phenomena via consumer selection, we have order, but no purpose on the same level. The order of a market is emergent; it results from a profusion of tiny purposes, not one over-arching purpose. There is a natural order in human society, but there is no natural over-arching purpose/end. Many minds find that incongruous, and so try to fill that gap with an imagined over-arching telos. That is what I think lies behind religion, deism, and natural rights philosophy: all of which try to construct a universal telos where it doesn’t exist.
I also discuss this tendency in my post on Pythagoras.
Sure you have. You’re making collective value statements that don’t reflect the values of all of the individual actors in the collective.
No, it isn’t controversial, but it is not axiomatic. You’re assuming that people will pay any cost to stop a rights violation, and we can clearly see in a democracy, people will gladly pay some cost rather than deal with the costs of enforcing their own rights. Basically, you’re asserting.
Remember, praxeology tells us WHY people act, not HOW people act. It’s a very significant difference.
Well that’s what I meant. You’re saying that ought is is. When that can’t be proven. That’s the entire basis of the discussion, and you post “just is” to assert discussion over. It would be like me posting, “Just Subjective”.
You wouldn’t accept my asserting, so why would you do it?
You’ve conflated inductive reasoning with deductive reasoning. You claim that praxeological laws have been broken, and yet you won’t indicate how. When asked, you make an appeal to empiricism. Which is it?
Conza quoted Mises?
Already have. And you should note that argumentation ethics doesn’t even mention a deity. So please stop being butthurt because you violate Okham’s Razor.
‘It is objectively proven when the citizens hang him upside down and stab him repeatedly.’
That only proves that those particular citizens believe that his actions were wrong. (or that they thought such action could further their other, unrelated goals. Maybe they are running for office?)
No it doesn’t. .
No they don’t.
Next time: try learning about that which you’re discussing.
I don’t think you understand the term methodological individualism. It doesn’t mean that we only talk about a single individual at a time. I’m merely abstracting. Do you believe abstraction is somehow incompatible with methodological individualism?
No, just because it hasn’t happened yet doesn’t mean anything. As soon as the welfare states collapse economically and the illusory wealth vanishes, individuals will overthrow the system. It’s not an assertion at all, it is a statement backed by praxeology and torrential historical evidence. Now what they replace this system with is up to them–one can only speculate.
Incorrect.
He’s separating subjective judgments from real world consequences, which manifest through individual action, guided by praxeological laws.
I believe the first part was Mises, am I wrong?
Your razor is too sharp I’m afraid.
I read it a dozen times, and maybe I am a moron, but I didn’t understand it. I think your questions weren’t clear enough for me. Urge, wells, mere, etc.
Thanks zefreak. Maybe you should try to convert all the moral relativists into moral nihilists. That would make them a bit more ‘honest’ or consistent if you prefer.
Please formulate a system of ethics that doesn’t arbitrarily attribute value to objects, ends or means and doesn’t rely on the shared disgust of performative contradiction.
(I am really giving too much away, as Argumentation Ethics and other epistemic arguments such as Anthony de Jasay’s aren’t valid and suffer from fallacies of equivocation)
Abstracting to what? You are taking a single actor and abstracting him to a group of theoretical actors (note you’re the guy who appeals to “the real world”) who all express the same value preferences as the single actor. Anyone can do that. It is meaningless.
No really, you have. See…
You’re claiming that human action can be predicted by praxeology. That is untrue. Praxeology informs us why people act, not how.
What praxeological laws? Can you name them please?
That’s debatable. [;)]