The Ancient Chimera of Universal, Absolute, and Objective Value

[wilderness]

Lilburne,

Remove my quote from the OP.

[Lilburne]

@zefreak

If this is the case (and I think you would agree) then it seems an arbitrary distinction. Useful in common discourse, but there is nothing ‘special’ about moral sentiment vs ‘other’ sentiment.

I guess it depends on your definition of “special”. [:)]

[wilderness]

Lilburne,

Remove my quote from the OP. You are not being civil and are being gamey.

[zefreak]

Just that moral and aesthetic sentiment can be sufficiently reduced to similar phenomenon

[Juan]

Just that moral and aesthetic sentiment can be sufficiently reduced to similar phenomenon

Again zefreak, wouldn’t you be so kind as to teaching the ‘moral’ subjectivists that their morality is not really morality ?

I beg you, explain to them that moral nihilism is the right path.

[Lilburne]

@zefreak

Just that moral and aesthetic sentiment can be sufficiently reduced to similar phenomenon

Sure, I think all urges, moral or otherwise, are similar in that they are feelings and not ratiocinations. But moral feelings are quite remarkable and distinctive in that they, unlike all other urges, impel men to act in ways detrimental to their own material well being, whether it be for the sake of a drowning child, for the sake of man they COULD rob with impunity, for the sake of a god, or for the sake of an internalized doctrine. In that regard, I think human society would have impossible without them.

[wilderness]

Lilburne,

Remove my quote from the OP.

This is actually becoming more and more fun!

[Esuric]

@wilderness

Lilburne,

Remove my quote from the OP.

This is actually becoming more and more fun!

What’s the big deal? I don’t get it.

[wilderness]

@Esuric

@wilderness

Lilburne,

Remove my quote from the OP.

This is actually becoming more and more fun!

What’s the big deal? I don’t get it.

I wonder the same thing. What is the big deal? Just go in and erase it. I don’t think he’s representing me honestly. He’s addressing my quote with strawmans and I will not be subject to his argument. I asked him to remove it because it was part of a whole other thread and now it has been taken out of context. I had already addressed what belong with that quote in numerous other posts and will not repeat myself. He’s now changing the whole discussion and addressing me that is not being honest. So I ask. What’s the big deal? What fetish does Lilburne have with not being able to simply edit out my quote that does NOT belong in the context of his OP - at all - as my quote was part of a whole other discussion that has nothing to do with his OP.

[Lilburne]

@Rothbard via Conza

And yet as soon as anyone makes any policy suggestion, however narrow or limited, an ethical judgment—sound or unsound—has willy-nilly been made.

@Mises via Lilburne

An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g. an effect which even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If this economist states the outcome of his investigation by saying that a is a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate. In this sense the free-trade economists attacked protection. They demonstrated that protection does not, as its champions believe, increase but, on the contrary, decreases the total amount of products, and is therefore bad from the point of view of those who prefer an ampler supply of products to a smaller. It is in this sense that economists criticize policies from the point of view of the ends aimed at. If an economist calls minimum wage rates a bad policy, what he means is that its effects are contrary to the purpose of those who recommend their application. (Human Action, Chapter 39)

[zefreak]

@J. Grayson Lilburne

@zefreak

Just that moral and aesthetic sentiment can be sufficiently reduced to similar phenomenon

Sure, I think all urges, moral or otherwise, are similar in that they are feelings and not ratiocinations. But moral feelings are quite remarkable and distinctive in that they, unlike all other urges, impel men to act in ways detrimental to their own material well being, whether it be for the sake of a drowning child, for the sake of man they COULD rob with impunity, for the sake of a god, or for the sake of an internalized doctrine. In that regard, I think human society would have impossible without them.

Ok, just checking to see if there was any real disagreement between moral anti-realism and your own position. It seems there isn’t, and yet you have in the past rejected such a label. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding.

Either way, your definition of morality is very different from conventional usage, even in academia. I took two undergraduate courses in Ethical Philosophy and it was torture

[EternalSanction]

To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?

[zefreak]

@Justin Spahr-Summers

To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?

It facilitates trade and cooperation? Realize that cultural evolution as expounded by David Hume predates the theory of biological evolution. Law and morality as emergent phenomena is not a new idea.

It would be more accurate to say why has man adopted common law and values. Also, part of the reason is physiological. There is strong evidence suggesting that there is a neurological basis for empathy, and initial ‘moral’ sentiment could have arisen from that.

[EternalSanction]

@zefreak

@Justin Spahr-Summers

To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?

It facilitates trade and cooperation?

But how can we assert that trade and cooperation are “good” or—to be more precise—desirable ends without some objective standard by which to determine that?

[Lilburne]

@zefreak

Ok, just checking to see if there was any real disagreement between moral anti-realism and your own position. It seems there isn’t, and yet you have in the past rejected such a label. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding.

The labels I was rejected were “amoralist” and “moral nihilist”, because, to me, those terms seem to indicate people, not entirely unlike Bloom, who profess to reject personal conscience-based morality, who profess to look only to further their own material well-being, and who say that it is only external threats of retaliation that keep them from rape, plunder and pillage. That in no way describes me. I consider my conscience to be a hugely important guide to my action and my judgment of the actions of others. So, I bridle at the labels “amoralist” and “moral nihilist” as completely misleading.

[zefreak]

@Justin Spahr-Summers

@zefreak

@Justin Spahr-Summers

To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?

It facilitates trade and cooperation?

But how can we assert that trade and cooperation are “good” or—to be more precise—desirable ends without some objective standard by which to determine that?

We don’t? But to be fair, I edited my post. You might want to zip back on up and read it.

[Juan]

But rejecting moral realism, which is what zefreak does, is, according to him, the same thing you do. You and he basically share the same position.

To reject moral realism is to be an amoralist/moral nihilist. It seems you think that those words are ‘bad’ for your public relations/public image but that’s irrelevant.

[Juan]

people, not entirely unlike Bloom, who profess to reject personal conscience-based morality,

Bloom is a perfect example of ‘misesian’ utilitarianism. For Bloom, the ‘good’ is whatever advances Bloom’s plans.

Bloom does indeed have his own personal morality. Too bad if you don’t like it.

[zefreak]

@J. Grayson Lilburne

@zefreak

Ok, just checking to see if there was any real disagreement between moral anti-realism and your own position. It seems there isn’t, and yet you have in the past rejected such a label. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding.

The labels I was rejected were “amoralist” and “moral nihilist”, because, to me, those terms seem to indicate people, not entirely unlike Bloom, who profess to reject personal conscience-based morality, who profess to look only to further their own material well-being, and who say that it is only external threats of retaliation that keep them from rape, plunder and pillage. That in no way describes me. I consider my conscience to be a hugely important guide to my action and my judgment of the actions of others. So, I bridle at the labels “amoralist” and “moral nihilist” as completely misleading.

That seems like the common equivocation of egoist with egotistical. As we know, psychological egoism is not incompatible with non-material values and goals. It is a very naive egoism indeed that produces an egotist.

Likewise, moral nihilism is a meta-ethical position that has no relevance to the actual values the person holds. There are the occasional Jacob Blooms that take a position based on a very superficial understanding of their philosophy, or who ‘overcompensate’ by rejecting the concept of value altogether (an altogether untenable position).

Jacob Bloom’s material pragmatism is not inconsistent with moral nihilism, but is not necessitated by it, just as psychological egoism allows but does not necessitate egotism.

[Lilburne]

@zefreak

That seems like the common equivocation of egoist with egotistical. As we know, psychological egoism is not incompatible with non-material values and goals. It is a very naive egoism indeed that produces an egotist.

Likewise, moral nihilism is a meta-ethical position that has no relevance to the actual values the person holds. There are the occasional Jacob Blooms that take a position based on a very superficial understanding of their philosophy, or who ‘overcompensate’ by rejecting the concept of value altogether (an altogether untenable position).

Jacob Bloom’s material pragmatism is not inconsistent with moral nihilism, but is not necessitated by it, just as psychological egoism allows but does not necessitate egotism.

Ah, I see. Still, the average reader doesn’t distinguish between meta-ethical and ethical positions, and I don’t want them to think something about me that isn’t true.