Why not, indeed? Excellent thought. Miklos’s post highlights an essential starting point, one clearly aimed at achieving a true understanding of the problem under discussion. As he has demonstrated, we have to address, at the very beginning of our investigations, what the concept of a truly free society logically entails, before we can even begin to ask the question of what prevents free markets from emerging in society. Therefore, any effort to discover which core ideas or values (what Miklos has termed “cultural prerequisites”) would have to be present among members of a theoretically free society, would be a worthwhile effort, from my perspective.
I find Miklos’s description of the three fundamental goods types, “Solitary,” “Positive social,” and “Negative social” goods, to be helpful starting points for describing in purely formal-theoretical terms what kind of social reality is logically necessary for preventing free markets from emerging: the prevalence of those in society who are seeking “negative social goods.”
Amazing… Simply amazing.
In contrast to the above approach, some have put forth the idea that legal protection of private property is the conceptual basis of free markets. However, it may be helpful to consider that, regardless of what particular form a given society’s legal institutions or property relations may take, it remains the case that in every society, people must understand social others to be present. Those who wish to act socially will, of necessity, need to regard social others in one way or another. And how exactly they regard social others will be their basis for every social institution they aim at constructing. This means that how they regard social others is a question even more fundamental than the question of how, in particular, a given society’s institutions (even those of legal property relations) are arranged among its members. The question of precisely how legal property relations are, or should be, arranged among members of society, will always be determined by how those members of society regard one another. I believe Miklos is approaching this fundamental insight by illustrating what can be expected from any society comprised of members who predominantly value what he has termed “Negative social goods.” His conclusion seems to be that such members will not benefit from the advent of a free society to the extent that they truly hold “negative social goods” as a value, and that claims to the contrary, even by well-meaning property rights protection advocates, would be overlooking something important.
Naturally, such well-meaning property rights protection advocates are quite aware of the theoretical existence of those who hold “negative social goods” as a value, but tend to have a hard time taking due account of such individuals in the property rights theories they advance. For such advocates, the typical response to the theoretical existence of “negative social goods” seekers is to either claim that such individuals would be better served by an institution of legally protected private property (which is in no way established, given the known values of “negative social goods” seekers) or to impatiently brand these uncooperative individuals “criminals” and rush to advocate forcing them to conform to yet another set of positive legal/social institutions, only this time, erected under the supposed banner of “market liberty.” And then the familiar cycle of institutional stagnation begins anew.
It must be understood that there is no way to advance (nor utilize) any social theory without regarding social others in some way. And precisely how social others must be regarded when we understand them to be “criminals,” is as some kind of problem which social theorists will be trying to solve. From this perspective, the actions of social others can come to be understood as what prevents a free society from emerging. According to this view, then, to the extent that we want a free society, to this same extent must we embrace the belief in a need to restrict the actions of social others.
Any time the actions of social others are understood to be the problem with society, the obvious solution will be to restrict the actions of social others, for the good of society. But even if we believe we have good reasons for doing so, the fact remains that we can only proceed with an effort to restrict the actions of social others by embracing at least one “negative social good” as a value. In the process of doing this, we must, of necessity, contribute to whatever social outcome is logically inescapable for any society whose members pursue “negative social goods” as a value.
Accordingly, well-meaning property rights protection advocates have, whether knowingly or not, come to embrace an underlying principle of restriction based on how they have chosen to regard social others. By seeking to establish precisely when the restriction of others in society is warranted, property rights protection advocates have taken it as given that such restriction has an indispensable role to play in a free society. At that point, it can only be a matter of degree that separates competing political theories, since they will all agree on the need for resorting to such restriction, in principle.
In any event, the goal here is to illustrate that the question “What social consequences are logically necessitated by members of society seeking ‘negative social goods’ as a value?” is one which is extremely relevant to libertarian social theory. The question is especially relevant to those theorists who promote various property rights theories, and it should be not be avoided in the hopes of making any preferred property rights theory more appealing to its potential detractors.
Richard D.