See here. Interesting debate between Molyneux and an Objectivist.
The part at 55:00 is interesting. Molyneux seems to say his theory is pretty good at convincing people except for people who “reject reason”…
Isn’t that question-begging ?..Why do people reject reason ?
And if you aren’t convinced by his theory is it necessarily because you reject reason or could it be that maybe his theory is flawed? [;)]
His theory seems to be a weak form of argumentation ethics, or at least it is similar. It is basically no more than the golden rule. Argumentation ethics at least gives reasons why one cannot coherently object to it (whether right or wrong), whereas I have not seen anything similar in UPB, but then again I haven’t read Molyneux’s book yet.
I would suggest you read the book then since you are mistaken regarding Molyneux and providing exceptions. Part of his proof for UPB is that debating requires both participants to hold truth to be a preferable outcome. Ergo, those who do not seek truth are the “exceptions”.
Have you read any Hoppe and his Argumentation Ethics? I’m curious on your take on the similarities and differences. Do you think Stefan succeeds where Hans fails?
How does one recognize truth outside of tautology? Action does not wait for truth, just belief. Molyneux has written some very good items, but his direction now seems weak. I could be wrong, but I’ll not soon be paying a shekel for such advice.
Truth can be found from statements which are empirically accurate and logically valid. Reality exists independent of people which is how why it makes sense to hold reality to be objective and consistent.
That is indeed a type of truth, but still suffers from the difficulties of the positivist position. The key there is that today’s empiric truth does not guarantee its truth for tomorrow. And as well, I don’t think M’s argumentation rests alone on empiric truth. Hard to do when discussing organisation of human society including aspects of sociology and psychology. M also, IIRC, argues from the Austrian Econ perspective which rests on apodictic and logical truth, where empiricism holds little sway in validating the theoretical position, and includes the assumption of free will in its methodology. The empiricist position there would seem to include behaviorist truths as underpinning human behavior rather than praxeology’s apodictics. But it seems the jury is still out on all that and we need to wait for that area of though to become clearer.
The empirical aspect of truth need not be anything complicated or false as many of the positivist make it seem. It can be as simple as “polluting results in damage of someone else’s property”. All the empiricism is needed for is to make sure the logic applies to reality. Saying that “If A, then B” is internally logical yet it is still useless until it can be proven to applly to the wreal world by empiricism (the simple kind is fine).
I don’t know about Stefan, but i think the real question is this: how does one ask a question or ponder the validity of the answer to one without logically committing to the value of truth? One cannot. And so, all who reason, also have a commitment to truth - at least while they reason.
Afruff, that would be something that is a synthetic a priori truth, no? I think Long clarifies the meaning of this term as used by Austrians in his paper on Wittgenstein.
Thanks for your interest in UPB.
An early draft of the UPB argument is available here, if anyone is interested…
You can also find more ethical arguments in the new tool I wrote called the Philoso-Physician…[:D]
The book is also free to anyone who wants it, just send me an email through my web form.