There is no third aim. There are two aims, one of which is valued more. One could say it is valued more because it furthers the well-being (eudaimonia) of the agent more. But “regarded as furthering one’s well being” and “valued” are synonyms. So the magical third aim of “eudaimonia” is nothing but a redundancy. The statement, “I value A over B, because A furthers my well-being more” says the same thing as the statement “I value A over B, because I value A over B”.
Yes we have one “overarching end” in that we all want what we want. But sound ethical theory is not to be built on such an unenlightening pleonasm.
It’s unclear to me how eudaimonia (or flourishing) is different from happiness (satisfaction, removing uneasiness, etc…), which is the ultimate end in Mises’s analytic method.
I stated that there is a third party to which rationalizes whether ice cream or fame is better for the individual.
Ice cream is valuable
Fame is valuable
There must be a way to decide which is more valuable
Well now you are contradicting yourself. First you say there is only A or B, now you say there is an overall end which we all have which would imply that there is more then simply A or B.
As I told wilderness, “I was being facetious when I called wanting what we want an overarching end. Yes, A does = A. But, redundancy does not = profundity.”
Eudaimonia is supposed to refer to an objectively desirable life (featuring a guardian spirit!) while happiness is a subjective assessment of one’s life. The terms are used almost interchangably by some though.
Actually virtue ethics, as it has been foreward by people like Plauche, contains both a “particular” and “general” element in which a certain sense of pluralism is synthesized with a certain sense of universalism, which leaves room for people to pursue mutually held goals in different ways. It does not imply that there is a rigidly singular way to live life - the notion that there are multiple ways in which people can “flourish” is fully granted by the eudaimonists.
I didn’t mean to imply that there is a rigidily singular way to live in order for one to be eudaimon, just that Eudaimonia is broader notion than happiness, and it acribes features that are more objective. Basically the “general” elements.
I wish anyone trying to synthesize pluralism and universalism the very best of luck.
I noticed Laughing Man bailed after a very simple question and that somebody gave this thread a one-star rating right before he logged off.
I hope eudaimonists can be more forthright about taking a hard look at their apparently unenlightening “man values what he values” tautology than the objective-natural-rights folk were about their is-ought hybrid syllogisms.
Here’s the part I don’t understand about Eudaimonia or virtue ethics.
For the sake of discussion, let’s say there are 6 or 7 primary virtues, and one them is “giving the other person his due.”
Then I happen to have a dealing with a virtue ethicist who didn’t give me my due. I approach him about it, and he is quite honest, and admits that he didn’t give me my due as virtue ethics requires. So I say to him: “You are a virtue ethicist, why didn’t you give me my due?”
To this he replies: “I chose to diminish my virtue (or Eudaimonia, or flourishing) in this case.”
My understanding is that the reason some give for pursuing this type of ethics, is because utilitarianism or instrumentalism can allow or “license” immoral outcomes. To me this means, that if we were to construct a theoretical system that showed “instrumentally” which ethical acts lead to a person’s happiness, and which lead to his unhappiness, this would still be unacceptable, because then the person could make a calculated choice to still engage in immoral conduct, as long as he was willing to suffer the unhappiness that the theory demonstrated would occur.
But as my example shows, at least to the extent I understand eudaimonia or virtue ethics, a person is still going to be able to act against what is best for his flourishing, based on his subjective choice. He will still be able to choose, “instrumentally,” to diminish his flourishing, in order to avoid giving a person his due, if and when he subjectively chooses to do so.
A while back, I was corresponding with a defender of eudaimonia ethics, and he seemed to indicate that if a eudaimonia ethicist did as my example illustrates, then “he would not really be a eudaimonia ethicist” (here I’m paraphrasing). In other words, it was the opinion of this person that, a priori, a person acting against the eudaimonia virtues, would automatically become a member of another philosophical school (utilitarian, I suppose). And that was his proposed solution to the problem. A person acting contrary to the primary or objective virtues, a priori is a member of an inferior ethical school of thought. This struck me as perhaps wonderfully convenient for his theory, but problematic if every ethical school decided to do the same thing. (define all immoral acts of their adherents, as acts that by definition could only be committed by members of the adversarial school of thought)
My main point is that I don’t understand how virtue or eudaimonia or flourishing ethics, constrains the behavior of the individual more than an ethics theory that would demonstrate “instrumentally” how certain acts lead to the happiness or unhappiness of an individual.
Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won’t the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so?
Won’t this be a “license” to engage in immoral conduct, as long as one is willing to suffer a diminishment in his own eudaimonia?
Then he isn’t eudaimon in this particular case. Choosing to lessen one’s flourishing is a perversion of practical reason.
I think what he was trying to say is that he was confused as to the implications of what he was saying (either this, or the person in question is just plain wrong).
They could indeed choose to do so, but they would not be flourishing. They would be hypocritical, supposedly holding that one course of action is right while pursuing another.