I would like to clarify “property”. When I say property what I’m referring to is: the quality or characteristic of an object. In that fine hair suggestion, properties, like heat is the property of fire, or the greenness of a leaf, are unavoidably aspects of the object. For instance, liberty is a property of human nature. Life is a property of human nature. Thus property is a metaphysical concept. To avoid property being some Platonic thing where redness exists all by itself without say a red wagon, property may or may not be modal logic (I’m personally not sure), but it is contingent. It is true and it is not true. It depends on the object in which it is a characteristic of. And each person has property and necessitates property so in this case I think there is an argument that it is a mode of being.
This is exactly how a human being (is) property. Not that this solely suggests the human “owns” him or her self nor does it suggest that another person (or another thing) owns people outside of themselves. Owning is clarified with will and negative liberty (free-will of the primary agent) and positive liberty (a secondary agent; a master), but these being properties of a human, property in this sense does refer to a sense of ownership. The heat of a fire is of the fire. It is not of the snow. Thus heat being a property of fire refers to origination which is what owning is. So for this ontology to make sense all three: life, liberty, and property are pertinent (and since I introduced two liberties at this point, the liberty I’m referring to ontologically in my original premise is negative liberty).
The extension of property, as in the property referring to what a human has labored to make is now to be discussed. This identification of these tangible objects being properties of the artist (the human producer/laborer) is as with the person being property too. It is identified by will and what the properties are the property of (in this case a human). The will that generates into the goods/property. The owner of such properties, and in other words, the originating nature that has such and such properties, liberty, life, tangible goods, these are referring to human nature.
Here is my disection of the problem. Whenever an individual chooses between 2 or a set of things, he has a basis for choice. Eudaimonia if I understand it correctly is the assertion that there must be an ultimate end that is the ultimate basis that underlines all choice. That implies that eudaimonia must be an a priori truth similar to all men act. Then eudamonia must be that men choose what they think is best. The unchooseable starting point, is that you must choose This truly has been a brain shredding few days.
The question is, why isn’t the ultimate end conceived, as you write, along the lines of an a priori “truth” or formal axiom?
The confusion seems to revolve around the attempt to conceive the ultimate end in more concrete terms, so that it would be of the same essential nature as the “2 sets of things” chosen by the individual. That is, there seems to be a philosophical attempt to conceive the ultimate end, not as an axiom or a priori formal construct, but as some concrete value or set of values, or some concrete set of norms or social institutions.
The question is, is Eudaimonia the formal conception of happiness? Or does Eudaimonia depend on specific concrete values or norms? This seems to be where the unclarity is coming from. If Eudaimonia depends on concrete values that have been rationally assessed (concrete values that everyone must hold to experience Eudaimonia), then those concrete values and their rational assessment should be subject to discussion and analysis.
I believe it is the same reason people don’t precieve “All men act” as a priori true without the explanation. There first inclination is “no thats false, i can just not do anything!” and then you always have to point out inaction is an act. Similarly “all men choose” the first inclination is that “I can just not choose anything,” but alas it is a choice. To choose to willfully not choose. Its part of our brain that makes us not have to consider everything, it keeps us from going nuts, but sometimes hides a truth from us.
Nothing other than the person who wrote the OP asked me something in which one short sentence spilled this out to fully answer what I thought was an answer at the time. And then somebody questioned what I meant so I further responded with an exegesis of what property means. Now if specific examples of happiness would arise as Adam recently suggested might be something to do, then of course what I brought up has everything to do with the OP.
It’s given in the abstract as a formal conception of happiness (along with several features thereof, such as it being agent-relative, individualised &c.) Flourishing in the specific depends on the individual in the neo-Aristotelian schema, and is a matter of them exercising practical reasoning in order to achieve it. Basically, the system is unlike deontology in that, aside from rights (which it takes to be the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place - their justification is given by the fact that flourishing is largely a self-directed activity because it is contingent on active reasoning by the individual in question, which must not be hindered by violent repression), it is up to the agent to figure out how to achieve it, and there are no easy to apply, readily had rules to do so - it makes the individual into a “lifelong project” so to speak. I’ve mentioned Rasmussen and den Uyl’s Norms of Liberty before, and I’ll reiterate its value in clarifying the system’s concepts. I’m more inclined towards epistemological proofs for libertarianism and so I am still on the fence regarding it, but as far as it goes the neo-Aristotelian defence of libertarianism is one of the more elaborate ones I have seen.
Here is what I’m seeing in your description, if I may separate it roughly into two parts:
It’s given in the abstract as a formal conception of happiness (along with several features thereof, such as it being agent-relative, individualised &c.) Flourishing in the specific depends on the individual in the neo-Aristotelian schema, and is a matter of them exercising practical reasoning in order to achieve it. …flourishing is largely a self-directed activity because it is contingent on active reasoning by the individual in question… it is up to the agent to figure out how to achieve it, and there are no easy to apply, readily had rules to do so - it makes the individual into a “lifelong project” so to speak.
…rights (which it takes to be the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place - their justification is given by the fact that flourishing is largely a self-directed activity because it is contingent on active reasoning by the individual in question, which must not be hindered by violent repression)… (my underline)
Regarding #1, at least as you are describing it, I don’t see much that is inconsistent with the Misesian conception of action. Happiness is conceived formally, is subjective to each individual (agent-relative), and is a self-directed activity. In addition, to the extent that, as Mises writes “Reason and action are congeneric and homogeneous, two aspects of the same phenomenon.” (Ultimate Foundations, p.43), then by definition, action is “cotaneous” with the individual exercising his reason. So in #1, in general I don’t see anything importantly inconsistent with the concept of action.
As for #2, this seems to entail a person’s particular vision of libertarian society. This is the question of what social order provides “the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place.” To me, this boils down to the individual’s “preferred” libertarian society. Here is where I see a possible theoretical disagreement. The question is whether “the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place” are “objectively” ascertainable, or are “agent relative” (subjective to each individual). This is where it may become contentious. As you probably agree, there are almost as many visions of libertarian society as there are libertarians, and this fact alone lends strong support to the idea that the concrete social institutions conducive to flourishing (happiness, eudaimonia, etc…) may be agent relative.
I have my new copy of Norms of Liberty in hand, and I ran across these passages on page 298:
“…human flourishing is…essentially individualized and agent-relative, the possibility of differing versions of self-perfection requires that attention be given to how to create and maintain a social/political context that is in principle both open to divergent forms of self-perfection and consistent with all…”
“The question facing political philosophy is how to determine what justice is for a “system of cooperation” that encompasses a social context that is open-ended or cosmopolitan, and the virtue of justice, as we have noted, cannot provide this. Further, no shared set of values or commitments can be assumed.”(my underline)
“Here justice seeks to regulate human conduct so as to establish conditions for the possibility of individuals seeking their own form of human flourishing among others. Its aim is two-fold: to preserve the open-ended or cosmopolitan character of human sociality and to respect the individualized, self-directed, and agent-relative character of human flourishing.”
I personally find these passages promising, and I found the underlined passages particularly important. To me, this implies that the system of cooperation that is open-ended (the society or societal form envisioned) is not provided by one’s virtue of justice, and does not assume a shared set of values. This means to me that the particular form of society conducive to one’s happiness is agent-relative. And to the extent this interpretation is generally correct, I don’t see any principled difference between this conception and the political philosophy of Panarchism, which envisions multiple societies coexisting across and through the same territory or geographical region. This allows each individual to join or to disassociate from any civil or social organization, according to his/her own values, convictions, and level of social development.
So an important question seems to be:
Is the particular form of society conducive to individual happiness subjective to each individual? I think this is an important question. Does person A have to live in a society envisioned by person B, because person B has determined that this is the society conducive to A’s happiness? Or does person A choose based on his agent-relative estimation of what society will make him happy?
You seem to have replaced your contradiction with another. Eudaimonia is the ultimate end. The whole point of Long’s ice cream/fame argument is that one’s eudaimonia/ultimate end is singular, and not plural. Yet you are saying your eudaimonia/ultimate end is both social preference and intellectual advancement. Well which is it?
I don’t know the answer to the question I asked, which was, “Okay, what does Long’s “third aim” position say about “why they value what they value, etc…”?” That’s why I’m asking you.
How am I being “a cadre”? Are you saying I’m adopting cadre tactics? If so, how so? And what cadre do you suppose I belong to?
as Jon pointed out, it’s agent-relative. I know I had a long post in this thread, but the reason being “open-ended” as I stated or as Jon called it a “life-long project” shows the vastness of possibilities. In the other words, the potentiality of how a human might live, as long as they are allowed to live such an endeavor that is - meaning their natural rights are not violated and each person is able to therefore live life as the vast experiment/adventure that it is.
My guess is that they’d answer yes to the first (provided said society does leave the individual free to reason, as they take reasoning as integral to flourishing), and no to the second. As long as one does not interfere with another person’s life and force them to live in the sort of society they envision, it’s up to them to figure out what sort of society they wish to live in, whether it be anarcho-capitalism, a collection of communist enclaves &c. So basically it would amount to panarchism.
My eudiamonia is intellectual advancement, the overall eudiamonia of individuals whose -preferences are not known to me at this time period is the maximization of their social preference. We say social preference in order to include numerous amounts of subjective desires for ultimate ends.
Why do they value a rational deliberation of the advancement of their social preference?
You implied that ‘young, impressionable libertarians’ are being brainwashed into Long’s hype about eudiamonia. You treat them like underlings unable to choose for themselves which argument they prefer and you tell them to ‘take a hard look at the real-world.’ I have come to find that the ‘real-world’ is merely linguistic code for ‘start thinking like me.’
When you write: “their social preference,” I don’t fully understand. Why is the word “social” necessary in your conception here? In your description of your own eudiamonia, you do not write “social intellectual advancement.”
To me, the word social somehow implies, or might imply, interpersonal relations. So my question of clarification is whether or not in your conception, the overall eudiamonia of individuals whose preferences are not known to you must be described as “their social preferences,” or can be described simply as “their preferences.” ?
Is the word “social” necessary for your conception of the eudiamonia of others or not?
If the word or general concept of “social” is necessary, then how does this concept attach to your eudiamonia of intellectual advancement? In this case, would you write: “my social intellectual advancement?”
Eudiamonia could possibly be interpersonal relations.
I say social preferences because we are engaging in behaviorial actions. However if you want to say just ‘preferences’ then I see nothing wrong with it.
Well it would depend on how I use my intellectual achievements.
If this is true, then to me it represents an emerging consensus around the idea of a non-monopolistic conception of government or civil associations, and the idea of individual choice in membership in them. Maybe this is old-hat to some. But I consider the prominent libertarian theories of the mid-to-late twentieth century to have been monopolistic in overall conception. I don’t recall much discussion along the lines of “it’s up to the individual to figure out what sort of society they wish to live in.” I sense the libertarian paradigm is shifting.
If I understand it correctly, “social preferences” are largely identical to “preferences of behavioral actors,” and may include, but do not necessarily include, interpersonal relations. Is that a fair interpretation?
And in this conception, there is no ontological priority or ontological hierarchy granted to interpersonal relations as a constituent of eudiamonia, as opposed to other possible preferences not entailing interpersonal relations? Or is this incorrect?
This truly has been a brain shredding few days.