Types of A Priori?

[E_R_Olovetto]

A couple things I have read recently have me confused. I guess that I just want to see people’s opinions. First from the introduction to Barry Smith’s book on Austrian Philosophy (vs. German and this isn’t talking about Austrian Economics), a characteristic of the Austrians:

(v) A special relation to the a priori, conceived not however in Kantian terms but in terms of a willingness to accept disciplines such as phenomenology and Gestalt theory which are, as Wittgenstein expressed it, ‘midway between logic and physics’. (The question as to how such apriorism can be consistent with a respect for empirical science will be one of the issues to be addressed below.)

Then from Husserl’s piece on Reinach from here (pg. 7) and mentioned partly here:

Only one of Reinach’s treatises is historical in character: “Kant’s Understanding of the Humean Problem” (Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 141; 1908). It deserves the most careful attention. Reinach’s insights into “relations of ideas” and his discovery that Kant wrongly interpreted these as analytical judgments, were, as I studied them at the time, of decisive importance for me on the way to pure phenomenology. Reinach for his part, as an accomplished phenomenologist turning to the study of Kant, detected Kant’s misunderstanding and treated of it in a rich and instructive article.

The first of Reinach’s’ systematic-phenomenological essays, “Towards the Philosophy of the Negative Judgment” (in the Festschrift for his earlier teacher in philosophy, “Munchener philosophische Abhandlungen. Th. Lipps zu seinem 60. Geburtstage gewidmet von fruheren Schulern,” Leipzig, 1911) deals in an extraordinarily penetrating way with difficult questions belonging to the general theory of the judgment. It is original in attempting to develop a phenomenological difference between “conviction” and ('assertion" and in this way to enrich the theory of the negative judgment by making various phenomenological distinctions. Very important but apparently neglected is Reinach’s study, “Deliberation in Its Ethical and Legal Significance” (Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 148 and 149; 1912§13). The pure phenomenological analysis of the essence of theoretical (“intellectual”) and practical (“voluntary”) deliberation leads Reinach to fine and significant distinctions in the area of intellectual and practical-emotional acts and states of mind; he then applies his results to questions of ethics and penal law. The most significant and the longest work of Reinach’s is also a mature and thoroughly finished work, “On the Apriori Foundations of Civil Law,” which appeared in the first volume (1913) of my Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, of which Reinach was a co-editor. This work attempts something completely new with respect to all present and past philosophies of law: on the basis of pure Phenomenology it attempts to develop the idea, long held in suspicion, of an apriori theory of right. With inimitable analytic power Reinach brings to light a whole array of apriori truths which underlies any real or possible legal code; and these truths, as he shows, are apriori in exactly the sense of the basic axioms of arithmetic and logic, that is, they are truths which are grasped in intellectual insight as being valid without any possible exception, and they are prior to all experience. These apriori truths in the sphere of right, such as that a claim is dissolved by its being fulfilled, or that property, through the act of transfer, passes from one person to another, have nothing to do with the “enactments” (arbitrary determinations that something ought to be) of the positive law. For all positive enactments presuppose concepts such as clajm obligation, property, transfer, etc.; these concepts are thus apriori with respect to positive law. Reinach’s apriori principles are simply expressions of absolutely valid truths which are grounded to the meaning of these concepts. What is utterly original in this essay of Reinach’s, which is in every respect masterful, is the idea that we have to distinguish this a priori, which belongs to the proper nature of (any legal orders) from the other apriori which is related to positive law as something normative and as a principle for evaluation: for all law can and must be subjected to the idea of “right law” - “right” from the point of view of morality or of some objective purpose. The development of this idea would lead to a completely different apriori discipline, which however does not, just as Reinach’s apriori theory of right does not, go in the direction of realizing the fundamentally mistaken idea of a “natural law.” For this apriori discipline (of “right law”) can only bring out formal norms of right, and from these one can no more extract a positive law than one can get definite truths in the natural sciences out of formal logic. No one who is interested in a strictly scientific philosophy of right, in a definitive clarification of the basic concepts which are constitutive for the idea of any possible positive law (a clarification which, it is clear, can be achieved only by phenomenologically penetrating into the pure essence of our consciousness of right) can afford to overlook this work of Reinach’s which breaks so much new ground. It is for me beyond any doubt that it will secure for its author a permanent place in the history of the philosophy of right.

[wilderness]

@E. R. Olovetto

A couple things I have read recently have me confused. I guess that I just want to see people’s opinions. First from the introduction to Barry Smith’s book on Austrian Philosophy (vs. German and this isn’t talking about Austrian Economics), a characteristic of the Austrians:

(v) A special relation to the a priori, conceived not however in Kantian terms but in terms of a willingness to accept disciplines such as phenomenology and Gestalt theory which are, as Wittgenstein expressed it, ‘midway between logic and physics’. (The question as to how such apriorism can be consistent with a respect for empirical science will be one of the issues to be addressed below.)

This ‘midway between logic and physics’ is Aristotelian. In some of Smith’s other works he discusses this point, especially in terms of who that book is titled after. He was the influence of Carl Menger and it is Aristotelian through and through. Any divergences from Aristotelian would be too fine of a point for me to know at this given time by Brentano, Menger, or even Wittgenstein and phenomenology.

But this post is definitely in the direction I’ve been headed too when it comes to my recent studies as noted in the recent thread I opened on this similar vein of thought.

@E. R. Olovetto quoting a source

The development of this idea would lead to a completely different apriori discipline, which however does not, just as Reinach’s apriori theory of right does not, go in the direction of realizing the fundamentally mistaken idea of a “natural law.” For this apriori discipline (of “right law”) can only bring out formal norms of right, and from these one can no more extract a positive law than one can get definite truths in the natural sciences out of formal logic. No one who is interested in a strictly scientific philosophy of right, in a definitive clarification of the basic concepts which are constitutive for the idea of any possible positive law (a clarification which, it is clear, can be achieved only by phenomenologically penetrating into the pure essence of our consciousness of right)

I really don’t understand these kinds of assertions, yes, pointed at natural law. A natural law understood in praxeologic conditions isn’t void of the individual, ie. marginal utility, nor void of the rest of world, ie. objects preferred. Natural law of human nature is categorically ‘what the intellect apprehends in reality’. In other words, if it is reality being described it is natural law, and natural law being such an old traditional concept for ‘a reality apprehended by an individual’s own intellect’ thereby drips with human action. Thus why it is commonly recognized that Aristotle discussed action, even pertaining to the individual. Barry has even described or maybe it was him quoting somebody else, but none the less he had agreed, that science is what hangs together logic and the rest of the world in a theoretical sense (meaning science is theory in form whereas common sense, ie. individually founded, is more ad hoc in it’s application in everyday life, but is not isolated from any scientific theorizing unless the individual prefers to isolate him or her self from science but an individual may ignore their own common sense too so this isn’t that pertinent but to move on…).

If there is this search for a “right law” that is based on logic and experience at any given time, then the interpretation of the natural law dealing with human nature, ie. property rights based on scarcity, etc…, such an interpretation has cultural pressures. Common law seems to be such natural law interpretations for any given time era, if practiced. Common law can change but what remains is logic to decipher any current circumstances. I don’t see any conflict between natural law and common law. Principles, ie. natural law, are not isolated from epistemological short-comings. Theories change. Revisions are needed at times. And that’s common law - it changes with the times but logic doesn’t suddenly disappear.

By the way, what was your confusion?

[wilderness]

You may have read this article by Long. This is what we are currently thinking about, correct? Follows:

@Long

For Mises, thymology presupposes praxeology, since one must possess such concepts as means and ends before one can apply them. Praxeology, by contrast, does not presuppose thymology; Mises maintains, in Kantian terms, that we derive our praxeological categories not from experience but from the innate structure of the human mind.

The precise status of and relation between praxeology and thymology have been debated in Austrian circles ever since. For example, Murray Rothbard argued, in Aristotelean terms, that praxeological insight derives not from the mind’s innate structure but from experience, and that it is a priori only relatively, being prior to more narrowly empirical sorts of experience. And Don Lavoie, invoking Gadamer, suggested that praxeology depends on hermeneutical verstehen just as much as thymology does. And so on…

We can’t have thymology without praxeology, because we can’t apply concepts we don’t possess; but equally we cannot have praxeology without thymology, because we can’t possess concepts we are unable to apply. In that sense, Rothbard and Lavoie are correct in holding, against Mises, that praxeological insight requires some sort of experience; but Mises is equally right in insisting that praxeological insight is not derived from experience – since the relevant experience already involves praxeological categories. Praxeological and thymological understanding arise together; they are simply aspects – not separable components – of the single indissoluble whole which is intelligent human experience.

I don’t know if I agree with Long’s analysis of Rothbard’s experience slant as Rothbard discusses there is self-reflection involved.

But I would need to think about this more because I don’t know if Rothbard tried to discuss what I think is an Aristotelian ‘midde-way’ or moderate estimate of reality between logic and data. In fact, I’m thinking I may need to discover how much Aristotle emphasizes this ‘middle-way’ action. I guess I would need explicit writings by all of them in which they mention this categorical middle-way action. I need to step back and maybe skim back through this, including my post I linked on my previous post in this thread to see if there is inclination of emphasis by each of these individuals either upon logic or data without an assumption on their part of this ‘middle-way action’, and then come to a more thorough conclusion.

I think it’s important to recognize that any one of these individuals, ie. Mises, Rothbard, etc…, could have assumed this ‘middle-way action’ somewhere - explicitly, meaning, they discuss it as one of their assumptions. Because thereafter, after they point out this assumption of theirs, then all each of them have left to deal with is the terminology at their disposal. And that terminology, though reformulated into a different paradigm due to their possible assumption of this ‘middle-way action’ that they may have mentioned somewhere outright without any need for the reader to have to read in between the lines, this terminology after such an assumption could throw the reader off when he or she reads their writings. Especially if the reader never came across this base-line assumption of theirs. The terminology at their disposal, eg. Mises possessing Kantian terms, Rothbard access to Thomist-Aristotelian terms, Hoppe Kantian, etc…, would throw the reader off into thinking these individuals are describing their theories in Kantian, Thomist, etc… terminology that might inhibit the readers from being able to know that somewhere in their writings these individuals made it explicitly clear that action is to be described in a ‘middle-way paradigm’.

For instance as I mentioned, Rothbard saying his approach is a law of reality and extremely empirical, though not of the logical positivistic empiricism, since he is saying action involves inner reflection too. That right there appears to be Rothbard pointing out the ‘middle-way paradigm’ that I’ve described here in this post.

What do you think?

[E_R_Olovetto]

This ‘midway between logic and physics’ is Aristotelian. In some of Smith’s other works he discusses this point, especially in terms of who that book is titled after. He was the influence of Carl Menger and it is Aristotelian through and through. Any divergences from Aristotelian would be too fine of a point for me to know at this given time by Brentano, Menger, or even Wittgenstein and phenomenology.

I know this is kind of similar to the other thread. It is just one of many I have had to put on the backburner because of tax season and a Medicare period that ends today. I was reading more mainstream philosophy for months until coming back to Austro-libertarian writers in the past couple.

Let me read over some more things and try to give you a proper response. I googled the Wittgenstein quote and one of the few results was chapter 10 of Smith’s book. I think the answer is in there. Read pg. ~6 and the last one. It is all about Menger and Austrian economics. Again here though, he doesn’t cite the source of this quote which is very frustrating to me.

[wilderness]

@E. R. Olovetto

This ‘midway between logic and physics’ is Aristotelian. In some of Smith’s other works he discusses this point, especially in terms of who that book is titled after. He was the influence of Carl Menger and it is Aristotelian through and through. Any divergences from Aristotelian would be too fine of a point for me to know at this given time by Brentano, Menger, or even Wittgenstein and phenomenology.

Let me read over some more things and try to give you a proper response. I googled the Wittgenstein quote and one of the few results was chapter 10 of Smith’s book. I think the answer is in there. Read pg. ~6 and the last one. It is all about Menger and Austrian economics. Again here though, he doesn’t cite the source of this quote which is very frustrating to me.

Here’s some more quotes of Smith in a paper he wrote (his emphasis and is also a general discussion of Husserl in which whom you had brought up in your OP):

@Smith

For a collection of scientific statements to constitute a theory, then, there must be on this purely formal level an ‘ideal-lawful adequacy of its unity as unity of meaning to the objective correlate meant by it’ (II A92/323). The objects meant by the constituent propositions of the theory (and therefore also by corresponding judging acts) must hang together in a precisely appropriate way, must constitute the formal unity of a certain determinate formal manifold.

What I’ve read from that paper in full context and read here in this quote: science hangs together logic and data (with obvious “corresponding judging acts” as he notes). This doesn’t seem to interfere with how I’ve thought of science. It is experimentation of data, and in the human sphere that means “lived experience”, and of course science differs in complexity from common sense, as the latter, ie. common sense, is formulated in the same way, at times, through “lived experience”, too. This is aside of illogical and impractical fantasy of course which wouldn’t be hanging together with either the given logic and/or data.

[wilderness]

Here’s two more papers that give a background to Aristotelian/Menger/Brentano, etc… in a historical context. I thought both were definitely insightful.

ONE

[ONE is the review by Barry Smith of David Gordon’s fuller text (TWO). The review was in and of itself insightful too]

TWO

I’m going to be gone for some unnumbered days. Have fun![:D]