Hah, so a guy alone on a desert island cannot have any property? What does he eat? And, if by eating it he necessarily excludes everybody but the owner from its use, after all it’s now in his gut, why isn’t it property? After all, there’s no state violence here at all, alone on the island.
What about a person’s property in themselves? Are we to be liberated from our own bodies? Death, to you, is the ultimate liberty?
Communalists want us to live as spirits disassociated from all matter, all need, where the current physical realities can be ignored, where there is no scarcity. This is the great yearning behind all communalist schemes.
Private property libertarians actually want to deal with reality as it is, not how they’d ideally want it to be.
Property is a fact and always will be a fact as long as you’re alive. You already own the physical makeup of your own body, and must obtain new property in order to keep that body alive. Every breath sequesters new air for your own use and then uses up some vital quality of it that the next guy can’t equally use. Every drink of water take as liquid property for your own sole use, until you piss it out. Every bite of food. And what’s more, without the ability to own land and other things, you cannot obtain food, nor water, nor air.
Private ownership of property is in fact necessary simply to live. What use would it be to eat if you had no access to land to farm. Or to drink if you were cut off from any source of clean water.
The communalist attack on property is the most wrong-headed doctrine that has ever existed in the history of humanity. It’s so boldly backwards that it blinds its adherents from seeing just how ridiculous it is.
If property is a product of one’s labor, how can land be property? Crops are property of the one who labor to producte it. But he has not labored to produce land. Locke says that because exclusive right land was necessary for his labor to produce crops, therefore land can become property. But in order to have exclusive use we do not have to have property, ius in re, over land, but possesion, usufruct, ius ad rem, over land. Therefore, land cannot be defended as property.
Also, that property can exist is a sequitur that we are owner’s of our own actions, of our labor, because we are owner of ourselves. Selfownership, and it’s correlate- ownership of our actions follows from de facto situation- that we are the only ones that can control ourselves, and no one else can control our body with his thoughts, therefore no one can be owner of my body or my actions except me. What logically follows is that alienation of body (in slavery) is illegitimate, no mater if the slave gives his consent. Also what logically follows is that alienation of one’s labor is too illegitimate, no matter if the serf/ employee gives his consent. All property gained trough someone else’s alienation of their own body or labor is illegitimate.
As much as the marxist is wrong about abolishing property, capitalism is not so much better, because I don’t see how can land be legitimate property or how can employment be legitimate.
If property is a product of one’s labor, how can land be property? Crops are property of the one who labor to producte it. But he has not labored to produce land. Locke says that because exclusive right land was necessary for his labor to produce crops, therefore land can become property. But in order to have exclusive use we do not have to have property, ius in re, over land, but possesion, usufruct, ius ad rem, over land. Therefore, land cannot be defended as property.
Non sequitur. Also, how can someone grant usufruct of something that cannot be defended as property?
Also, that property can exist is a sequitur that we are owner’s of our own actions, of our labor, because we are owner of ourselves. Selfownership, and it’s correlate- ownership of our actions follows from de facto situation- that we are the only ones that can control ourselves, and no one else can control our body with his thoughts, therefore no one can be owner of my body or my actions except me. What logically follows is that alienation of body (in slavery) is illegitimate, no mater if the slave gives his consent.Also what logically follows is that alienation of one’s labor is too illegitimate, no matter if the serf/ employee gives his consent. All property gained trough someone else’s alienation of their own body or labor is illegitimate.
What exactly does alienation of ones body or labor mean in this context?
If property were the product of labor, then children are owned by their parents, negating self-ownership. This would also mean that no one is responsible for their actions, so long as a parent or grandparent is still alive, since we are property of them. Therefore, property defined as simply the product of one’s labor and self-ownership are mutually exclusive propositions.
Maybe I should not have written “therefore”. “land cannot be defended as property.” was just a restatement of the fact that land is not a product of labor and therefore not legitimate property. Property (ius in re) of land is not needed for making property (because ius ad rem is enough), and therefore to see it as a ‘legitimate addition’ to the “property is product of one’s labor” principle is also unnecesary, and because the only justification of that addition is that “it’s necessary” is shown to be wrong, that addition is therefore illegitimate.
Not usufruct, I now see it has to do with property, I just remembered that the word means “use of fruits”, so I used it. Sorry about these mistakes, English is not my first language.
Alienation of body means selling oneself into slavery, alienation of labor means making yourself someone’s serf or employee.
Which would make a contradition with self-ownership principle, which means that such construction is wrong. Doesn’t mean that selfownership principle is wrong, because it’s (as shown by argumentation ethics) to be an (a priori) axiom, and from that follows that it doesn’t make concept of property wrong (because property follows from selfownership [being that we own ourselves, and thus our labor, products of our labor are our property]), so only the construction you put those two concepts is wrong. That is, being that property follows from selfownership, is cannot supersede/ negate it, because then it would have nothing to follow from, negating itself, and being negated itself it cannot negate anything else, which it did with selfowership, but it couldn’t. So, the construction is contraditional. Children are the products of their parents’ actions/ labor, but parents don’t own the children, because the children, because of the existence of the selfownership principle, own themeselves; so, as I said, being that property follows from selfownership, is cannot supersede/ negate it.
Well for one thing, I consider “property” and “ownership” to be inherently normative concepts. A person can possess or use something, but whether that possession or use is legitimate in my opinion is another matter.
For another, following Roman law, there are three kinds of right that are considered to inhere in ownership. There’s the jus utendi, or the right to use. There’s the jus fructibus, or the right to the results of use. And there’s the jus abutendi, or the right to alienate (transfer, destroy, or otherwise dispose of something). Usufruct entails the first and second kinds of right, but not the third. So it’s really the third kind of right, the jus abutendi, that distinguishes ownership.
So when you say that you use the verb “own” to refer to property, do you mean that in the sense as I described it above? Or do you mean it in a different sense? Either is fine with me - I’d just like to know which one.
Also, let me ask you this: do you think land can be alienated in any way?
I own myself and my actions/ labor inalienably, but I own the products of my labor alienably. I can have ius utendi over land, because it cannot be owned. Is that good enough of an explanation of my views?
You can notice that I wrote: I own myself and my actions/ labor inalienably, but I own the products of my labor alienably. I can have ius utendi over land, because it cannot be owned. Notice the sentance: I can have ius utendi over land, because it cannot be owned. Only ius utendi.
Land cannot be legitimately alienated because it cannot be legitimate property. One can legetimately only use land.
If you’re agreeing with me - at least arguendo - that ownership necessarily includes the right to use, rights to the fruits of use, and the right to alienate, then to say that you own yourself and your actions inalienably is a non sequitur. If you don’t think it’s possible to alienate yourself or your actions/labor, then how can you think you have the right to do so? Or am I missing something?
Saying that you can have jus utendi (what about jus fructibus?) over land because it can’t be owned doesn’t explain to me why you think land can’t be owned in the first place. Can you please explain that to me? Since the only distinction between usufruct and ownership is that the latter also includes the right to alienate, this means explaining why you think land can’t be alienated.
If property is a product of one’s labor, how can land be property? Crops are property of the one who labor to producte it. But he has not labored to produce land. Locke says that because exclusive right land was necessary for his labor to produce crops, therefore land can become property. But in order to have exclusive use we do not have to have property, ius in re, over land, but possesion, usufruct, ius ad rem, over land. Therefore, land cannot be defended as property.
The traditional labor theory of homesteading suggests that ownership is conferred to the person who first uses the resource, not the person who produces it. As you say, if we adopt the latter theory of homesteading, that rules out the possibility of owning any natural resources since they are by definition not produced by any person. I consider that a reductio ad absurdum, and reason enough not to accept this production theory of homesteading. The traditional labor theory (aka first-use theory) works just fine.
that we are the only ones that can control ourselves, and no one else can control our body with his thoughts, therefore no one can be owner of my body or my actions except me
The underlined conclusion is a non sequitur from what proceeded it. You have conflated control of some thing with ownership of that thing. No one can control your body other than you,but it does not follow that no one can own it other than you.
Also what logically follows is that alienation of one’s labor is too illegitimate, no matter if the serf/ employee gives his consent. All property gained trough someone else’s alienation of their own body or labor is illegitimate.
Since the premise from which this follows (body is inalienable) is false, this too is false.
I’d say you’re wrong here. Ownership is a farce if it does not denote control. Control is what ownership means. What use would it be for someone to agree that you own a sandwich only to deny then your right to eat it, give it away, or sell it?
Any attempt to own another person is always illegitimate precisely because one cannot alienate control over themselves. This is what we mean when we say it is man’s nature to be a self-owner.
Ownership is a farce if it does not denote control.
Ownership does not require control (otherwise I would not own a horse which bucked), nor does control confer ownership (otherwise a thief who stole my car would become its owner).
Control is what ownership means.
To own some thing is to have to right to use that thing however one pleases.
Note: the right, not the ability. Two very different concepts.
You may be the owner of something, and thus have the right to use it in any way you like, and yet be unable to use it in some particular way. For example, I may own a lawnmower. And I would be within my rights to use it to cut 6" grass, I can use the thing however I like. However, it just so happens that this mover can’t handle such high grass. Hence, though I have the right to use the lawnmower in a certain way, I am unable to do so. This inability to use the mower as I would like does not in any way suggest that I am not the owner of the mower. Likewise, the fact that slave-master A cannot use slave-B as he would like (will his body into motion) does not mean that slave-master A cannot own slave-B. His ownership of slave-B consists in his right to use slave-B however he likes, that he may be physically unable to use him in certain ways (willing his body into motion) is irrelevant - in the same way that me being unable to use my lawnmower in certain ways is irrelevant to whether I can own the lawnmover or not.
What use would it be for someone to agree that you own a sandwich only to deny then your right to eat it, give it away, or sell it?
As owner of the sandwich, you have every right to use it in any way you please: whether you are actually able to do so is another matter. You might be so inept you cant match sandwich to mouth, and are thus unable to control the sandwich, so to speak. It doesn’t follow that you don’t own it.
Basic errors. Control means you can make decisions about that property and it would be wrong of anyone else to stop you. Thus, you decide to butcher the horse and eat it, fine. It’s your horse. It doesn’t mean you can control the horse’s muscles literally, rather ownership is a concept between human beings. No other human will stop you eating the horse.
Actually in that case the thief does at that point own the car, except his ownership is illegitimate. So, again, incorrect.
The two are inseparable. If you have a right to free speech but not the ability, your right is a farce. Just as if we said everyone had freedom of religion in a communist society, yet because it’s a communist society the state controls all property, and the state refuses to make matzah balls for the jews. Then, do they really have freedom of religion without the means to make matzah? Nope.
Which is to say that if you has the right, no one may legitimately stop him from exercising his ability to control the horse.
Yes, but in such a case it is metaphysical reality that gets in the way, not another person, which is separate from the concept of rights which deals with human beings and their interactions. So it’s not germane to the discussion.
I see your point, but aren’t you sneaking in an animal context to ownership between human beings?
We can own animals because they don’t have rights, and because force is the only way to deal with them. You cannot reason with a lion. However you cannot legitimately import that concept to allow ownership of human beings, because they can be reasoned with and they are self-owners by nature. Thus, any ownership of a human being would be illegitimate, because all humans are self owners.
To be honest, this is the first time I hear of ius fructibus, I’ve googled it, and found no mention of it. But I don’t see how can anyone be entitled to any fruits except the fruits of his labor.
As I said- because property follows from the ownership of one’s labor, making the products of labor property. Land is not a product of labor.
Homesteading principle (that says that land bacomes property by using it [just by the fact that it is the first use]) is a social, arbitrary, contruct. Property defined as a product of one’s labor is a principle following from selfownership, which is an apriori axiom. I don’t see why should I accept homesteading principle, because I already have a definition of property, and that addition is unnecessary- I don’t see the justification of adding the homesteading principle to the definition of property.
Body is de facto inalienable. Only I can control my body. Not only because of that is that I don’t see how can the body be legitimately de jure alienable, but also because discursive/ argumentation ethics show that selfownership is an apriori axiom.
Alienability makes it contraditory. Mill talked about freedom being inalienable because that makes a contradition- reliquinishing freedom cannot be freedom because, as the itself says- you reliquish it. Likewise with selfownership, which, as said, is an apriori axiom. You cannot justify rejecting an axiom by calling upon that same axiom.
Saying that you can sell yourself because you own yourself, is the same as saying you can reject an axiom because you accept it - it is a plain contradition.