From Further Notes on Preference and Indifference: Rejoinder to Block, Hoppe says:
“Not everything that behaviorally “happens” is the result of a choice (my original reference to Searle was intended to make precisely thispoint). If I choose to walk from point A to B, for instance, this walk must begin (and end) with either my left foot or my right foot; that is, behaviorally, my walk can be described as either left-right-left-right, and so on, or as right-left-right-left, and so on. But while this or that particular sequence of steps may be the result of a deliberate choice on my part, it needs not be so (and it typically isn’t). It may just “happen” to be this sequence rather than that without me choosing either one (i.e., demonstrating a preference of one lead-leg over the other). How do we determine what is the result of choice and what isn’t? Obviously, not by mere “observation.” Rather, we must inquire of the actor in order to reach a (correct) description of his action. Did he choose to put his left or his right foot down first or did it merely happen that it was one foot rather than the other? The answer depends on the correct description of the action in question; and what is or isn’t the correct description of the action depends on the perception and conceptualization of the action by its very actor: on his description of his goal and his means available to satisfy this goal.”
Hoppe is saying that an actor remains indifferent to any behavioral aspect of an action that’s not included in the actor’s own description of the action. Do you agree? Or does the actor demonstrate a preference with respect to all the behavioral aspects of an action, regardless of the actor’s description?
Why not just say that there is mind and not simply condition and behavior.
If that is not what he means to say in so many words, I don’t see the point in what he is saying or what the application of this is all about. And I would say who cares?
I think the point is that action and behavior are not the same thing. People behave by walking left-right or right-left, but that doesn’t imply that they act by walking left-right or right-left.
It’s important because a fundamental principle of the Austrian School is that preference is always demonstrated by action. Indifference never is. He’s saying the actor can be indifferent with respect to some behavioral aspects of an action, but only those that are not a part of the actor’s description of the action.
An application of this has to do with this conundrum regarding the law of marginal utility: If the units of a supply are equally serviceable i.e. homogeneous, then, by definition, the actor must be indifferent as to which unit he employs in the attainment of a goal. But since the law of marginal utility implies an action, does this not imply indifference with respect to action, contrary to the Austrian position? Since a particular unit must always be chosen, it would seem that either preference is not demonstrated by the action (there’s indifference), or if preference is demonstrated, then the supply is both homogeneous and heterogeneous at the same time.
Hoppe says the supply cannot be both homogeneous and heterogeneous, which is what Block thinks. Nor does he believe that preference is not demonstrated by the action. Rather he thinks that because the description of this action is confined to emplying “any one” unit from the supply, and not a particular one, and that the choosing of a particular unit is part of the behavior, but not a part of the description, the actor can remain indifferent without violating the rule.
I agree that there may be preferences lurking below your conscious level. Its related to free will; you can discern or act on the things that you are aware of. So if you never though about the preference of left foot first or right foot first, you still have a preference, but no free will in the matter. Once you realize the “which foot first” issue you can develop a conscious preference and therefore have free will/choice in the matter.
Strictly speaking I don’t think you can have a subconscious preference. Preference (choice) is demonstrated only by action, and action involves thought. Hoppe would say it might appear that you’re choosing,i.e.. the behavior of the action might make it look like you have a preference, but unless you’ve actually thought about it, then you don’t.. If it never crosses your mind which foot to put forward first, then you simply have no preference.
Here’s his point though: Having no preference in the matter does NOT contradict the Austrian position that preference is always demonstrated by action, because the indifference is confined to the unthinking behavioral aspect of the action, rather than the thinking part of it.
All action involves choice (of means and goals). All choice involves preference. Therefore all action involves preference (no indifference)
All action involves choice. All choice involves thought. Therefore all action involves thought.
Some behavior involves no thought.(e.g. reflex behavior). Therefore some behavior involves, no choosing and no preference (indifference).
The action is the actor’s internal “description” i.e. the thoughtful behavior (no indifference possible).
The external behavior may include thoughtful behavior (in which the actor cannot be indifferent) and thoughtless behavior (in which the actor must be indifferent).
If I am understanding you correctly you are saying there is an action that is not purposeful because it is a certain type of behavior such as reflex or heart beating, but as I Ryan stated they do have purposeful action. The undeniable purpose of preservation of life. I would argue that incomplete knowledge leads to unintended choices, but I think all unintended choices must stem from an intended choice or preference.
I disagree. Nature by no means requires all life to preserved, nor does it require all life to die out; it exists regardless.
We could in fact say that the purpose of life, biologically or genetically, is to propagate itself; this is evident by reproduction. But for in general, or in philosophical sense? I’m not sure we could say the same thing without sounding a little absurd.
However, I must warn that my own bias is showing here, since I am irreligious, so I apologize.
Indeed, the knowledge problem & all that.
Maybe, maybe not. I think it assumes too much, honestly. Unintended choices could be the result of external circumstances that may not stem from an intended choice or preference of the person making the unintended choice, like say, in the heat of battle or an armed conflict.
I think part of the problem is the definitions we use, which can lead to confusion. In every day speech the term “action” can include any kind of behavior, whether or not it involves thought, but in the praxeological sense “action” means only “purposeful behavior” . Furthermore, “purposeful behavior” means having a conscious goal, which requires thought. This is somewhat different to everyday speech because when we say a “beating heart has a purpose”, we don’ t mean we, or it, has to think about the goal it serves. In the praxeological sense, however, since a beating heart requires no thought, it is not purposeful behavior; it is not an action.
Therefore, all behavior involving choice i.e. requiring thought (purposeful) is action. And all behavior not involving choice and not involving thought (not purposeful) is not an action, but simply reflex behavior.
There are no uninetended choices.. All choice , by definition, involves thought. Incomplete knowledge might lead to unintended consequences, but not unintented choices.
I am willing to accept this definition for your praxeological investigation into the action of man. But I also don’t ignore the fact that there is no true biological organ or behavior that is not purposeful in the evolutionary sense. Which is what I meant by the “undeniable purpose of preservation of life.” To deny this purpose is to remove yourself from the gene pool and be unrepresented, so in that sense it is undeniable. So just be specific when you talk about behavior because that is more general than action.
NitroAddict you had a good point about uncontrolled external influences, I hadn’t really contemplated that. I’m not religious either, I think this universe has always existed and always will, determinists be damned.
Ok, well here is the thought experiment I used to say that. If I buy a new car, I have certain preference, color and so on. Lets say I do not know anything about motors so I happen to get a v6, but in actuality there were many models that looked the same, some with i4 and some with v8. I would say that my unintended choice would the choosing of a v6, but perhaps you would call that a consequence?
You didn’t intend to buy the car with the v6 did you? You chose the car for other reasons, which didn’t include the engine. It was just the luck of the draw, so the V6 was a consequence of your choice of car, but not a choice itself.
I guess I was unclear on whether the consequence could be included in the actual choice. Since I saw a car as a single unit, seeing a sub piece of it as a consequence wasn’t obvious to me. Even when I try to imagine immediate consequence, I see it as following the choice, not a part of it.