I’m writing a paper. Please check, first, if what what I picked are the ‘essential’ points of his presentation. Then, what do you think about the validity of Hoppe’s theory. Seems pretty good to me, especially when combined with Blanshard’s theory of ideas as objective.
Summary:
“[P]raxeology also provides the foundation for epistemology” (i.e. the science of human knowledge of true material propositions), which differs from ontology (i.e. the science of true material propositions: argumentation is a synthetic a priori material proposition, “which states that humans are capable of argumentation and hence know the meaning of truth”, like action is a synthetic a priori material proposition, which state that if human knowledge includes causality, then human preferences that create sensations of want, want-satisfying behavior, and sensations of satisfaction (Hoppe [1993] 1995:65).
The material proposition that humans argue is a synthetic a priori material proposition; one cannot “deny that one can argue, as the very denial would itself be an argument….nor can one dispute knowing what it means to make a truth or validity claim without implicitly claiming the negation of this proposition to be true”, but “this knowledge is not derived from observation: there is only verbal behavior to be observed and prior reflective cognition is required in order to interpret such behavior as meaningful arguments”; these “axioms—of action and argumentation—are intimately related. On the one hand, actions are more fundamental than argumentations with whose existence the idea of validity emerges, as argumentation is only a subclass of action. On the other hand, to recognize what has just been recognized regarding action and argumentation and their relation to each other requires argumentation, and so, in this sense, argumentation must be considered more fundamental than action: without argumentation nothing could be said to be known about action. But then, as it is in argumentation that the insight is revealed that—while it might not be known to be so prior to any argumentation—in fact the possibility of argumentation presupposes action in that validity claims can only be explicitly discussed in the course of an argumentation if the individuals doing so already know what it means to act and to have knowledge implied in action—both the meaning of action in general and argumentation in particular must be thought of as logically necessary interwoven strands of a priori knowledge” (Hoppe 1995:65-66).
“In explicitly understanding knowledge as displayed in argumentation as a peculiar category of action, it becomes clear immediately why the perennial rationalist claim that the laws of logic–beginning here with the most fundamental ones, i.e., of propositional logic and of Junctors (“and,” “or,” “if-then,” “not”) and Quantors (“there is,” “all,” “some”)—are a priori true propositions about reality…. because they are laws that have their ultimate foundation in action and could not be undone by any actor. In each and every action, an actor identifies some specific situation and categorizes it one way rather than another in order to be able to make a choice” (Hoppe [1993] 1995:71).
To be blunt, you have a lot of grammatical errors that seem to indicate you do not understand the words you are using. I recommend you ask a friend to go over this a few times with you to pull out all the grammatical/spelling errors.
As much as I love Hoppe in almost every way, when it comes to his argumentation ethics, I think he’s mistaken. His mistake is to take action as axiomatic and to assign natural law (particularly, self-ownership) to the status of self-evident or irrefutable truth. David Friedman easily dispatches Hoppe’s arguments here. Nevertheless, I do believe Hoppe’s argumentation ethical argument is in the right spirit, that by having a discussion one is indicating disinclination to non-verbal dispute resolution but I think he entangles the philosophical and legal aspects to his detriment. It is true of legal disputes that verbal discussion implies reluctance to non-verbal dispute resolution (might makes right) but this is not true in philosophical discussion. I can consistently maintain that slavery is justifiable yet no one may rightly enslave me simply by denying the principle of universalizability. That is, I can boldly accept that I am, in fact, a hypocrite.
I literally just pulled Hoppe’s words (and used them in connection with Buridan and certain other philosopher’s terminology,e.g. Johnson’s, defined elsewhere, because they all used different terminology; hence ignore any of the other text in between Hoppe’s quotes here–its a running effort at terminological standardization… I’ll work at it some more.)
I was more asking whether Hoppe’s quotes that I picked convey the spirit of his argument?
Friedman’s essay seems to be about another topic rather than this particular argument of Hoppe’s. Friedman is playing with the self-referential sentence (all generalizations are bad is a generalization, etc). Oliver Johnson has simply shown much earlier that, in fact, generalizations about the whole world do tell us something about the real world: It is such and such a world rather than something else.
However, to be honest, I really don’t care for Hoppe’s homesteading argument.
For my part, I think that private property has already been shown as irrefutable by Destutt de Tracy and Bastiat rather more simply: wants felt by one person cannot be ‘satisfied’ in another person. The first type of property is self-ownership, originating with sensation, which then empirically suggests the broader concept of object-ownership.
I think a narrower formulation of hoppean AE will work. If you establish that argumentation implies consent, it means it is impossible to argue for slavery. You’re trying to get someone to choose to have no-choice. Its impossible. Its a short step from slavery to statism. This is how you use Hoppe’s AE against statists.
I have only heard Hoppe’s argument second hand but I think he is on to quite a bit here. You do necessarily imply alot when you open your mouth and argue one way or another.
I’ve been mulling the ethic part of the argument, since people suggested it is problematic (this part of the argument was not quoted not in the first post of quotes, since I was concerned only with Hoppe’s epistemological argument, which preceded the ethic part in the same paper).
Hoppe argued, “The epistemological status of ethics as an a priori valid system of norms has its explanation in the fact that argumentation as such, apart from whatever its content may be, presupposes the validity of certain norms; norms which no one could ever challenge argumentatively, because they would have already been accepted as valid simply because of the fact that one was engaging in argument as such” (Hoppe 1993:162).
Hoppe argued, then, “the norms that any argumentation has to presuppose must be such that they acquire meaning in the means-ends framework of action and praxeology. [And] the normative foundation of argumentation as such is the recognition of the institution of private property as valid” (Hoppe 1993:162-163). This is correct.
He proposed, “property right in one’s body must be said to be justified a priori… anyone who would try to justify anything would already have to presuppose exclusive right of control over his body as a valid norm simply in order to say ‘I propose such and such’….[and] if no one had the right to control anything except his own body, then we would all cease to exist”, that is, we require personal property in goods to live, “hence, simply by virtue of the fact of being alive, property rights to other things must be presupposed to be valid, too. No one who is alive could argue otherwise” (Hoppe 1993:163).
Two results:
Bastiat-De Tracy’s argument for private property was stronger, and more general. If I feel my sensations and not other people’s sensation, there is the concept of I and self-ownership. Since want and satisfaction belong to one body, then all objects of want-satisfying capability are personal insofar as property can be either personal or public.
Hoppe’s argument is has an error, whereas the Bastiat-De Tracy’s. The Bastiat-De Tracy argument demonstrates ‘personal property’, as a physical fact; the ‘right to personal property’, which Hoppe argues exists is not something required. There is no a priori ethics; this is an error revealed by Mises. Personal property exists: there is no sense in arguing about a ‘right to’ or ‘no right to’ to personal property any more than it makes sense to argue about a ‘right to’ or ‘no right to’ the speed of light, the moon, or mass.
In other words, as far as the 1993 argument overall: Hoppe is fully correct about epistemological concerns being derived from the action axiom, but wrong that private property requires ethics. Bastiat was more correct: there is theft because there is property, and there is property because people have a physical body; and there is no need for any ethics to prevent theft. Theft is a physical fact, not just a moral fact.
Remember, Hoppe’s paper has two distinct arguments: one for epistemology, one for ethics.
I agreed with the Hoppe on epistemology, but he makes an error on ethics by introducing any concept of “right to”.
Ownership does not require rights; it is a fact about the physical world. (That’s also why Mises denied objective ethics, while Hayek tried to empirically justify norms as rules of spontaneous order that are information bearing, no more no less.)
So:
We can discover facts about the real world because argumentation is a form of action (Hoppe’s first part of the argument, which is correct). Bastiat and De Tracy constructed valid arguments for property as a material proposition that is true.
Hoppe’s second part of the argument, however, is that private property ethics (not merely private property per se) are also synthetic a priori material proposition related to the action axiom. But that’s false. Only private property, not ‘ethics of’ private property, is related to the action axiom.
Private property exists; every limitation of it is theft. Norms (insofar as ethics) are not required to tell us this. Norms may arise that reinforce this fact, as Hayek argued, but objectively: personal property exists in the same way the moon exists
To be a hypocrite, you therefore boldly accept the you deny a truth. I don’t know why you think argumentation would physically stop you from being what you say “a hypocrite”. It’s missing the mark on what argumentation is.
It doesn’t necessarily mean Bastiat’s argument is wrong BTW, when I’m hashing this out with you. I don’t think Hoppe’s is necessarily wrong either.
Yet here you say “slavery is not justifiable” that’s an ethical argument. You can point out physical reality but it is not void of abstraction either. There isn’t a either/or description here; either physical or abstraction. I think that would miss out on what an axiom or proposition is.
Also, it appears you might not realize, I may be wrong, but when I read through the posts above I don’t know if you realize property is defined to include ‘in ones person’. That is also property and it is a scarce, etc…
You confuse truth and goodness. Hypocrisy is maintaining that something is bad when done by others but good when done by oneself (or vice-versa). True/false have nothing to do with hypocrisy. No true facts need to be denied in order to be a hypocrite. Granted, rejecting ethical universalizability is automatically self-discrediting in the eyes of all other participants to an ethical discussion but the question is why? Why do humans take ethical universalizability to be so basic to human relationships? I don’t think there is any metaphysical reason why, I think that it’s a simple consequence of our evolutionary history. Not all species adhere to universalizability, in fact, many do not. Ants and bees have clearly delineated, genetically determined class hierarchies. Wolves and other species have “alpha male” dominance in which only one male is permitted to procreate with the females in the pack, enjoys first share of the hunt and directs other affairs within the pack. These social structures are inherently non-universalizable, they endow specific individuals with super-privileges by virtue of who they are.
Self-ownership is the basis of De Tracy’s argument (where Bastiat got his idea from).
And I think it De Tracy’s sensory argument is the strongest argument for self-ownership.
I think, in fact, the slavery example is a good one for illustrating this problem. Lets go back to Gossen-Weber-Mises’ value free contention:
‘Right’ in common language refers to someone’s ‘belief’ in the right. Logic is true whether one believes or not.
Example: children may disagree at first 2 + 2 = 4. But if they, or even if the whole world disagreed, the 2 + 2 = 4 will still be a reality.
Suppose I say slavery is not justified.
I am not making an moral argument (an argument that is subjective). I am making an objective argument which uses subjective data. The predicate is subjective, but as the major premise is subjective. Yet the whole process was objective. Given my subjective predicate, it could not be any other way.
Because wants and want-satisfaction exists only in one person, which is a sensory entity that can distinguish between itself and its wants, on the one hand, and want-satisfying objects on the other hand, we find that slavery is theft (it violates self ownership).
Theft cannot coexist with the market system.
Slavery as theft cannot maximize my own wealth in the market system, as it reduces the amount of exchanges.
Slavery of X is not right or wrong; but slavery of X is counter to my intentions if I wanted to most satisfy my own wants within a reasonable period of time. I am less rich, in the satisfaction of all my preferences, because X is a slave. If X wasn’t a slave, perhaps I could be better satisfied.
=> slavery is not justified.
Now, since the subjective preferences that are mine are left unspecified, the general argument hold for any subject qualitatively, only differing quantitatively.
No. I didn’t confuse the two. You brought up hypocrisy in reference to argumentation. Now apparently you didn’t mean what you said.
It seems that I don’t know what you mean by “ethical universalizability” as your use appears to not follow from what I thought you meant.
During an argument if you deny that there is life you negatively demonstrate there is life as it involves life to deny it. That’s argumentation ethics in a nutshell.
And yet animals don’t argue meaningfully when the discussion is self-evidently about human nature being that the subject is argumentation ethics.
How is Hoppe not being “value-free”? You would need to prove that what Hoppe has logically argued is in fact what Hoppe values. Same as Mises. Mises in his book “Liberalism” states that to be a liberal it entails the protection of life, liberty, health, and private property. Obviously that’s John Locke’s natural rights. I link the quote. [second Mises quote in that post]
ok
ok. Natural rights involve that which is “subjective” and “objective” too.
You’re not arguing against rights. Rights are not axiomatic. Nobody has said they are. Life is axiomatic, but the right of life isn’t. Rights are a theory. If rights were axiomatic then there would either be always no criminals or always criminals. Depending on which side of the fence the axiom fell. You’re making a category error.
Knowledge of truth requires choosing between options, as Hoppe correctly and in my opinion very wonderfully explained. I find this part of the argument very original and powerful.
But Hoppe’s ethics argument (‘the debaters must accept private property’) I think diminishing the generality of his epistemology argument:
How A can have an choice (an action remaining given the identity between action and argumentation) to X accept or x deny private property after argumentation already, being an action, forced them to classify ‘personal property’ as a reality and public property as unreality? A cannot have such a choice, unless A never considered whether private property exists or not. So personal property is axiomic. But if it is axiomic, what is the point of ‘a right too’?
It seems pointless. What the point of ethics? Hayek would say ethics of private property only affect people who do not know (yet, because they have not engaged in the argument) private property exists, but society has evolved an ethical rule of behavior to respect private property.
For instance, people would respect personal property in western Europe due to ethical rules before any logical argument based rules for personal property existed.
Of course, we can redefine the word ethics = truth, but it precisely the point of ‘ethics’ to refer to those rules were ‘argument’ is possibly lacking.
It can be used in slightly different ways but Kant uses it as a basis for deriving his categorical imperative, which is basically the Golden Rule - treat others as you want to be treated. I specifically use it to mean that “any true ethical proposition should be independent of the identity of the individual to whom it refers.” That is, “It is wrong for X to murder Y” cannot be a true ethical proposition unless it is true for any name put for X or Y. Note that there is an interrelationship between universalizability and property (what is mine is exactly that for which universalizability does not hold).
Yeah, I understand argumentation ethics but I just think it doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. It’s an unfortunate lapse in Hoppe’s otherwise laser-guided rationality.
Natural rights are oaken laws for example that holds the same for ceteris paribus and Newton’s first law. They hold true until another force counters them and even then they still exist, but are not being maintained. The logical implications remain in existence, but nobody is saying an argument stops an axe murderer from completing the swing, inertia still holds as a law even if a billiard ball smashes against an already in motion ball, and in economics not all things remain the same as the market is dynamic. But none the less all remain true.
They are categorically universal, but it is a logical mistake to think the term ‘universal’ doesn’t maintain a class exclusively distinct from another class. It is a universal proposition that All gardens in my yard are tilled. To be a universal proposition that doesn’t necessarily have to include all yards nor all gardens in the universe, nor does it mean that the whole universe has to be a garden or a yard to be considered a universal proposition.
Well whenever you’re able to argue your scrutiny without life, liberty, and property let me know. I’ll be waiting for your reasoned scrutiny.