Well everything is an action. I don’t dispute that.
But praxeology is not concerned with the ought. Merely concerned with what is.
Well what else is there? Without value statements, praxeology is merely the explaining of actions which is sufficient in explain things but that is all it is good for. I think that perhaps you are coming down too heavy on the side of praxeology and not recognizing the thymological aspect of human action.
“Bewildered, people had to face a new side of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust.”
Given that ethics is the determination of right and wrong it seems that Mises himself understood that praxeology cannot be used in the subject anymore than it can be used in economics. It can explain why people act the way they do, not why they hold certain values (whether that be utility or moral). Mises was utilitarian after all.
Laughing Man:
#1 is not accurate. Do you really want to maintain that everything is an action, and that in social science, there is no distinction made between a human act and a rock?
“One must not confuse knowledge with mysticism. The mystic may say that “shadow and sunlight are the same.”[1] Knowledge starts from the clear distinction between A and non-A.” (UF p.2)
If you are familiar with Rothbard’s writings, then you are familiar with those of his writings that assert there is an incontestable logic that results from the fact that man acts to attain his chosen ends utilizing means. Then, if there are “ethical acts,” and if we accept what Rothbard claims, then there is an incontestable logic to these ethical acts just as there is a logic to acts that are oriented toward the market economy.
In other words, if there is a science that can be built around the fact that man acts (utilizes means to attain ends), and this science ultimately arrives at “economic” (market, catallactic…) laws of human action, then this same science can arrive at “ethical” laws of human action. This is because the laws ultimately derive from the underlying means/ends relationship of human action.
#2 In your distinction between is and ought, you seem to be implying that is statements only refer to singular concrete perceptions: a rock is, a tree is, etc…
I don’t agree with this notion. As I understand it, both physical and praxeological laws are included in is statements. The law of gravity and the law of marginal utility are both intended as is statements—as laws of the way things are.
So when you say praxeology is merely concerned with what is, I agree with this when this includes exact laws of phenomena as is propositions.
Such exact laws are the core of Austrian Economics. For example, Book 1, chapters 1 through 5 of Menger’s Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences.
Also, see Mises:
“Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict, with apodictic certrainty the outcome of various modes of action.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.117)
So what we’re talking about here is a science of ethical actions: If you do ethical act X, then Y must necessarily happen.
We’re not talking about a science of what is as you seem to be implying: If you do ethical act X, then you will have done ethical act X.
#3 I’m not sure you understand the importance of praxeological laws in social science. When Rothbard says that natural law provides man with a science of the paths that will lead to to his real happiness, and when virtue ethicists say that in living a certain type of life one will experience or attain eudaimonia, these are all expressions of laws of human action. They are expressions of a relationship between entities saying that if you do X, then you will experience or achieve state Y.
You seem to be conceiving praxeology as a science that goes around simply identifying objects: This is X, this is Y, this is Z, etc…
That’s really not what’s going on. The idea is to conceive how one thing Y is entailed in another thing X, such that if an actor attains X, he will necessarily also attain Y. (incidentally, Long is attempting something like this by way of his concept of constitutive means…)
In what you write above, it seems you aren’t acknowledging the concept of exact laws. This concept is central to both Misesian and Mengerian social science. But it is also a concept that implicitly underlies all ethical theories that say if you do X, then you will attain, achieve, or experience Y.
Why are there so few Miseseans (on the epistemology of ethics) ?
Because he was simply wrong on that issue.
“Given that ethics is the determination of right and wrong it seems that Mises himself understood that praxeology cannot be used in the subject anymore than it can be used in economics. It can explain why people act the way they do, not why they hold certain values (whether that be utility or moral). Mises was utilitarian after all.”
Angurse:
I would argue that ethics is a subject realm within the wider subject realm of human choice and human purposive activity. In ethics, one can choose from among various courses of ethical action and from among various ethical codes. In ethics, one can have as one’s purpose to adhere to a given ethical code. So ethics is an area within the wider realm of things open to an individual’s choosing and purpose.
Ethics can be pursued as a discipline concerned with right and wrong, and with good and bad. And that is how Rothbard and Rand pursued the subject realm of ethics. They approached ethics as a discipline of the ought.
But the question is whether there is another way to approach the subject realm of ethics. Can the ethical acts of an individual be studied as actions? Do ethical actions utilize means and aim at ends?
If the answer is yes, then these actions can be studied not only with respect to their goodness and badness, as Mises writes, but also with respect to their regular patterns in action, i.e., with respect to the laws of such actions. This is the Mengerian and Misesian approach to the subject realm of ethics as opposed to the Rothbardian and Randian approach to the same subject realm.
Mises understood that praxeology does not and cannot establish objective ethical values as Rand and Rothbard attempted to do. This corresponds to his understanding that in economics, praxeology does not and cannot establish objective economic values. Austrian economics substituted a new subjective theory of value for the older, objective and labor theories of value. In the same way, if praxeology is applied to ethical phenomena and ethical actions, ethical phenomena will be considered in relation to the ethical subject, as opposed to the attempt to conceive ethical standards that are objective (not relative to the ethical subject).
Wow. Perfect.
But essentially, you’re replacing one form of natural law, granted by God, nature, or whoever, with another form of natural law, originating from logic.
“Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict, with apodictic certrainty the outcome of various modes of action.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.117)
We may be arguing semantics, but Consequentialism doesn’t appear to rule out natural law–it just explains the origin of such laws, which are grounded in reality. If action A leads to result B, which is undesirable, and which is overturned by men who seek to better their own position, then we can say that action A was immoral. This is an objective statement, insofar as action A leads to result B.
Sure, all human action can be observed within the framework of praxeology.
Of course. Its called descriptive ethics, but it doesn’t actually answer the question of what is “right” or “wrong.” So I wouldn’t put it within the philosophy of ethics at all. You could compare it to beauty, praxeologically one can show how people desire beautiful things but it doesn’t help to answer the question as to why or what beauty is.
The laws will follow the action axiom like everything else, ethics will play a part in what means they seek to do so. (A crying baby annoys a mother - she wants quiet - she could hit it with a hammer or she could feed it.) Her ethics are a factor that guides her decision.
I think you have left out a crucial point. Not only did Mises understand that praxeology does not and cannot establish objective economic and ethical values it also does not establish subjective economic and, therefore, ethical values. It merely explains how things are. But if you want to consider descriptions as a form of the philosophy itself well… sure, ok.
Esuric:
Regarding #1. Yes, if we are explicitly talking about ‘law’ in the sense of a constant relationship between non-identical entities.
Menger:
"The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one, an aim which research pursues in the same way in all realms of the world of phenomena, is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness. It is the determination of laws of phenomena which commonly are called “laws of nature,” but more correctly should be designated by the expression “exact laws.” (Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences, Book 1, Chapter 4)
I don’t believe everyone who uses the term natural law necessarily is referring to the notion of ‘law’ in the sense of a constant relationship between entities. It depends on what one means by natural law.
Here is another passage linking the idea of natural law to the idea of laws in the sense of a constant relationship between entities:
“Long before the Classical economists discovered that a regularity in the sequence of phenomena prevails in the field of human action, the champions of natural law were dimly aware of this inescapable fact.” (Theory and History, p.45)
So in discussing natural law, we will want to clarify whether we are talking about regularity in the sequence of phenomena, or about something else.
In #2, I’m not clear on which definition of natural law you are using. Also, I can’t tell who is doing which act in this example.
Angurse:
I think your main point is that no matter what praxeology does or is, it isn’t normative ethics, and can’t provide the information that normative ethics attempts to provide. If this is your point, I agree.
On #4, I don’t understand this part:
“it also does not establish subjective economic and, therefore, ethical values”
In Misesian praxeology as I understand it, the idea isn’t that subjective values are somehow established. The theory is constructed on the supposition that all values (all desires) are relative to a valuing/desiring subject. The idea is that where there is a value or desire, there is a valuing or desiring subject who “holds” that value or desire. This assumption or supposition is part of the theoretical construct (theoretical value subjectivism). Someone could attempt to construct a theory on the assumption that value or a desirable quality is intrinsic to various objects, or they could attempt to construct their theory based on some other assumption. But the problem becomes one of consistency of explanation. That is why the subjective theory of value supplanted the older objective and/or labor theories of value.
“It [praxeology] merely explains how things are.”
Yes, but is explanations include laws of nature and praxeological laws such as the law of gravity and the law of marginal utility. Praxeological laws are essentially universal laws of human nature; laws derived from the phenomenon of action—aiming at ends. Thus, praxeology merely explains universal laws of human nature…
Yes, but that there’s a real causal connection–not Hume’s theory.
The belief that the existence of a law is set by nature and therefore has validity everywhere. Laws which are set in reality, and not determined by policy makers and jurists (they are to be uncovered). Your argument is basically the argument I put forth in Garyson’s thread about natural law. It is true that every individual forms his own subjective moral judgments, but the consequences of such actions, which are guided by his/her judgments, are grounded in reality. Thus, it doesn’t matter whether the king believes that inflation is immoral; the reaction will tell him that debasing the coinage is wrong; or, should not to be done by a king who wishes to remain in power. The subjective beliefs either match up with reality or they don’t.
This is how I’ve always understood natural law, though I’ve never really ventured into it. My philosophy professors have always been insane nihilists who deny even the principle of minimal contradiction.
Thats basically my main point Adam,
In that praxeology simply cannot prove ethics, explain how they should be (normative), or reveal their foundations (meta) I wouldn’t consider it a fitting alternative.
No, now perhaps I’ve misread you, but praxeology doesn’t explain natural laws such as gravity it is “a third class.” Back to my point, discovered praxeological laws would only describe how people behave due to the phenomena of ethics, it won’t resolve the question of ethics itself. So I don’t think the approach could be considered an alternative or substitute to the approaches of Rand or Ross.
Angurse:
Yes, you partially misunderstood what I wrote. You wrote that praxeology merely explains how things are, meaning, can only make “is” statements.
My point was that in science, in general, including both physical science, and social science, “is” statements include “if -then” statements; statements of logical entailment. These if-then statements are essentially laws, since they assert a constant relationship between non-identical entities. So when we say that praxeology merely explains how things are, this includes an explanation of the praxeological laws we are subject to.
I think above you’ve restated your position:
The type of social science Menger and Mises were interested in arrives at exact laws which allow us to know the necessary outcome of various modes of acting. These laws say that if an actor does X, then Y will be the result.
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that this does not answer the question whether an actor should or ought want Y, or whether Y is good, fair, just, moral, etc… I.e., praxeology is not normative ethics.
Exactly, plus “what is right?” i.e. meta-ethics. Understanding the “if-then” implications of “is” does nothing to change that.
By that conception Austrian economics would be “meta-economics” from the perspective of prior economics schools.
Sorry, I should of been more clear. Everything purposeful is action.
Well nothing in this reality is truly illogical. Whether you believe in impositionism or reflectionism, there is a logic to the world so it is only natural that everything in this world can be logically deduced or observed.
But it seems like you are trying to blend in ‘why people exchange goods and services?’ with ‘why do people interact the way they do?’ Yes praxeology is concerned with human action but human action that is value free. You cannot actually have a ‘value-free’ ethical system.
Yes but you cannot derive value statements without implying them through ‘is’ statements in terms of ethical systems. You cannot ascertain whether private property is a beneficial institution simply by stating this or that is private property.
Interactions, future behavior, value statements, these all have to do with thymology, not praxeology.
‘Understanding does not deal with the praxeological side of human action. It refers to value judgments and the choice of ends and of means on the part of our fellow men. It refers not to the field of praxeology and economics, but to the field of history. It is a thymological category. The concept of a human character is a thymological concept. Its concrete content in each instance is derived from historical experience.’
-Mises
This is a very useful insight, and really clarifies what I was trying to articulate in the last post.
This why I don’t suspect praxeology can be usefully applied to ethics in a universal, objective sense. In economics, if one doesn’t want to participate in the system towards the (presumably) common end, one abstains. Ethics, on the other hand, must be considered for every interaction between individuals. If you presuppose a common end of which every interaction between individuals strive towards, I would argue the presupposition is too great to be useful, because the individual that does not strive toward the presupposed goal is ignored.
Yes, “right/wrong” is included.
However, I would mention that to the extent a theory asserts that in doing X, a person will be right, and in doing Y, a person will be wrong, the theory asserts a constant relationship between entities.
I.e., “If you don’t want to be wrong, then avoid doing Y.” “If you want to be right, then do X.”
The theory provides an actor information he can then “utilize” (utilitarianism) for his own benefit and welfare…
Jackson:
I think you provide the answer to your own question:
As your passage implies, the subject realm of ethics pre-supposes an interaction between individuals.
Interaction between individuals is the commonality of which every ethical action consists.
The individual that does not interact with another individual is not ignored.
The individual that does not interact with another individual does not undertake an ethical action.
That is, such an individual is not the subject of a science that studies ethical actions…
Well, meta-economics does incorporate ethics, perhaps you meant this for Adam. However, Austrian economics doesn’t say or speculate as to what value is… it accepts that its subjective and doesn’t dig any deeper.
I just realised, in terms of disciples of Mises, Hayek or Rothbard, would I be right to say there are virtually no “disciples” of Sennholz or Reisman? Why do you think this might be?