Actually Reisman does have one. He comments on the Mises blog a lot and I think has written blogposts and perhaps articles; Wladimir Kraus. The reason might be in Reisman’s case is that both a) his work is not too widely known/digested yet and b) he deviates (nominally) from praxeology which might set off alarm bells for some.
Perhaps this is why for Sennholz. Hes too good!
Laughing Man:
On #1. OK I interpret you as acknowledging that the logic of action applies to ethical actions as well. I agree with this. But Rothbard said this was wrong. (EOL p.12)
My main point is to establish that there are ethical actions, and that therefore a science of those actions is possible. If you agree with this, then we are in agreement.
On #2 Previously, I thought we were contrasting praxeology to objective or normative ethics.
In what you write above, you are contrasting praxeology to thymology. In the Misesian system as I understand it, thymology deals with the concrete content of human actions as opposed to the categorial form of human actions. But thymology is not objective or normative ethics.
I believe that by the term thymology, Mises means the concrete content of human actions, in this sense:
History:
Jeff says: “The reason Bob went to New York rather than California is because he prefered the cultural atmosphere of New York.”
Larry says: “No, the reason Bob went to New York rather than California is because his friend owned a rent controlled apartment in New York.”
Psychology:
Jeff says: “The reason Bob likes New York is because he had an intense father who was a New Yorker.”
Larry says: “No, the reason Bob likes New York is because he wants to live an alternative life-style and in a small town he feels judged.”
The point I’m trying to make is that I believe in the Misesian system, thymology is a discipline that deals in explaining events with respect to their concrete content, whereas praxeology (of which economics is the best elaborated part) deals in only the formal aspects of action without respect to content.
(my point in the above is not to provide a definition of history versus psychology. my example may be defective in that respect)
But thymology is not objective ethics or normative ethics. Thymology does not attempt to arrive at a judgment as to what is right and wrong or what one ought or ought not have done…except…as this would be understood by praxeology with respect to means and ends:
Thymology: Bob wanted to get to New York as quickly as possible. He thus took the corridor train. What he ought to have done is taken the 5:30 Jet Blue which would have gotten him there an hour sooner.
I.e., If Bob wanted to get to New York as soon as possible, then he ought to have taken the Jet Blue 5:30.
In the Misesian system, thymology is the natural compliment to praxeology, and it deals with the concrete content----the concrete content of the formal form that praxeology provides.
The entire system basically has nothing to do with the program of objective or normative ethics.
(what I mean is, the goal of thymology is not identical to the goal of objective or normative ethics)
That’s why Rothbard noted that Mises was an “opponent of any sort of objective ethics.” and “a value-free scientist and opponent of any concept of objective ethics.” (EOL, p.206, 209)
Obviously Mises was not an opponent of thymology. Thymology and objective ethics are distinct and separate disciplines.
What do you think are praxeological laws of ethics?
Well not necessarily. As my quote of Mises pointed out in Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, thymology includes but is not exclusive to value statements. The understanding of human behavior. Thymology does not work within praxeology but with praxeology. Praxeology can tell you all these wonderful things about money but it can’t actually tell you what money is in a given society. That is what thymology does. It looks at human interactions/experiences and give you information concerning their behavior. Theorize you are an alien and you come to this planet. You see people handing over green pieces of paper to each other. You wouldn’t know if this is some kind of game, or religious event or a way of communicating but if you have experienced the concept of money then you can witness the event with clarity.
Thymology does not necessarily have to be objective in terms of ethics. Mises still made value statements concerning the welfare and behavior of humanity that he felt were not objectively found in the world. Things like people valuing prosperity and abundance. And perhaps is something we can discover through discussion, we both know praxeology is value free, but is thymology?
Praxeology itself is value-free, but its objects of study, actions, are never value-free. Action always involves choice; and choice always involves a ranking of alternatives (valuation).
if praxeology is a value-free study of human action, how did it get adapted to the study of ethics?
Yes, according to Mises. Thymology is a historical science. And as Rothbard said, Mises was a value-free scientist. Mises could not have a value-free scientist, consider thymology a science, and consider thymology a non-value-free science all at the same time. Moreoveer, the notion of objective/normative ethics, according to Mises, is not a science, because as he said, there is no such thing as a scientific “ought”. Therefore, Mises could not have considered objective/normative ethics a part of thymology, since the latter is value-free and the former is not.
Laughing Man:
On #1. You can read a summary of that in my essay “The Logic of Happiness,” (March 2009) and a lengthier treatment in “Striving and Attainment” (August 2008)
On #2.
I will begin by saying that the precise conception of thymology in the Misesian system is debatable, especially since he didn’t devote that many pages to it. What makes his conception of praxeology much less debatable is the fact that this was his primary focus, and so most of his conceptions and illustrations are with praxeology in mind. In other words, in my understanding, he would have considered himself a praxeologist, and not a “thymologist.”
That being said, I would advance the following argument:
As Mises devoted some time to conceiving a branch of social science he termed thymology, then he would intend this branch of social science to be a complimentary branch to praxeology. He in no way would have intended thymology to be a branch of knowledge at logical odds with praxeology. All thymological (concrete) knowledge would be understood to take the logical form provided by praxeology. I think I can illustrate this point.
A thymologist might ask a question such as: “Why did Rothbard seek to construct an objective ethics?”
And in Mises’s conception of thymology, the thymologist would answer something like:
“Because Rothbard thought that doing so was the most efficacious means of attaining liberty.”
So the thymologist asks why person A did X, or why person A does X (or why person A valued X, or values X), where A and X are concrete things. But the answer, in the Misesian conception, will always take the form of the praxeological means/end relationship.
“Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical, science. Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts. Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.32)
Here, Mises contrasts praxeology with history, as he does in the quote you provided about thymology. Thymology and history refer, in Mises’s system, to the concrete content. As I understand this, thymology is historical in the Misesian system, since specific content can only be established as a matter of what actually did happen. (In Mises’s system, I believe he conceives the immediate present as the just passed instant, so that technically, in his system, the content of action experienced presently is considered historical experience…)
My main point is that I think we can safely assume that in the Misesian conception of thymology, thymology would not be considered an “escape hatch” from formal praxeological concepts.
To the extent that thymology could develop into a concept that then contradicts Misesian praxeology, we would, in my opinion, be referring to a conception of it propounded by another scholar such as Roderick Long.
Any scholar is free to develop his/her own concept of thymology. But I will argue that to the extent such a concept implies a renunciation of Misesian praxeology, to this extent is a non-Misesian conception of thymology being employed.
It didn’t. That is what the debate and discussion is partially about. : - )
So Rothbard independently added the parts about natural rights without regard to praxeology? I know I’m getting a lot of eye rolls here, but I’m easily confused.
This simply replaces natural law, granted by god, nature, or whatever, with natural law originating from logic. I still don’t see a real difference.
Oh, OK. I think I agree, because concept of what is considered “logical” is subjective to the individual, so it is impossible to have a universal, external “logic” upon which to measure morality.
But Mises, and every sober thinking individual, rejects polylogism.
Why? Psychopaths are people too!
Mises borrows from Freud and early 20th century psychoanalysts in stating that polylogism does not even apply here and those that we refer to as deranged or pschopathic are still acting in the sense they are engaging in purposeful behaviour.
It is just that from the perspective of ourselves who consider each other sane, we may deem their ends as nonsensical or “crazy” and the means that they apply to achieve those ends contrary to purpose.
This is a very critical notion made in the early part of Human Action that I feel could be easily overlooked.
Yeah, I’ll buy that, but wouldn’t that imply logic is subject to the individual’s perception of reality?
I believe the answer is, because there are at least two senses of the concept of natural law. This complicates things. We have to distinguish whether we are talking about natural law in the sense of the law of gravity, or in the sense of a so-called moral law. As Patrick M. O’Neil writes:
Ignoring the difficulties involved, let us assume thatthe ultimate value of a particular ethical system could he proven,
what could be made of conscious, deliberate defiance of it?
We come upon a man committing some act grossly violative of his nature: let
us say that he was engaged in a theft. We apprehend him, and while we have him
in custody we question him about the nature of the act we caught him performing.
We fmd he is an extremely knowledgeable fellow, familiar with all the arguments
of the natural law school. In fact, he has read Rasmussen’s article and was con-
vinced that the proposition that a man ought to act in accord with his nature is
correct, logically. “Well,” we ask him, “if you know that to steal is to act against
your nature, and you know that you ought to act according to your nature, how
could you bring yourself to commit your felonious act?” “I chose not to act in
accord with correct ethical principles,” our philosophical burglar might answer.
My story, I trust, illustrates the problem. To deny an ultimate value and to
defy an ultimate value are not at all the same activity, and it is the latter which
provides the stronger suppolt of the is-ought dichotomy. One can deny a fact, but
one cannot defy one. You can deny the law of gravity is operative in the world,
but your denial will have no effect on what will happen when you step off a
precipice. The law of gravity operates no matter which course of action you
pursue-if you accept the existence of the operation of the law and hold yourself
back from the edge of the cliff, or if you reject the truth of the law of gravity
and step over the ledge, or if you accept the truth of the law, but wish to fall (let
us say as a means of suicide), in all three cases the operation of the law of gravity
is unaffected.
Moral law does not work in this way, however. One can admit the intellectual
correctness of a proposition of moral law (even of its ultimate value), and yet
deliberately defy it. This being the case, we must question what moral law means:
If one could not, by any means whatsoever, defy moral law, great difficulty would
arise over the appropriateness of the use of “ought”-for we do not normally use
that word to command actions which in any event cannot be avoided. If, on the
other hand, one can and does defy the imperative of a moral law, how is one still
seen as bound by it? Punishment or other ill consequences do not suffice to make
moral law objective, for if the person committing the violation of the maxim(s)
prefers the object of his illicit action, even when coupled with punitive or other
unfortunate consequences, that seems to mean that there is no apparent reason why
he should not act contrary to that moral law.
Any reason offered for why one should not act contrary to moral law must
either be a fact or a value. If a fact, it will need to he made relevant by the accep-
tance (envaluation; not epistemological acceptance) of that fact by the individual’s
will, which condition, in turn, renders it subjective. If a value, it, in its turn, will
require an answer why it may not be defied, and so ad injnitum.
( http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf p. 94/95)
To answer your question, we have to agree on what we mean by the concept natural law.
“Yet, modern psychology has brought about some results which may arouse the interest of praxeology. It was once usual to consider the behavior of lunatics and neurotics as quite nonsensical and “irrational.” It is the great merit of Breuer and Freud that they have disproved this opinion. Neurotics and lunatics differ from those whom we call sane and normal with regard to the means which they choose for the attainment of satisfaction and with regard to the means which they apply for the attainment of these means. Their “technology” is different from that of sane people, but they do not act in a categorically different way. [8] They aim at ends and they apply means in order to attain their ends. A mentally troubled person with whom there is still left a trace of reason and who has not been literally reduced to the mental level of an animal, is still an acting being. Whoever has the remnants of a human mind cannot escape the necessity of acting.”
Money, Method, and the Market Process, p.21/22.
So 2+2=4 for you, but 5 for me because my “perception of reality” differs?
Holy crap Adam A+++++! Reading that post, I feel the same way when I read “The Ego and It’s Own”, something like:
“Yeah, I was thinking that, but the doody leaking from my brain and out of my mouth/ hands couldn’t even come close to how concise and articulate this guy is making it!”
Now if only Marko and UKnigraham read this…