WTO of the Day: Selgin on the word "Semantics"

Miscellaneous General
1

Last week I covered Retopper’s egregious word-thought overwrite (WTO)* on the word “prohibit” but today’s example is much more innocent, yet just as potentially harmful. It comes from a post by Selgin in the thread George Mason vs. Mises Institute. In this case it is not completely clear that Selgin actually WTO’d, but I suspect he did. In fact, this WTO is so common that I predicted it before it happened! Still, only Selgin himself can know what he was thinking.

Before I begin, some may ask, why go into such detail to uncover such a tiny error? Because this is the kind of tiny error that wastes a whole lot of time, even possibly ruins careers (I don’t mean Selgin’s). And examples like it are all over the place. Furthermore, it is precisely the difficulty at getting at such errors that makes them so pervasive. I therefore hope the dear reader will find the value in accompanying me on this longer-than-average excursion into the world of word-based error.

This time, in the context of free banking vs. full-reserve banking, in response to Daniel Muffinburg’s insightful comment about definitions here:

Selgin then writes (here comes the WTO):

[quote=“Selgin in [mises.org/Communityhttps://forum.freecapitalists.org/t/george-mason-vs-mises-institute/18631/71]
(George Mason vs. Mises Institute), bold added”]I don’t think the different definitions make the debate “futile”: the real debate is about whether or not it is legally legitimate and economically desirable for banks to lend sums handed over to them by customers in exchange for contractsd offering so-called “demand deposits.” There are ways to settle this, that aren’t merely semantics.
[/quote]

It seems to me that Selgin is making a common WTO on the word semantics. Since he only uses the word once, it is impossible to accuse him of a definite equivocation (he may reply that he meant something else entirely), but I see a likely equivocation in the following sense:

By using the word semantics here, Selgin seems to refer on the one hand to the perjorative sense of semantics=“arguments that are mere wordplay,” yet in speaking of ways to settle the argument he also seems to write off the possibility that semantics=“the sorting out of definitional inconsistencies” is needed.

It seems likely to me, judging from the general tenor of Selgin’s comments in the thread, that he thought something along the lines of the following (AJ’s comments in brackets): “The full-reserve banking cult’s argument is all about semantics [=wordplay], which is basically useless, and sorting out definitions is also semantics [=eliminating wordplay!], so sorting out definitions is basically useless.” That equivocation on the word semantics would lead to thinking that the very solution to the problem was the same as the problem itself, just because the same word could be used to describe both. Yet clearly, if one side’s argument is plagued by wordplay and shifting definitions, the first solution would probably be to try to clear up that wordplay by reconciling the definitions (which could - confusingly - also be described as “arguing semantics”).

This seems to suggest that Selgin is at least partially, yet systematically and unintentionally, avoiding the very thing that could actually bring resolution to the debate. That might explain why he seems partially aware of the need to address such things, but partially unaware in the sense that he seems to think that is not where the real action is. In my opinion, definitions are where the real action is until such time as they are finally agreed upon; only then can the debate begin (if indeed there is any debate at all after squaring up the definitions).

Disclosure: Although this is only on cursory examination, I generally tend to side with Selgin in the free banking debate. I am pointing this out in hopes of clarifying things, which is always beneficial for the side that is right (again, that’s if there’s really any disagreement).

*[The folowing explanatory text also appeared in last week’s post] Word-thought overwriting (WTO) is that pernicious pattern of internal equivocation whereby the words you are using to reason something out get stored in place of the original thought, but then when you try to recall the thought you recall the words instead and re-interpret them in a slightly different way. You end up believing that you believed something different just because the words told you so.

George Mason vs. Mises Institute
2

I beg to differ.

Daniel Muffinberg seems to be saying “All you guys have to do is use one word for Situation A, a different word for Situation B, and everything will be fine. You will see that one side is talking aboout Situation A, and they are right in that case, the other about Sit B, and are right too.”

To which Selgin replied "Nope. We are both arguing about issues of substance that exist in every possible situation. In addition, the other side is trying to win the argument unfairly, by defining things in such a way that make us seem wrong. For example, if we defined FRB as “axe murdering” it is easy to make a case against it. But it is the wrong way to win the argument.

Now I grant that Selgin is using the word semantics in a different way than Dan does. But that did not create any hole in his reasoning. And he made it clear from the context what he means, as did Dan.

Disclosure: I don’t know who is actually right about FRB.

3

Dave, I think AJ’s claim is that Selgin is implicitly equivocating about the meaning of “semantics”.

4

AJ,

Yes, he is using it in two ways, but

  1. It is clear from the context what is meant.

  2. The arguments he presents remain valid.

I thought a WTO is when the use of the word in two different ways produces a fallacy.

For example:

Is that your dog? Yes.

Is that dog a father? Yes

Then that dog is your father.

The WTO in that one is, I think, the word “your”.

Restated, the argument is:

Do you own that dog? Yes.

Has that dog sired puppies? Yes

Then that dog has sired you.

When the word “your” is eliminated, the argument is seen as fallacious.

In Selgin’s post the word “semantics” can be replaced and the argument is still the same, and still valid.

5

I agree that Selgin’s argument is valid (at least the part I think you’re referring to). The equivocation on the word semantics doesn’t invalidate that, it is just something I think may be keeping him from seeing a more expedient course of action. It seems he partially realizes the problem, but something is keeping him from completely apprehending the situation, and I suspect this is it.

Also, the reason for my posting this is more to call attention to the phenomenon of word-thought overwriting than anything else. This time was a bit of a stretch since, as I mentioned, I cannot be sure what Selgin was really thinking (though I still think it was likely a WTO).

6

We don’t need to agree about definitions. We merely ought to be aware when someone uses another definition for the same word.

It is ridiculous when someone insists that Selgin means the same thing as Hoppe when using the word “deposit.” Selgin defines what he means by “deposit” in almost every conversation with 100% reservists. Whether one likes that definition or not should not stand in the way of one understanding his argument. Moreover, his is the same definition customarily used by almost every economist, banker, and court for at least 300 years.

Words are arbitrary symbols – established by convention, not etymological investigation. Rothbardians’ persistent use of the word “deposit” to mean something other than everyone else just further reinforces the problems that Selgin elaborated, i.e. establishing your own vocabulary and language for discussing economics just makes Austrian community that much more insular and cultish, especially when the matter is a relatively innocuous term like “deposit.”

7

Yeah, by “agree on definitions” I more meant that people have to at least agree to interpret the other side’s terms in the way they define them (unless the definition is hopelessly problematic). Both sides seem reluctant to do this. Selgin and Yeager, at least, seem to refuse because they say the 100%ers use “persuasive definitions” and are needlessly differing from established customary definitions, and the 100%ers seem to refuse to acknowledge the FRB definitions because - who knows why - perhaps they are understandably fond of their persuasive definitions, and would argue that differing from established customary definitions is needed because the established ones are designed to mislead. For whatever reasons, neither side seems completely willing to accept the others’ definitions, which doesn’t bode well for any progress being made.