I know Hoppe’s argumentation ethics is old news that has been mostly cast aside, but I think too often critics dismiss the entire concept rather than adopt and adapt the idea into a meaningful theory. One reason for this might be that there are very few individuals sympathetic to Hoppe’s thesis who don’t already view it as sound, especially in comparison to the natural rights position. Another might be that Hoppe’s critics are either unaware or unwilling to ask “how can this work in light of my criticism?” - though very few critics ever ask this question. My hope, then, is to demonstrate that the structure of argumentation ethics is fundamentally sound when treated in the right context.
The structure of argumentation ethics relies on two concepts: that there are norms which must be logically presupposed in the course of an argument and that arguing against these norms results on a performative contradiction. David Gordon wisely suggests that one “consider exactly what Hoppe means by argumentation,” which seems to be the starting place which is often passed over. Obviously Hoppe doesn’t mean argument in every sense which we might use the term – shouting matches and bar fights don’t apply – he means the process of proposition making between two or more individuals with the goal of not only conveying meaning but also reaching a conclusion based on the epistemological standards set for topic. By this I mean that an argument in mathematics relies on a different set of standards than one in political science or literary criticism.
Understanding exactly what is meant by argumentation sets the stage for the introduction of a number of normative concepts. So long as one is arguing, we can quite reasonably say that there are things that one ought and ought not to do because they are necessary components of argumentation. On this point, I differ from Hoppe who believes that these norms gain their “ought-ness” from a sort of impossibility proof arising out of the performative contradiction. Either way, these norms roughly encompass libertarian ethics on a scaled down level – self ownership, Lockean homesteading and non-aggression.
I don’t want to spend much time going over these norms specifically because my argument isn’t dependent on what form the norms take, only that some norms exist. I don’t think that the libertarian norms put forth by Hoppe are too disagreeable on their own, that is, few people would disagree that it’s permissible, during an argument, to aggress against their opponent or deny them the ability to use their own body, or to assume some structure of property which would make it wrong or illegal for one actor to occupy the space that they do.
The big questions then, given the existence of “the a priori of argumentation,” are: how does a performative contradiction arise, what is the nature of such a contradiction, and why does it matter? Before directly addressing those questions, we should think of argumentation as a type of game with all sorts of rules. In a game of chess you mustn’t move a bishop laterally because it’s simply against the rules to do so. Certainly you can try, and if you get away with it the move might be beneficial to your goal of winning, but that’s not how you play chess. Similarly, argumentation has rules that when broken, might give one party the advantage, but breaking those rules isn’t how you argue (for example, consider any number of formal or informal fallacies).
Adam Knott rightfully points out that a performative contradiction isn’t a real contradiction because contradictions can never actually exist in nature. After all, we are all familiar with the principle of non-contradiction. Knott says “When person A says aloud “I am not talking,” person A could be lying (though perhaps badly), or joking, or intending to mean that he was not the one who has been talking, or practicing for a play, or listening to the sound of his own voice, etc.“ While lying, joking, practicing for a play, or just vocalizing whatever comes to mind are certainly ways of meaning “I am not talking,” those things are outside the scope of what is being done in an argument. If two men were talking back and forth, one only speaking in lies and the other rehearsing lines from a play, would we call that an argument? We might, but that’s not what Hoppe is talking about. What Hoppe calls a performative contradiction is actually either an attempt to argue from outside an argument or break the rules of the game without being caught.
So why does this matter? What does this prove? Well, it shouldn’t be taken as a proof of libertarian ethics or as a persuasive device. It certainly doesn’t stop anyone from adhering to or even advocating a non-libertarian ethic. What argumentation ethics does, I think, is highlight the deep connection between what gets said and the act of saying it, and shows that this connection can place limits on meaning.