Some libertarians get so excited about Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. Frankly, it’s an argument that seems extremely bad. So maybe it’s true that by arguing, I assume that I exclusively control myself (to a limited degree, mind you–in other contexts maybe I’m less in control. It only proves self-dictatorship for a very limited set of actions). Where do “rights” enter into it? Hope just goes control ==> rights without anything in between. But it’s the between that’s important. No one would contest that people control things. Hope demonstrates no rights, he just assumes them.
Also, the argument that self-ownership ==> property rights more generally is similarly flawed.
I agree with it being bad argument, but I don’t think that many libertarians take it all that seriously. Just a few…and probably less now than three years ago…and probably even less 3 years from now than today will probably care. I think more people like to start arguments against it than for it; kind of one of those philosophical whipping boys, like Plato, Descartes, free will, natural rights, Hegel, etc. Probably just best to let a bad thing die out on its own.
I haven’t studied Hoppe’s arguments in depth, but I’ve read the basic summaries of them and I’m unimpressed. But do the same criticisms apply to Habermas’ discourse ethics? I haven’t seen his arguments trashed as much, but obviously that’s because I peruse libertarian-themed sites a great deal more than anything else.
Haven’t read him (Habermas), but honestly I am a bit confused how the words “argumentation/discourse” and the word “ethic” can be squished together to form a coherent concept. The two words in themselves are incompatible as a coherent way to think of a description of reality. I think with all this stuff people just want to talk about abstract non extant legal theory or something and than throw the word “ethic” into it to add some lofty pretentious weight on the matter.
Really if you use the phrase “argumentation ethics” it sounds like “argumentation aesthetics” to me, which is a silly silly thought.
And I’m really unimpressed by any of the objections raised here thus far. Do any of you have some concrete objections that can actually be presented in an argument, or is this just another thread about trashing and mocking what people don’t understand.
Do any of you have some concrete objections that can actually be presented in an argument
No. I’ll just carry on with my day to day affairs and let the argumentation or estopple ethicist go on about how I am being good or evil, or always “misrepresenting their postion” and see how that goes.
It seems to me that Hoppe extrapolates too much. You could do a type of grain argument and say, “sure, when arguing I accept that you own yourself and the words that come out, but this is only useful in argumentation because it keeps the peace while we express ideas amongst ourselves and we both desire peace when arguing.” But again, recognizing that you own yourself doesn’t imply that, in a given circumstance, that denying your right to self-ownership can’t a “good” thing. Obviously utilitarians are going to take issue with this.
A criminal exerts control over his self as well, but does that mean you can’t punish him in a way that denies his right to self-ownership? Hoppe is just pointing out that we are in control of ourselves, but this is an ontological statement and has nothing to do with the ethical question of, “when should the rights of others supercede our individual self-ownership?”
On the other side, it still has a million issues to deal with in terms of metaethics, that being the legitimacy of moral claims in the first place.
This isn’t Hoppe’s argument. And nothing in the rest of your post gives any indication that you have even begun to understand, let alone grasp, Hoppe’s argument.
Please go ahead, if not for me then for the benefit of the children here, and quote him. I want to see where he “makes the leap” by a mere “assumption”.
He’s saying it’s a performative contradiction to deny libertarian ethics. I’m suggesting that recognition of solving discourse by using peace and acknowledging that discourse is the opposite of force doesn’t seem to entail that there can be no circumstances where a “right” of somebody else is subordinate to your right to self-ownership or that violence is a priori unjustified (as in the case of something like stealing from somebody to buy a starving man a piece of bread, a violation of the store-owner’s Lockean property rights). Can you explain how my concern is misguided? Because I’m apparently too stupid to understand the nuance .
I basically agree with this piece written by Brainpolice:
The argument that “self-ownership” is implicitly proven via the act of argumentation itself is a confused misnomer because it conflates the fact that you excersize control over your person with “self-ownership” as an ethical concept, I.E. “self-ownership” as the idea that your person should not be controlled by others. These are two entirely different questions - “self-ownership” in the former sense is ontological, while “self-ownership” in the latter sense is ethical.
There is no way to directly and absolutely derive one from the other - the fact that I purposefully act, in and of itself, does not prove that others ought to not interfere with my action. At best, all it proves is that I purposefully act. Nor does the fact that I purposefully act inherently imply that I share a particular ethical theory of justified action (namely, an explicitly libertarian ethic of personal sovereignty).
Obviously, “self-ownership” in the ethical sense is not an ontological given, otherwise the world would inherently be libertarian already. Hence, “self-ownership” in the libertarian sense in by no means some sort of unavoidable fact of nature, since it is regularly transgressed upon. People might all purposefully act, but they do not have “full self-ownership” in the sense of a personal sovereignty from interference with their person by others.
The same goes for “property rights”. The fact that someone owns something in and of itself is not “property rights”, it’s simply ownership. The fact that someone currently owns something, in and of itself, is not a “proof of property rights” - unless your notion of “property rights” is “might makes right” or something along those lines. Clearly, libertarians do not wish to propose that “might makes right”, so this is rather confusing.
It is becoming the the norm here. People making false claims. And when challenged, they start to litterally resort to bluffs like this is some kind of a poker game with money on the line and a reputation to maintain.
If one desires to resolve conflicts peaceably by way of rational argument, then one must recognise some kind of basic self-ownership, i.e. a right to some individual control over one’s own body. If one does not care to resolve conflicts peaceably by way of rational argument, then one probably isn’t interested in ethics at all – argument would be futile; rights to self-ownership irrelevant. At least, this is what I think Hoppe is saying. Hard to tell sometimes.
I am not so sure about some of Hoppe’s “deductions” from this principle, however.
I pretty much agree with Eric and Brainpolice’s takes.
DD5,
Pardon me for not being able to prove a negative. Shall I quote the entirety of everything Hoppe has ever written or said? Proving me wrong should be easy–if I’m wrong.
Modus Tollens,
That seems more like a proof that self-ownership is a useful problem-solving tool–duh. But there’s no performative contradiction or ethical theory of rights following from it.
Well, first of all, that post was quite different from your previous one asserting that hoppe’ argument is about determining what is good or not good.
To be sure, we are not talking about mere assertions and claims about what is good or bad (derived from an “ought”) but about justification, which implies the use of argumentation. However, self-ownership and property rights have been shown to be logically derived presuppositions of argumentation itself. This means that the justification of any alternative set of ethics always results in a logical contradiction.
Now, let’s say we can reduce the argument to just 3 logical steps: Argumentation=>self-ownership=>libertarian property rights
Hoppe demonstrates each step by showing that any objection always results in self-contradiction. Now, it seems to me that if one wants to show that the argument is false, one must simply demonstrate how arguing against each or one of these steps does not result in a self-contradiction. Writing long stories about why one does not agree with its conclusions (Brainpolice) without addressing the actual praxeological reasoning at its core is no refutation.
You made an assertion: Hoppe makes a leap, Hoppe merely assumes…
The burden of proof lies with you, making the claim that such leaps and assumptions by Hoppe do exist. I believe that’s proving a positive, and you are actually asking me to prove the negative, i.e., prove that Hoppe is not making mere assumptions, etc… Which by the way, can indeed be proven and should at least demonstrate to you that one can indeed prove a negative.