If I make the statement, “Everybody should physically aggress against everyone else, so long as no one is arguing,” am I caught in a performative self-contradiction?
No, but whatever society goes that route ain’t gonna last long.
could you even call such a thing a society? it isn’t even social action is it?
The fact that the proposition is an ought-statement places the proposition outside the analysis of AE. Argumentation ethics deals strictly with is-statements because, as Hoppe sees it, ethics is the logic of justifying arguments. What this statement proposes is a guide for how one should behave and there is no justification provided. If it can be rephrased so that it is an is-statement, then (I think) argumentation ethics can scrutinize that proposition.
Touché.
Ok, then. “It is the case that everyone should aggress against everyone else, so long as no one is arguing.” Would this involve a performative contradiction?
Yeah, but what difference would it make? If Hoppe is right, then no rational justification can ever be provided for a non-libertarian ethic.
You still say should: this is still an ought-statement. Take the following argument: Taxation is justified because taxation provides for roads and national defense, which are goods.
Taxation requires the use of force to take money from A, B, C, to give to X, Y, Z. Implicit in the ethical “norm” of taxation, then, is a lack of adherence to Kant’s categorical imperative (this alone would invalidate any notion of taxation as an ethical norm) as it states that “some have the duty to give up taxes and others have the right to consume those taxes.” Further, taxation involves the violation of property rights (theft). Hoppe’s contention is that argument presupposes, both, the NAP and property rights to be valid because argument presupposes that both parties assume the first-comer ethic of property appropriation (most evidently by the ownership of their bodies) as well as the fact that there is always the option of agreeing to disagree (no “argument” involves physical violence; the presence of physical violence makes the interaction cease to be recognizable as argument). Hoppe’s argument, then, is as follows:
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Argumentation implies propositional justification.
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Argumentation implies the use of property rights (specifically, the body as a result of the first-comer ethic).
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Therefore, no proposition which is contrary to property rights is ethically permissible.
To return to the original proposition regarding taxation: this contention contains a performative contradiction because, while asserting that aggression is justified, the actor is nonetheless relying on the assumed validity of the NAP and property rights to even make his argument. The propositional content of the argument is contrary to the ethic (argumentation) by which it is delivered.
Out of curiosity, have you read Hoppe’s argumentation ethics? Is this a query for a briefing of them or are you just searching for clarifications?
I don’t get why it matters if my statement is an ought statement. Aren’t all norms statements about what actions ought/ought not to be taken? And isn’t Hoppe claiming to show that all non-libertarian norms are unjustifiable?
In any case, let me reword it - “It would be justified for people to aggress against each other, so long as they are not arguing.” Am I contradicting myself yet?
I’ve read the presentation of the argument in ATSC and in a few essays. I think it’s basically sound. This is just one lingering objection I have.
It matters because of the fact/value dichotomy. One cannot get to an ought-statement from an is-statement. Hoppe places special emphasis on this divide in his argument.
My reading of ethics, so far, is limited to what I’ve read from Hoppe (in other words, works which I’ve read purely for insights into ethics; every political tract deals with poltics, which is a branch of ethics [that branch concerned with the legitimate use of force]) so my knowledge of ethics is limited (although, thanks to this thread, I now have a pretty good ethics reading list). Hoppe takes care at the outset of his argument that he is dealing specifically with ethics as the logic of justifying arguments; he separates his argument from the branches of ethics that deal with how one should live their life on the basis of what one thinks to be the case (contained in this branch includes arguments based on, but not limited to, religious teachings and emotive arguments). A rationalist, Hoppe attempts to provide an objective, rational basis for ethics.
Awesome.
Yes you are contradicting yourself: the content of this proposition explicitly holds aggression to be legitimate while you deliver the proposition assuming, by what is implied by the act of argument, the validity of private property rights and the NAP.
An example of this proposition in action would be the following: I meet you on the street. I have never before met you in my life. You punch me in the face and steal my wallet (… jerk). What you did is argumentatively unjustifiable (for reasons mentioned above).
NB: Hoppe does not deny that there have been anti-libertarian actions in the past (this is one of the objections to his argument); all his argument states is that such actions are argumentatively unjustifiable (as is aggressing against anyone with or without argument in doing so).
“I demonstrate that only the libertarian private property ethic can be justified argumentatively, because it is the praxeological presupposition of argumentation as such; and that any deviating, non-libertarian ethical proposal can be shown to be in violation of this demonstrated preference. Such a proposal can be made, of course, but its propositional content would contradict the ethic for which one demonstrated a preference by virtue of one’s own act of proposition-making, i.e., by the act of engaging in argum"entation as such. […] Likewise, non-libertarian ethical proposals are falsified by the reality of actually proposing them.” [Hoppe 2006, 341]
I recommend a book about AE, by Stefan Molyneux, ‘Universally Preferable Behaviour (UPB)’. It attempts to create a rational framework to aprove or falsify ethic propositions. Very interesting in my opinion. It’s available as an e-book for free, here (http://freedomainradio.com/FreeBooks.aspx).
That said, I didn’t know that Hoppe wrote on rational ethics, I ought to look into it.
This should get you started:
Economic Science and the Austrian Method
The Economics and Ethics of Private Property
Argumentation and Self-Ownership
Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide
Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics, Again
Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics: A User Friendly, Neighborly Introduction
The italicized hyperlinks lead to Mises Wiki pages of full books (at the bottom of those pages inculde links to the free versions of the book at Mises.org as well as multiple supplementary sources). There may be only specific chapters dedicated to argumentation ethics in these works, but it’s all good stuff.
Thanks a lot =D
Although I read quite a lot about libertarianism for quite a long time now, it’s always good to have more knowledge/“ammunition” for argumentation (ammunition with a peaceful conotation, of course).
If you’re interested, John James has established The Ultimate Beginner meta-thread in order to branch out many different areas of the libertarian philosophy/ethic.
As for peaceful weapons, I would recommend writing the government for access to President Pryor’s Neutron Bomb (it’s a neo-pacifist weapon).
groan
Epicurus wrote the book on ethics. Everyone else since has been either restating him or chasing their tail.
Clayton -
Pshaw! But I will look into this- thanks, Clayton.
Epicurean and Buddhist philosophy laid out what are essentially the basic principles of human action 2500 years ago.
Cicero summarizing an argument given by the Epicurean Lucius Torquatus:
This is the action principle. And it is the point where utility and morality intersect. Right and wrong - in the judgment of the individual human being - is nothing but his experience of pleasure and pain.
Where people get confused is the built-in assumption in human language that there is a harmonious alignment between individual notions of right and wrong and social notions of right and wrong - an assumption which in modern society is frequently incorrect. So, when we say “taxation is immoral”, we are actually talking about our own moral opinion not about social mores which quite strongly support the morality of the act of taxation.
But social facts are not facts about acting - how human beings generally behave and what they generally believe might inform my choices but it does not determine them.
Getting the right “meta-ethic” is the key to making sense of the arguments about ethics. Most arguments about ethics are just an exercise in talking past each other.
Clayton -
I am interested, I saw this thread earlier, and I’m preparing for go tru it. Thanks.
Oh, did not know that, gonna check it out. Dang, lots of reading lately haha.
didn’t grasp the concept interely (sorry, I’m not a native). In that argument, why exactly would taxation be immoral?
I didn’t assert it, I mentioned it hypothetically.
The point is that “taxation is evil/immoral” is false if by this we mean to give a description of prevailing moral sentiment. If I assert “taxation is immoral” I am not giving a description of social norms as they are, I am offering a criticism of social norms. “People don’t hold taxation to be an odious evil but they should.”
There are at least four levels of connotation at work with moral-value language:
- A value-laden expression of an individual’s own sentiments about a particular kind of human behavior (distaste, preference… this is why I groaned at Molyneux’s “Universally Preferable Behavior”… he’s discussing just one connotation)
- A value-free description of prevailing moral norms
- A value-free assessment of the suitability of specific ends to bringing about an individual’s satisfaction (in the technical sense of this term) - this is where Epicurus (correctly) placed the locus of ethical discussion
- A value-laden assessment of the correct resolution of a dispute
The last bullet is particularly problematic because human language tends to mash together the different connotations in ways that make it difficult to keep track of what exactly is being said.
Consider the proposition: “It is wrong to engage in homosexual sex”.
If we take this in the first connotation, it is saying “engaging in homosexual sex is distasteful to the speaker” or “the thought of even someone else…” etc. This connotation is value-laden because it is an expression of a subjective sentiment or opinion. It is always true as long as the speaker is speaking truthfully.
If we take it in the second connotation, it is saying “people generally believe homosexual sex is immoral”. This connotation is value-free and is either true or false. The complicated part of this is that we also have to specify in which connotations we mean that people generally hold it to be the case!
If we take it in the third connotation, it is saying “engaging in homosexual sex is an incorrect course of action for attaining happiness”. This is also a value-free statement and is either true or false but it is crucial to recognize that it is a statement about a population, not about an individual. The conditions under which the proposition is universally true (true for each and every individual) are more stringent than for the proposition to be simply true (with individual exceptions). For example, “sex is pleasurable” is a true statement about the human nature but it is not universally true (true for each and every individual without exception).
Finally, if we take it in the fourth connotation, it means that in disputes involving an act of homosexual sex, someone who has engaged in it should be considered to have “done wrong”. This is a value-laden assessment because it is an expression of essentially the same subjective sentiment as in the first connotation but with the added force that the proposition is meant to justify a legal outcome.
And this is where moral argument becomes extremely problematic and muddled. The origins of moral language lie in dispute-resolution… answering the question “who did wrong?” is, in the primitive situation, one and the same as answering the question “what is the correct resolution to this dispute?” But the role of law in society is not merely - or even mostly - to actualize prevailing moral sentiments. Specifically, moral argument and propaganda can become a basis for pushing law to suit the ends of special interests. So, the mere act of saying “homosexual sex is wrong” might be a precondition to making homsexual sex unlawful.
I didn’t mention the political aspect of morality but you should be able to fill in the blanks - when special interests begin to materially profit from altering the character of law, they become organized moral propagandists, otherwise known as political ideologues, political theorists, lobbies, religious leaders, and so on.
Clayton -
It should also be mentioned that which I’ve never seen mentioned regarding AE:
AE isn’t true because you can/do make arguments with other people, but because the brain is capable, and does in fact, make arguments. If you can say something to yourself, and you can if you’re human, then AE holds.