A Short Critique of Long's Theory of Constitutive Means

Economics Political Theory
1

The following brief critique addresses Roderick Long’s conception of constitutive means as he explains this concept in his essay: “Why Does Justice Have Good Consequences?”

http://praxeology.net/whyjust.htm

The passage below is taken from section #8, Second Digression: Ends and Means

“But here again there are two options; justice is either an external means or an internal means. An external means bears a causal or instrumental relation to its end, while an internal means bears a logical or constitutive relation to its end…playing this particular chord here…is an internal means to playing the Moonlight Sonata. I’m not playing the chord as an end in itself; the chord’s value to me lies in its contribution to the whole sonata. [So the chord is a means – but not an external means]. One test for the difference is to see whether it makes sense to wish for the end without the means. It makes sense to say, “I wish I could achieve fame, fortune, and the love of women without having to compose this Presidential Address,” because the means and the end are logically separable; but it doesn’t make sense to say, “I wish I could play the Moonlight Sonata without having to play all these notes.” [Just these notes, played in just this sequence, constitute the Moonlight Sonata]; there’s nothing we could count as playing the Moonlight Sonata without playing the particular sequence of notes of which it is composed.”

(underline and square parenthesis by AK)

  1. It makes perfect sense to say: “I’m playing this chord in order to complete the Moonlight Sonata.”

In this case, the chord is an instrumental means as defined by Long. Thus, where Long writes “So the chord is a means—but not an external means,” this is not accurate. By Long’s theory, the chord is either an instrumental means or an internal means, depending on how we consider it. But Long is implying that the kind of means the chord is, is independent of how the individual considers those means. It would probably be more accurate to say that considering the chord an internal means is constitutive of Long’s theoretical approach in this particular case.

  1. In Long’s example, he begins by identifying the internal means as the chord. Then he provides a test for determining whether something is an internal means. Then in his own test, he does not test whether the chord is an internal means. His test addresses whether the entity which is “all these notes,” or “just these notes, played in just this sequence,” or “playing the particular sequence of notes,” is constitutive of the Moonlight Sonata. Long concludes: “Just these notes, played in just this sequence, constitute the Moonlight Sonata…” But the original thesis was that the chord was an internal or constitutive means, not all these notes played in just this sequence.

If we consider the chord alone, the following example is conceivable and may be problematic for Long’s theory of constitutive means:

Person A: I was just listening to your rendition of the Moonlight Sonata.

Person B: Yes.

Person A: Why did you leave out chord X?

Person B: In an attempt to demonstrate a problem with Long’s theory of constitutive means.

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2

Hi Adam,

Thanks for this. Ironically you, as a critic, have been more forthcoming and clear in truly expounding upon Long’s theory than Long’s most ardent fans.

Would you say the chord is both constitutive and instrumental to the sonata?

3

Wouldn’t leaving out chord X deliberately mean that you are choosing a different end (demonstrating the problem) than playing the Moonlight Sonata? In that case, your leaving out the chord is itself a constitutive means to your new end.

4

Maybe Long was just a little sloppy in the example he gives, but I think he’s right. What if Long were to give the following example instead;

“Suppose my goal is to give an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata. This chord is a constitutive means because it makes no sense to say I wish I could give an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata without playing this chord.”

Another example: Suppose my goal is to go for a walk in Hyde Park. Moving my leg is a constitutive means, because It makes no sense to say I wish I could go for a walk in Hyde Park without moving my leg.

If I understand Long correctly, the key difference between a constitutive means and an instrumental means is that the former is implied in the very description of the end sought, whereas the latter is not. So in the above examples, I don’t necessarily need sheet music (the instrumental means), but I do need that chord (constitutive) to give an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata. Similarly I don’t necessarily need shoes (instrumental), but I do need to move my legs (constitutive) to go for a walk in Hyde Park.

5

Well if it wasn’t an accurate rendition then technically it wouldn’t be the moonlight sonata.

You are correct in the destinction between constitutive and instrumental means though.

6

Lilburne:

No. Long agrees that there are instrumental means. But as you can see from the example, Long doesn’t apply his own test to the chord to see whether it is a constitutive means. And in the exchange between person A and person B, we see that person B played the Moonlight Sonata without the chord in question, which according to Long’s test seems to indicate that the chord isn’t a constitutive means.

7

But what if we define the goal to be an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata, the exchange could be like this:

Person A: I was just listening to you play the piano.

Person B: Yes

Person A: What were you trying to do?

Person B: Give an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata

Person A: But you left out chord X, Why did you do that?

Person B: To demonstrate a problem with Long’s theory.

Person A: But you didn’t give an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata. You didn’t accomplish what you set out to do, so there is no problem with the theory.

8

Wombatron:

What about the two primary points ?

  1. Long claims that the chord in question is a constitutive means. But even if we grant that there are such things as constitutive means, the point is that the chord can also be an instrumental means. And thus, even by the terms of Long’s theory, it seems that the kind of means the chord is, is dependent on how the means are considered by the theorist. So this aspect of Long’s theory seems to be inaccurate.

  2. Long does not use his own test to determine whether the chord is a constitutive means. Until the chord passes Long’s own test of what constitutes a constitutive means, we will want to assume that the chord is not a constitutive means. But as this was the primary example arguing for the existence of constitutive means—Long uses this same example in Economics and Its Ethical Assumptions—then the validity of constitutive means as a workable concept is called into question.

“Wouldn’t leaving out chord X deliberately mean that you are choosing a different end (demonstrating the problem) than playing the Moonlight Sonata? In that case, your leaving out the chord is itself a constitutive means to your new end.”

According to Long’s test, we have to see whether it makes sense to wish for the end without the means.

Person A: I wish I could demonstrate the problem in Long’s theory of constitutive means without having to leave out this chord.

Person B: Rather than demonstrate the problem by means of leaving out this chord, why not post something on the Mises forum?

It seems to make sense to wish to demonstrate the problem without leaving out this chord.

9

Leonidia:

I would consider the revision you are proposing to Long’s theory a substantial revision. Whether Long wants to make the type of revision you are suggesting to his theory, I don’t know. Maybe you can contact him and suggest it.

My points were directed at Long’s theory as it was laid out in the passage, not at a theory that Long currently does not have.

Adam

10

It’s not a substantial revision of his theory at all.

It is a revision of the example he gives to demonstrate the theory.

As I said before, Long’s example could have been chosen with more care. But it doesn’t follow that you’ve demonstrated a problem with his theory just because you demonstrated a problem with his example. All one has to do to prove the theory is correct (i.e. that constitutive means exist) is to give an example where the means are necessarily constitutive. And as I think I demonstrated, it isn’t all that hard to do, Long’s example to the contrary notwithstanding.

11

Well, that’s Leonidia’s opinion.

My opinion is that you are proposing a substantial alteration to Long’s theory. But if I’m wrong, and Long can simply clean up the example, then I assume he will. But it is also possible Long may agree with me that your proposed alteration would be substantial, and lead to other problems with the theory.

By the way, though you imply that Long’s passages as written are faulty, you haven’t explicitly written where you yourself find those passages faulty. If you were willing to state clearly and unambiguously where Long’s theory (as it is laid out in his example) goes wrong, that would provide a basis or baseline for further discussion. It would create a standard to be met by future versions of the theory. But as you have not actually explicitly spelled out where Long’s example (as written above) goes wrong, we have no clear understanding of why you believe Long’s example could be more carefully chosen. In not clearly stating what is wrong with Long’s current example, you provide no standard by which a future version of the theory could be judged in your own estimation.

12

.

Adam:

You are confusing Long’s theory with Long’s example.

It’s an objective fact that Long believes there are such things as constitutive means. He describes them as means that bear a logical or constitutive relation to the end. He says we can demonstrate whether or not means are constitutive by asking, “does it makes sense to wish for the end without using the means in question?” That’s his theory. Period. I haven’t changed one word of his theory. Your opinion that I am proposing a substantial alteration to Long’s theory is simply wrong.

As I said, I don’t believe Long’s theory is wrong. You’re putting words in my mouth.

Ok. Well now at least you’re referring to the fact that I believe Long’s example is not a good one. You yourself make the case that the example fails. If you refer to my earlier posts, you will see that I provide two examples where I believe the means are necessarily constitutive to the end. If you think they don’t work, please say why. And please don’t just say, “that’s Leonidia’s opinion.”

13

Could you please elaborate. Perhaps analyze Long’s example, and show exactly and unambiguously why it isn’t a good one?

14

I’m not sure what you are saying here. Sure, the chord can also be an instrumental means, but to another end. It can’t be both instrumental and constitutive, and which it is depends on whether the means is a necessary part of the end.

I think it is just unclear wording on his part. Since chord X is itself part of “just these notes, played in just this sequence”, it is constitutive of the end of playing the Moonlight Sonata. It would’ve been less confusing if he hadn’t switched from talking about chord X to talking about everything that is constitutive towards the end, but it doesn’t fundamentally change the argument.

I think I get what you are saying now: “if one can choose among different means to achieve one end, how are any of them constitutive of the end, if they can be omitted at will?” Is this correct?

15

Long says, “playing this particular chord here is an internal means to playing the Moonlight Sonata.” He then goes on to say the “chord here” is a constitutive means because “it makes no sense to say ‘I wish I could play the Moonlight Sonata without having to play all these notes.’”

Two problems with Long’s exmaple:

  1. The term Moonlight Sonata is vague. You could argue that you’re still playing the Moonlight Sonata, provided you get a substantial number of notes right. If you leave one out, it might be possible to claim it’s still the Moonlight Sonata, in which case the note is not essential to the end.

  2. The language he chooses is unfortunate. If he wants to demonstrate the chord here is an essential element of the end, the question should be “it makes no sense to say 'I wish I could play the Moonlight Sonata whithout playing this chord here” rather than “I wish I could play the Moonlight Sonata without playing all these notes”

A better example would be:

Playing this chord here is an internal means to giving an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata because it makes no sense to say “I wish I could give an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata without having to play this chord here.” Therefore this chord here is a constitutive means of giving an accurate rendition of the Moonlight Sonata. Therefore constitutive means exist.

16

i admit i didn’t read Long’s article, but I’ve been browsing this thread. Is everybody trying to say “accuracy” has nothing to do with the Moonlight Sonata? I don’t know if over-analyzing is happening or what, so forgive me if I bring that up. Taking out a chord of this piece of music would not be the Moonlight Sonata. It would be close, but Beethoven determined what this particular piece of music will consist of Taking out one chord will not only conflict with Beethoven’s rendition, but will at this point in time conflict with all the musical sheets of Moonlight Sonata that currently exist.

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18

thank you Laughing Man. [:D][Y]

19

Is a means always an action? Is an end always a state/condition?

If so, how can an action ever be part of (constitutive of) a state/condition?

Some readers may now point out that the end of “playing the Moonlight Sonata” is an action, not a state or condition. However, the notion of an action being an end doesn’t seem to work out very well, so a charitable interpretation of Long demands that we avoid interpreting his end as an action.

To see this, imagine the following exchange.

Long: My end is “playing the Moonlight Sonata.”

AJ: At what point in time will your end change status from unachieved to achieved?

Long: Once the final chord has been struck and the piano has gone silent.

AJ: Not a moment sooner?

Long: No, exactly at that moment.

AJ: Well then, strictly speaking, your end is “having played the Moonlight Sonata.”

Long (A): Yes, that’s exactly what I mean. My end is the state/condition of having played the Moonlight Sonata to completion. If I were to mess up even on the very last chord, it wouldn’t count and my end would not be achieved - I’m practicing to avoid just such an error!

AJ: Thank you, that makes sense. Just to be completely clear, will your end have been in any way “partially achieved” if you stop playing halfway through your performance?

Long (A): No, it will still be entirely unachieved, since my end is “having played the Moonlight Sonata,” meaning having played it completely to the end.

…or…

Long (B): No, the end will be achieved little by little as I perform each note and chord of the song in succession.

AJ: So your end will be partially achieved when you are halfway through your performance, provided you’ve played it perfectly up to that point?

Long (B): Yes.

AJ: And when you have played the very next chord after the halfway point, your end of “playing the Moonlight Sonata” will be even a little bit more achieved?

Long (B): Right.

AJ: Doesn’t this mean that your end of “playing the Moonlight Sonata” can be thought of as a succession of many smaller ends of the form, “playing X chord or note after having played Y set of chords and notes”?

Long (B): Yes, it is a succession of smaller ends, but the key is that the smaller ends comprise an aggregate end that is meaningful to me - that of playing the whole song. Hence each smaller end is also a means to that aggregate end. Furthermore, we cannot wish for the aggregate end without wishing for each of those smaller ends, so each smaller end is a constitutive means.

Note here that Long cannot have both A and B. It cannot be that his end is partially achieved halfway through the performance and furthered with each note and chord, yet remains entirely unachieved until the performance is completely finished. He must choose.

However, interpretation B seems at odds with Long when he states:

“I’m not playing the chord as an end in itself; the chord’s value to me lies in its contribution to the whole sonata.”

The end is either a collection of smaller ends (chords and notes) or it is not. Clearly, Long intends for his end NOT to be a collection of smaller ends, so we must discard B in favor of A.

In summary, to remain coherent, Long’s end must be clarified as “having played Moonlight Sonata completely” (a state/condition). This end will remain entirely unachieved until he sounds the final chord in Moonlight Sonata, having played all the rest in correct timing before it.

However, the action of “playing this particular chord here” happens at a time before the onset of the state/condition that is Long’s end, so it is therefore external and cannot possibly be internal to it or constitutive of it. It is indeed not part of the end at all, as Long needs it to be. It is merely an indispensable step along the way. [Indeed, some instrumental means are optional and some are absolutely required, but that does not change that fact that they are external to the end.]

Now that we have more carefully examined the time element involved in playing a piece of piano music, Long’s theory has nowhere to hide, and reduces to the mundane observation in square brackets above.

20

A brick is part of a house yet is placed before the house is completed - the house is constituted by bricks; the brick isn’t just a means to building the house, it is in some respects part of the house. Similarly, the complete Moonlight Sonata is constituded by playing a number of chords, which individually comprise it. Contrast to use of money to procure something like an iPod - the money is in and out of the picture. Does this clarify?