A Critique Of Hoppean Ethics ('argumentation ethics')

Miscellaneous General
1

More videos on morality: http://vforvoluntary.com/morality

References:
[1] http://mises.org/daily/5500/Why-Liberalism
[2] http://mises.org/daily/5669/A-Utilitarian-Foundation-of-Morality
[3] http://mises.org/daily/5683/In-Defense-of-Misess-Utilitarianism
[4] http://mises.org/daily/5783/Twos-Company-The-Basics-of-Property
[5] http://mises.org/daily/5790/What-Gives-Rise-to-Society
[6] http://www.fee.org/news/harry-brownes-libertarian-resolutions/
[7] http://daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/On_Hoppe.html
[8] http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html
[9] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gj9D2mOe0i4
[10] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85X9ou_QzAw

Full text at:
http://nielsio.tumblr.com/post/16528520459/a-critique-of-hoppean-ethics-argumentation-ethics

2

I agree that Hoppe is wrong. I don’t agree that “libertarianism” is a means; or, to the extent that it is, it is only in the very indirect sense that “division of labor” or “capitalism” is a means. It’s not really a means because it is not something you yourself can utilize.

I think Mises is right that science has nothing to say about morality if he means a priori science, such as praxeology. Clearly, we can know things about descriptive morality (what people hold to be right and wrong). More importantly, I think we can give a theory of how moral rules come to be and I think this theory clarifies all the confusion surrounding the subject of morality, whether confusion on the part of science or otherwise. Once you understand the nature of personal morality (the attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain), you realize that descriptive morality plays the role of informing personal morality… what course of action will allow you to attain pleasure and avoid pain is, in large part, contingent upon what people hold to be right and wrong.

Clayton -

3

Argumentation Ethics and “Equivocation”

(but first better to be familiar with the argument ↓)

4

How do you go from “no ownership” to “ownership is determined by possession?” You’re so ready to address the conflation of ownership and possesion that you totally miss the actual claim.

5

Thank you for your feedback. This is just a matter of wording, the peaceful resolution of conflict, of course, implies the adoption of some rule of ownership (other than violence). To argue for none whatsoever, trivially voids the argument and is inconsistent.

The new wording is:

  1. Man has no ownership of his physical body.
  2. Man has partial ownership of his physical body.
  3. Man has full ownership of his physical body.

No other options exist. Now, we will show that (3) is the only acceptable option by showing all other possibilities, (1) and (2) to both be inherently stand in contradiction to the act of argumentation.

As for option (1), which is essentially “There is no concept ownership for bodies at all”, as Kinsella argues, the very act of argumentation presupposes that ownership and mere possession are not the same. To assume that the right to control is determined by the the physical ability to control of the resource is to adopt a rule of force, might makes right approach which is in contradiction to the core, most basic common argumentative presupposition of peaceful conflict resolution. Since (1) boils down to a simple rule of violence, the complete opposite of any substantive argument its propounding in argumentation is self-contradictory and inconsistent. It can be said that rule (1) directly contradicts the entire point of argumentation.

6

“I don’t agree that “libertarianism” is a means; or, to the extent that it is, it is only in the very indirect sense that “division of labor” or “capitalism” is a means. It’s not really a means because it is not something you yourself can utilize.”

If you’re a libertarian then you apply pressure to the rest of society. That which you support (private property) and that which you don’t support (all the rest of it).

7

Nielsio,

I don’t see the connection to Hoppe.

8

For the life of me, I will never understand why people don’t accept the validity of this. Rothbard went nearly his entire life without believing in a rational ethic and preached for years that such a thing was impossible. Upon hearing Hoppe’s argument he immediately changed his mind. I’m not trying to insinuate that just because Rothbard thinks a certain thing is so, that it must be right, but someone denying the axiom of argumentation and the neccesary knowledge that follows is no different than someone denying the action axiom and the neccsary knowledge that follows.

Hoppe describing the fact/value dictonomy:

"…there is the logical gap between “is-” and “ought-statements”

which natural rights proponents have failed to bridge successfully—

except for advancing some general critical remarks regarding

the ultimate validity of the fact-value dichotomy. Here the praxeological

proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely

value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely

in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an “ought”

from an “is.” The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is

propositional justification—a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation

presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading

principle—a priori true is-statement; and (c) then, no deviation from

this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement.

The proof also offers a key to an understanding of the nature of the

fact-value dichotomy: Ought-statements cannot be derived from is statements.

They belong to different logical realms. It is also clear,

however, that one cannot even state that there are facts and values if

no propositional exchanges exist, and that this practice of propositional

exchanges in turn presupposes the acceptance of the private

property ethic as valid. In other words, cognition and truth-seeking

as such have a normative foundation, and the normative foundation

on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of private property

rights."