It’s more just unclear definitions than a contradiction but this is basically it. We can distinguish between what we could call ‘factual self-ownership’ which would just be “this person is enjoying exclusive control over himself” and ‘ethical self-ownership’ which would imply an obligation to respect this control. You can have property in the factual sense without having any kind of property right (see: everything the state and it’s cronies own) and to justify the latter means delving into ethics more deeply.
i’d love for libertarianism to be an axiom
It isn’t, in fact it is impossible to be a libertarian, socialist, Christian, etc in any way outside of some customary/ legal terminology. That is to say, ia Christain can only be defined by making the sign of the cross before a meal and attending mass on Sunday or whatever physical observable criterea you may wish to use against whichever cultural backdrop you wish to identify with, one can not ontologically be a Xtian as the doctrine is nonsensical and can only be itself; as are all such labels as a thing is always, and can only be itself and concern itself with itself. To identify a libertaian by his physical creedal utterences or how he votes etc is doable, and subjective, but to think one of the term as an “axiomatic” label is not possible.
The market process is axiomatic…particularly if you enjoy civilization. Actual ethics, like any religion, on the other hand is literal jibberish. If something makes sense, it is most likely legal theory, custom, or simply good advice for a particular situation it is not and can never be ethics.
hear hear for common sense! it seems people are finally waking up to the semantic gibberish.
In that formulation it is demonstratably false. Any ethic can obviously be argued, and indeed they are frequently.
Don’t be so obtuse. You cannot make the argument without a logical contradiction in the argument.
Well, there is nothing contradictory in unlibertarian ethics themselves. They are contrary to libertarianism, big deal. Not even Hoppe thinks there are logical contradictions.
Right. In other words, Hoppe just begs the question of libertarianism.
Molyneux apparently does, and it also seems like some people think Argumentation Ethics contends this.
Well, there is nothing contradictory in unlibertarian ethics themselves.
Yes - they violate ethics’ claim to universality.
“Yes - they violate ethics’ claim to universality.”
This is true. I’ve yet to hear an ethical theory from a statist.
Usually if they have an ethical theory it is only applied to things under the state; like animal rights or the ethics of business or something like that. Never applying it to business, animals, and the state the same rules. Or saying that women ‘have a right to their body’ in the case of abortion, while not expanding upon the implication of course. In order to keep the state from those same demands.
Even if libertarianism is completely false and not justifiable at all, this would only make statism equally or more false.
My asssessment of argumentation ethics is actually the opposite – that Hoppe creates a solid meta-ethical framework for how we might understand ethical propositions and evaluate their truth, but fails when it comes time to fill in this framework with actual ethical claims. I agree with BrainPolice’s statement that
However, you (JamesB) evidently agree with that anyway. But suppose for a moment that Hoppe does succeed, and shows that all and only libertarian norms can be argued without performative contradiction. Would that be sufficient for an ethical theory?
I argue that it is. We can fix the meta-ethical problem by defining “ethical” as “able to be argued for without performative contradiction,” leaving us with an ethical theory that perhaps feels somewhat unsatisfying (since we might have been hoping for an all-encompassing life-guide à la Ayn Rand), but which is really the best that we could hope for from an “objective” theory. (It is unrealistic to expect Hoppe to have an argument whose sheer persuasiveness changes everybody’s ultimate values; this is ruled out by the is-ought distinction.) What this theory would be good for is providing a starting point for resolving disputes over rights, such as might arise in a court of law. So perhaps it’s better to think of Hoppe’s theory as a theory of law rather than a theory of ethics; thinking of it this way might lead us to have less unrealistically high expectations of what an argument like Hoppe’s can do for us.
If something is worth arguing for, it’s worth arguing for correctly…
I think Hoppe mentions that he is working with a political ethical system, not a personal ethical system. The purpose of this system is to settle disputes which arise out of the inherent scarcity which exists in the universe:
But there are a gazillion ehtical systems solving disputes over scarcity, each permitting argumentation to take place.
Do these all presume the freedom of agents, and are they consistent with non-aggression?
You can claim to argue for any of these ethical systems, but you cannot make your argument without contradicting yourself (performance contradiction). If a political ethical system is supposed to resolve disputes, how can it be internally contradictory? Such a system is useless for resolving disputes and violates the very definition of a political ethical system.
None of what you say makes sense. What ethcial systems exactly are internally inconsistent? And the performative contradiction claim is false. Plenty of people have argued even under statism.
I’d love to engage you in a proper debate but I am afraid If I question the state I may be found later to have committed a crime of sedition so I will refer you to Hoppe’s book.
scineram, can you offer a more specific description of what you find illogical with argumentation ethics? I feel like you’re only offering one liners and not any deep criticism. Are you confused about what it means to make a performance contradiction?