Neither does ethics. It says “if you want to be moral do X”.
You can choose your subjective values though
If they are saying we should value subjective ethics, they are not nihilists.
No comment on the content, but I’d like to point out that even if you are simply refuting bad theory, these days it seems you have to label yourself with something in order to be taken seriously. I don’t know if that is the case with neo-nihilism, but in philosophy in general I think the biggest advancements to be gained are actually in trashing the nonsense theories that distract people, especially Platonism (or whatever that theory is called that tries to tell people that naming something makes it real; apologies to any Platonists if I got the wrong title - no time to do the research right now).
"Yes there is such a thing as a moralizing Austrian, one who adheres to Austrian economic theory and moralizes at the same time! "
No, there is no such thing as a moralizing ‘Austrian’ qua Austrian Economist.
“The moralizing bit doesn’t have anything to do with Austrian econ per se.”
Yep, so why say it’s a moralizing “Austrian”?
“Truly his ethics were far more logical and non contradictory, but such is irrelevant to the fact that this undertaking was, in the end, a failure.”
The only failure here is your analysis & baseless assertions.
or whatever that theory is called that tries to tell people that naming something makes it real
Platonism is predicated on certain ideal concepts (like “horse” or “yellow”) having real existence in their own abstract realm. You could call it an ideal realism. It has little to do with naming things but rather archetypes.
Conza, it’s like saying “a brown fox”. You’re describing a noun. Austrian in this sense is an adherent to Austrian econ. Moralizing is the description. Since the thing I was talking about was subjective theory of value in relation to ethics, the point being made was that an Austrian who just so happens to moralize definitionally accepts STOV, but at the same time maintains that some values ought to be held instead of others. I was just…Laying it out.
“Conza, it’s like saying “a brown fox”.”
No, it’s like saying “a square circle.”
"You’re describing a noun. Austrian in this sense is an adherent to Austrian econ. Moralizing is the description. "
It’s exactly like the comical attempt of “thick” and “thin” libertarianism.
And why did you stop at economic school of thought? Why not political philosophy? Religion? Epistemology? How about methodology within the natural sciences? And on and on.
“Since the thing I was talking about was subjective theory of value in relation to ethics, the point being made was that an Austrian who just so happens to moralize definitionally accepts STOV, but at the same time maintains that some values ought to be held instead of others. I was just…Laying it out.”
Moralize, eh? Like? What and who maintains that some values ought to be held instead of others?
“The only failure here is your analysis & baseless assertions.”
How is my analysis a failure? Indeed such by itself is a baseless assertion.
Rothbard’s entire career on the subject of moral philosophy was based upon a non-utilitarian standard of ethics based upon the concept of self ownership but he never once answered the question of why one inherently should respect the ownership of others. He acted as though he had an irrefutable objective set of ethics when, in the end, he had nothing but an opinion that you should respect the self ownership of others based upon a set property norm. His ethics would have been just as valid had they been utility based.
It is particularly odd that Rothbard should take this approach when the reason that the Austrian school really works is because it understands subjective value and the fact that value preferences shift from person to person, yet Rothbard tries to set an objective value despite being one of the Austrian School’s greatest economists. Such is ironic and contradictory.
I hope this clarifies the above statement.
No, it’s like saying “a square circle.”
Can you clarify something for me; are you saying libertarianism, a certain moral system, Austrian economics, and anarcho-capitalism are interchangeable synonymous words, or did I completely miss your point?
“If you want to be socialist, redistribute wealth.”
“If you want to be shomer Shabbat, don’t turn on lights on Saturday.”
“If you want to be a {long list of 1,000 randomly-chosen actions}-er, do {one of those actions}.”
What distinguishes “moral” from any other category of actions that someone could come up with?
@Zavoi: Morality is not a strategy. That is, morality is not about means, it’s about ends. Morality is a subset of valuation.
Clayton -
Nothing. Why do you want to be ethical? Personal taste probably…
Morality is kind of this bundled term. Its the synthesis between our decision making process (do this, don’t do that), a green/red flag if you will, and a standard of conduct. I see no reason to bundle these concepts. They are analytically distinct.
This is more commonly known as Moral Anti-Realism
“How is my analysis a failure? Indeed such by itself is a baseless assertion.”
Negative, considering it was pointed out you didn’t make an argument. The burden of proof doesn’t lie with me. In any case, it’s what you have now taken it upon yourself todo.
“Rothbard’s entire career on the subject of moral philosophy”
Moral philosophy? Ahhh, you mean political philosophy - right?
“was based upon a non-utilitarian standard of ethics”
I believe the words you are looking for: a rationalist axiomatic-deductive objective ethics.
“but he never once answered the question of why one inherently should respect the ownership of others.”
That’s because your question is completely irrelevent to political philosophy. This is basic stuff bro.
“For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for “Smith” - the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat - to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.[5]” - MNR
“He acted as though he had an irrefutable objective set of ethics when, in the end, he had nothing but an opinion that you should respect the self ownership of others based upon a set property norm.”
Nope, not just an opinion. And “in the end”, he recognised argumentation ethics.
“In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he [Hoppe] has managed to transcend the famous is / ought, fact / value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist-lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law / natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison.” - Murray N. Rothbard, “Beyond Is and Ought,” Liberty (Nov. 1988): 44-45, 44.
…
"Nevertheless, by coming out with a genuinely new theory (amazing in itself, considering the long history of political philosophy) Hoppe is in danger of offending all the intellectual vested interests of the libertarian camp. Utilitarians, who should be happy that value freedom was preserved, will be appalled to find that Hoppean rights are even more absolutist and “dogmatic” than natural rights. Natural rightsers, while happy at the “dogmatism” will be unwilling to accept an ethics not grounded in the board nature of things. Randians will be particularly upset on the satantic immanual kant and his “synthetic a priori”. Randians might be mollified, however, to learn that Hoppe is influence by a group of German Kantians (headed by mathematician Paul Lorenzen) who interpret Kant as a deeply realistic Aristotelian, in contrast to the Idealist interpretation common in the U. S.
As a natural rightser, I don’t see any real contradiction here, or why one cannot hold to both the natural rights and the Hoppean rights ethic at the same time. Both rights ethics, after all, are grounded, like the realist version of Kantianism, in the nature of reality. Natural law, too, provides a personal and social ethic apart from libertarianism; this is an area Hoppe is not concerned with…" - MNR, pg 2.
“Can you clarify something for me; are you saying libertarianism, a certain moral system, Austrian economics, and anarcho-capitalism are interchangeable synonymous words, or did I completely miss your point?”
Sure. No, that’s not what I’m saying. Libertarianism is a political philosophy - which is a subset of ethics, it has nothing to do with Austrian Economics - which is value free. For eg. you can have an Austrian Economist - who understands the praxeological considerations, i.e that rent control destroys, but in term - he is a Nazi (political philosophy) and supports the Israeli government adopting such a policy.
The question of religion is another completely different ballpark. Where natural law ultimately comes from is completely irrelevent to political philosophy. Natural law is neither anti-religious, or pro-religious. It’s a different ontological question. There is also the type of personal ethics one adopts.
My point was - why stop at Austrian? Why not a “moralizing” Utilitarian-Libertarian-Austrian-Athiest-NeoKantian? Could probably add some more onto that, anyway it was a brief attempt at argumentum ad absurdum. Libertarianism I’d use as a general description of those who try and apply the NAP as their principle. Anarcho-capitalism is the logical conclusion of libertarianism.
This may clear things up; (context is discussion about thick and thin libertarianism) - may be helpful here though. From Wilderness:
"I came at it from the opposite direction which I think Conza is doing. It’s as if you are reading the story from the left column to the right column and I am reading it from the right to the left, ie. opposite direction. It gives the name a whole other meaning. The way I was reading it, is the noun (libertarian) is being added upon by the adjective, ie. thick or thin. The noun is staying political and the adjective is determining the kind of politics, ie. the noun. Read the way you put it, the noun is political but the adjective is a whole separate concept, yet, such a concept is still being discussed within a class of political individuals called libertarians so the thin and thick by such an effort might only have to do with libertarians and nobody else. But is that true? Are there no thick and thin socialists? I don’t know. But it would seem the way you are using the terms thick and thin they are not dependent on libertarian, ie. the politics. So if thick and thin are not dependent on politics then thick and thin has to be able to be used with other political stances. Now if thick and thin can’t be used by other political stances and if the thick and thin are only “indicating… a broader group of values”, then I don’t really have a problem with that.
To attach non-political values to a political term will make it a bit flustering unless of course it is vetted out as to what you mean, I mean, Conza means, etc… I think Conza sees the adjective as influencing the noun. Adjectives do that. That’s why they are grammatical of that sense. But if thin and thick are nouns too and libertarian remains a noun, then I think that’s what you are talking about. And as I said how can I really have a problem with that because that would be what I’m saying and what Conza and even E.R. are saying. Political is not ‘these broader values’. We are all agreeing with that. But does the grammar and thus meaning if thick and thin are adjectives placed onto the noun really doing that? I incline no."
Conza, look :
“A brown fox”. Fox is the noun, brown describes his color. “A moralizing Austrian.” Austrian (adherent of the economic school and appreciator of the subjective theory of value) is the noun, moralizing describes a particular Austrian. I never said all Austrians were moralizers and I never said they had one unified code of ethics, just like saying all foxes are not definitionally brown. You compare it to a square circle which is a logical contradiction. A moralizing Austrian is not a logical contradiction.
I narrowed my discussion to what Austrians tend to believe since I am under the assumption that we all like the Austrian school on here. What I was attempting to say (but didn’t spell out very well) was that Austrians believe value is definitionally subjective. Some Austrians extend this descriptive aspect to social behavior and leave it at that by denying moral normativity, but some don’t as they believe that while value is subjective, there are still actions that ought to be valued. Like I said, I was just trying to describe the situation.
As for Rothbard, I don’t necessarily accept deontology, but I think when you get down to it, most human beings believe that we own ourselves. So Rothbard’s deductions are perfectly valid (if you own yourself, you own your labor and if you own your labor, you own what you “mix” your labor with). There’s no ultimate reason to be logically consistent, but most of us want to and if you deny the right to ownership and support taxes while at the same time assuming that we own ourselves and our labor, then you are contradicting yourself.
Rothbard’s argument for self-ownership are that the alternatives are praxeologically untenable. He may rely on Aristotelian/NR arguments here and there but his ultimate case for self-ownership is that; it’s far more Kantian than Aristotelian. Hoppe relies on arg. ethics and a less well known argument formulated in Kinsella’s How we come to own ourselves. They’re fairly minimalist arguments, like Anthony de Jasay’s in Against Politics, which is why I like them.
In that case, then, it seems that you are a “neo-nihilist” as well.
Just because I think prescriptive morality is a useful concept does not make me a nihilist… 2+2=4 by definition of its symbols and etc.
What is your definition of the symbol “moral”? Is it a long, unstructured list of actions? (In which case your position is indistinguishable from neo-nihilism.) Or is your definition something like “that which it is possible to coherently argue for”? (This, in my view, is the only definition that could potentially provide a non-trivial basis for ethics.)
Nihilists are a diverse bunch, but if being a “neo nihilist” means you claim ethical propositions are false then I am not one. Ethical propositions simply have no truth content and are therefore not capable of being true/false.