“In other words he has no refutation of it, but for the reasons stated is going to assume it’s wrong.”
Mises doesn’t assume determinism is wrong. Methodological dualism is not ontological dualism. Methodological dualism isn’t resorted to because we don’t know WHETHER actions are determined. Even if it were proven that actions are indeed determined, so long as we do not know WHICH actions will be caused by WHICH factors, we still must resort to methodological dualism. It is not enough to know THAT firing neurons lead to choices. For a scientist studying human behavior to practice methodological monism, he would need to know WHICH circumstances regarding the firing of neurons would lead to deciding to compose a symphony, and WHICH circumstances regarding the firing of neurons would instead lead to deciding to read a book. So long as we can’t accomplish such a mind-boggling feat as that, the only way of studying human behavior that makes sense is by considering humans as acting beings with minds, wills, and intentions.
devoid of any scientific foundation [=no facts whatsoever lead one to believe it is true]
meaningless for scientific research
useless for scientific research
contrary to reason [=makes no sense whatsoever]
contrary to experience [= no basis whatsoever in reality, quite the contrary]
then I’d say he’s rejecting it ontologically as well.
Not to mention that if determinism is true and we behave because of things happening on som emolecular level, then that scientist would not need to know anything, because he would have no choice in doing what he’s doing. He also could not be called “studying human behavior” [because his conclusions would be forgone anyway], just as a computer or robot cannot be said to fall in love.
Edit: 1,2 and 3 are the basis for a shave by Occam’s Razor. 4 and 5 are reasons to reject it without resorting to the razor.
What more does he have to say to convey that he thinks it’s nonsense [=ontological rejection]?
Not to mention that if determinism is true and we behave because of things happening on some molecular level, then >>that scientist would not need to know anything, because he would have no choice in doing what he’s doing
Not if you’re Hoppe who claims to have proven it (or established it as an irrefutable axiom) by using performative contradiction. I’m merely saying he has done no such thing.
if you assert that only you act and nothing else does you merely reduce the domain of ‘humans’ or agents that are analysable through praxeology and that are bound by argumentation ethics etc. etc. In other words, you are excluding other bipeds from the domain of ‘personhood’ and ‘agency’, you are not taking the intentional stance with them.
If “acting” is a defining characteristic of the set “humans”, then “humans act” is not an axiom but a mere circular rehash of the definition itself.
Of course, which is why Mises doesn’t call it one. He is simply stating what is already implicit when we come to analyse human action. In so far as we recognise the tautologies to be reflected in the nature of the actions of human beings then, like mathematics, they have empirical relevance. Utilizing understanding to analyse specific cases is by no means trivial, yet it does not invalidate praxeology in the same way that a physical calculation mistakenly utilising a mathematical averaging technique to phenomena for which it is not applicable does not invalidate the method of averaging, nor the empirical relevance of its results where conditions do match its categories.
So if X is defined as “all those who freel”, this implies that if member A “greels”, all other non-A members of X must also “greel”?
Not at all.
Not if you’re Hoppe who claims to have proven it (or established it as an irrefutable axiom) by using performative contradiction. I’m merely saying he has done no such thing.
Did Hoppe actually claim to prove the action axiom? As axioms cannot be proven or disproven. What makes it an axiom is whether its self-evident, to which you agree it is.
Hoppe’s claim is that it is my performative contradiction that raises human action to an axiomatic level. I say it doesn’t. Self-evident seems good enough of an axiomatic pass to me.
Hoppe’s claim is that it is my performative contradiction that raises human action to an axiomatic level. I say it doesn’t. Self-evident seems good enough of an axiomatic pass to me.
He isn’t saying you are committing a performance contradiction at all though, as you are making a statement about others whereas a performance contradiction would have to be self-referential as in “I don’t act.” Your saying “other people don’t act” challenges the Action Axiom itself no more than saying “giraffes smell” rather your statement challenges whether other people are rational beings at all.
Self-evident seems good enough of an axiomatic pass to me.