Game Theory, self interest, and praxeology

Sun. 12/08/12 14:07 EDT
.post #233
[url=Game Theory, self interest, and praxeology - #25 by zefreak]

…and also, apparently, the two questions I asked you.

Well, my interpretation of what Clayton wrote differs from yours.

First, Clayton neither wrote nor posited that behavior is a “product” of anything, nor, as the quote I provided makes clear, does Szasz. Here is another Szasz quote, from p. 30 of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis:

To speak of behavior as the “product” of mind or brain, the way (for example) bile is the product of the liver, is incorrect. Behavior is not a “product”; behavior is human choice and action. This is not to say that behavior is not influenced by many things (including the brain).

As for Clayton, he wrote (my emphasis):

Clayton’s point (the way I read it, anyway) is that calling a child’s misbehavior a “disease” (or a “disorder”) creates the illusion that the problem “resides,” disease-like, in the child. This is identical to what goes on in the classroom: If the student finds the teacher and subject boring and irrelevant, the student must have a “disorder.” Heaven forbid that perhaps the teacher and subject are boring and irrelevant! And heaven forbid that perhaps some parents are lazy and ignorant. No, it’s much easier to slap the “mentally disordered” label on the kid, and psychiatrists are only too eager to oblige.

I’m not sure whom you think “the victim” is that Clayton is “blaming.”

Some parents have problems with their kids’ behavior, and some kids have problems with their parents’ behavior. But, since the parents, teachers, school boards and psychiatrists are more powerful than the kid, it is they who get to slap the “mentally disordered” label on the kid, then force drugs into him.

Neuroscience is irrelevant to child/parent relationships, but psychiatrists and psychologists invoke it to justify recasting as a medical problem what is in fact a relationship problem, then pushing drugs onto and into the kid.

No, I think Clayton nailed it pretty well.

No, it doesn’t mean this.

No, it doesn’t mean this either.

Szasz’s contention is neither.

What Szasz asserts is:

Behavior is not disease.
Behavior is not a “product” of the brain, nor is the brain’s “function” to “produce” behavior.
Behavior is not “caused” or “produced.” Behavior is influenced and chosen.