There are a few problems here. Are you talking about legal ownership or just ownership? Also, it does not imply that. One could argue that being able to control something is a necessary condition. I do not believe that either, as that would mean that the fully paralyzed do not own anything. But you can see that this statement does not imply what you said.
Nope.
If you would like.
I have nothing to say about this, as we are not using my definition of will.
As stated above, I do not consider control to be a necessary aspect of ownership.
If you must know, I consider title to be necessary and sufficient for ownership. And, since that title cannot be transferred in the case of the will, ownership of your will always remains with yourself.
My answer is above.
Well, you can define things however you want, but the control of your mind and body always remain with you. The only way to alienate any part of your body is to physically remove it from your body. But your body as a whole cannot be removed from yourself. To say otherwise is to commit the fallacy of composition.
That is not what I said. You cannot insert your own definition into Rothbard’s argument in order to prove him wrong. If I defined will as tractor, then I most certainly could prove that the will is alienable, as tractors are alienable. But the will, as Rothbard has defined it, is inalienable. There is not much purpose to critiquing his argument if you can just insert whatever definitions you want in place of his own.
Slavery does not alienate your body. The master does not literally control the body of the slave.
I asked if this implied that control by the matser of the slaves body is a necessary condition for him to own the slave. You responded:
it does not imply that
…Then what is the sense of the underlined passage? The second sentence reads like a justification of the first, so that I read the entire passage as “slavery does no0t alienate your body because the master does not literally control the body of the slave.” That is, To own the slave’s body the master must control it. If that is not your position, then what is the relation between these two statements:
Slavery does not alienate your body.
The master does not literally control the body of the slave.
I said: " Let’s assume arguendo that will and body are one identical thing. Are you saying that, for A to own B, it would be necessary for A to control both the mind and body of B?"
You responded:
I have nothing to say about this, as we are not using my definition of will.
Yes, I know, I went back and changed my statement to reflect your definition. It now reads: “…will and body are inseparable”
So I ask again, in your view, in order for A to own B, would it be necessary for A to control both the mind and body of B?
I consider title to be necessary and sufficient for ownership.
And, in order to have title to something, does one need to have control of that thing?
That is not what I said. You cannot insert your own definition into Rothbard’s argument in order to prove him wrong. If I defined will as tractor, then I most certainly could prove that the will is alienable, as tractors are alienable. But the will, as Rothbard has defined it, is inalienable. There is not much purpose to critiquing his argument if you can just insert whatever definitions you want in place of his own.
Learn the difference between validity, truth, and soundness.
If one wishes to call an argument invalid, then one must show that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premise: i.e. one must uphold the premise, and work through the argument showing the logical error which makes the conclusion not follow therefrom.
Whereas, if one wishes to call an argument unsound (not because it is invalid, but because it is false), then one must show that the premises are false. That’s what I’m doing. Rothbard’s argument is valid but unsound.
Suppose I say:
All dogs are blue
Rex is a dog
Therefore, Rex is blue.
According to your reasoning, if you disagreed with this argument, you’d have to accept my premise (all dogs are blue). But that’s absurd. You see that the argument is valid, it just isn’t true, because all dogs are not blue.
You: I consider title to be necessary and sufficient for ownership.
Me: And, in order to have title to something, does one need to have control of that thing?
The will is physically inalienable: i.e. it is physically impossible for the will to be separated from the body. (A better term would be physically inseparable, as then we don’t get the legal concept of alienation confused with physical separation).
From the fact that the will cannot be physically separated from the body, does it follow that the will should not be alienable in the legal sense? If so, why? Make a syllogism.
Another issue:
Suppose I want to buy a family heirloom from someone. This thing has a physical body, it also has non-physical components/properties (sentimental value to some people). The non-physical components cannot be sold, because they are not eligable to be property (not scarce). Does it follow that the hairloom cannot be sold? Presumably not, of course you can sell the heirloom. The non-physical properties thereof simply don’t come into question in a property transaction.
Perhaps one could say the same about buying a slave. The will is not property, it is a non-physical component of the slave, and so it simply does not come into play.
What is the distinction between the two cases?
By way of anticipating your agument, maybe a distinction one could posit is that the will is inseparable from the body of the slave, while the sentimental value of the heirloom is separable from the heirloom. But is that true? Does that even make sense? Are we now putting “sentimental value” of objects in a different category of non-physical things from “will?” If so, why? Seems to me the cases are alike: the will cannot exist without the body (but not the other way around), and the sentimental value of the heirloom cannot exist without the heirloom (but not the other way around).
Maybe one would make another objection: that the sentimental value only exists for some people: i.e. it is not an objective prioperty of the heirloom. But does “will” exist objectively? No, of course not. From the perspective of every individual person, every other person is an automaton. The will is not knowable objectively.
Sorry to be flooding you with posts, but here’s another consideration:
Here’s a postulate: “if one part of some thing is physically inseparable from that thing, and cannot be legally alienated because it’s not property, the thing as a whole cannot be sold.”
Do you agree with this?
Consider: I want to buy a house, which is painted red. It is impossible to physically separate the redness (not the paint, but the non-physical property “redness”) of the house from the house itself. If the above postulate is true, then it follows that I should not be able to buy the house, because a part of it which is inseparable form the rest is inalienable.
Once again, what’s the distinction between this case and the case of a voluntary slave contract? Redness:house::will:body …or not?
Okay, that is just plain fucking annoying. Do you know what modus ponens is? If p, then q. P, therefore q. Guess what? You cannot prove that the argument is invalid by inserting your own definition of p. The argument is valid. Period.
Rothbard is making the argument:
If you go ahead and define will as whatever the fuck you want, then of course you can make his conclusion sound ridiculous. If you want to prove him wrong, you don’t go ahead and redefine his words, you show how his premise is false. His argument is valid. It’s the premise you have a problem with.
Take this:
You don’t go ahead and try to prove this wrong by saying:
Jesus fucking Christ.
LOL! No, this is not at all what you did. You were saying, “Let’s define will differently”. You were not saying that Rothbard’s definition of the will is false. In the case of dogs, I am not saying, “Let’s use a different definition of dog and a different definition of blue”. I’m just going to go ahead and say that the proposition “all dogs are blue” is false.
There is a difference here. You never said that Rothbard’s definition was false. You said you preferred a different definition. And in the case of words, there is no objective truth. There are concepts, and then there are the words we use to communicate those concepts. Rothbard uses the word “will” to communicate the concept “control of the mind and body”.
Do you know what modus ponens is? If p, then q. P, therefore q. Guess what? You cannot prove that the argument is invalid by inserting your own definition of p. The argument is valid. Period.
O, is that what I’m doing?
If I were claiming that his argument is invalid (i.e. conclusions don’t logically follow from premises) then you’d be right in saying that I must stick with his premises. But that’s not my claim. I’m claiming that his argument is unsound,not because it’s invalid, but because its conclusions are false (because its premises are false).
Again, learn the difference between validity, truth, and soundness.
All dogs are blue
Rex is a dog
C: Rex is blue
…is a valid argument, but it is also a false (and therefore unsound) argument because #1 is false.
For the 3rd time I now say, Rothbard makes a valid argument. But it is also a false argument because the premises are false (i.e. the definition is no good, as I would be further along in demostrating presently if you would just stay on point and stop having temper tantrums every fifteen minutes).
If you go ahead and define will as whatever the fuck you want, then of course you can make his conclusion sound ridiculous. If you want to prove him wrong, you don’t go ahead and redefine his words, you show how his premise is false. His argument is valid. It’s the premise you have a problem with.
Correct, as I’ve said multiple times. Like here:
If I were claiming that his argument is invalid (i.e. conclusions don’t logically follow from premises) then you’d be right in saying that I must stick with his premises. But that’s not my claim. I’m claiming that his argument is unsound,not because it’s invalid, but because its conclusions are false (because its premises are false).
Anyway…
You were saying, “Let’s define will differently”. You were not saying that Rothbard’s definition of the will is false.
I said:
It is now clear that our entire disagreement (or at least the most important part of it) stems from differing definitions of will and body…Going forward, we need to debate which definition of will/body is better. The only way to do this is to consider the consequences which follow from adopting each definition. I believe I can make a reductio ad absurdum argument against your definition equating will and body.
So…I was proposing a definition contradictory to Rothbard’s, but in your mind I wasn’t disagreeing with Rothbard’s? I see.
And in the case of words, there is no objective truth.
Not sure what you mean by this vague statement, but I assume it’s something to the effect of “every author has the right to define things as he pleases.” And that’s certainly true. No one definition is more true than any other per se. However, there are consequences to adopting each and every definition. Hence I proposed analyzing what consequences would follow from Rothbard’s. I said that I thought I could reduce it to absurdity: i.e. show that it has consequences which would be unacceptable for libertarians, thus prompting its abandonment.
Well that’s the problem with your argument. Slavery does not mean that. Slavery is forced servitude. It is not voluntary, despite what Block may try to say.
Then Rothbard’s argument is faulty. I agree with most of what Autolykos and Minarchist have said. There have now been five people in this thread who have dissented from your Rothbardian position. Maybe you should start considering whether we might be on to something instead of calling us “fucking trolls.”
I’ve read the Rothbard piece. It’s rubbish. For one, Rothbard doesn’t seem to consider the fact that a transfer of property is a promise. If I sell my house, I obligate myself to certain behaviors. I have to leave the house, I can’t return to it without the new owner’s permission. If I don’t conform to the behavior specified by the new owner, then he has the right to forcibly move my body. Property is always about the governing of people’s behavior in regard to an object. It has nothing to do with the physical properties of the object itself.
I have attempted to understand your arguments in two ways:
X is impossible, therefore one ought not do X
This you say is not what you are arguing. The only other thing I can think of that you might be arguing is something like this:
X is impossible, therefore one ought not do Y
The second argument is even worse than the first. It’s either a non sequitur or begging the question.
I am not mixing up the realm of is and ought. My argument is entirely an ought argument. Rothbard made it clear (and I agree with him) that contracts ought to be considered valid only if there is transfer of title. In other words, a contract ought to be considered valid only if there is transfer of title.
And this is what tells me that you are just begging the question. The whole question is whether there is a transfer of title of the person’s body. Since, as you admit, slavery does not involve the alienation of the will, then we can only be talking about the right of the slave owner to forcibly act on the slave’s body. Rothbard’s assertion that one can’t alienate one’s control over their body is either wrong or undermines his other arguments. Because I can move my hand doesn’t mean that I have to move it. If the fact that I can move it means that it is inalienable, then just about everything is inalienable. I can still control my car even after I sell it, therefore the contract by which I sold it is not binding. So I don’t see why my ability to move my hand means that I can’t give someone the life-long right to whip my hand.
I was not aware we were supposed to keep count on who agreed with whom. But if you must: JJ, That Old Guy, Conza88, NonAntiAnarchist, and myself have all been on the side of Rothbard. So what? There are five people in this thread that disagree with you, Troll on the Hill. Maybe you should start considering whether we might on to something instead of leveling false accusations at me.
What?!?!? What did I just say? False accusation? Strange. What could I mean? I know what it is! You have falsely accused me of calling you a fucking troll. And you have accused me of calling Autolykos a fucking troll. But I have not done this. I reread the thread (okay, okay, I actually did ctrl + f and searched for troll), and guess what? The only person I accused of being a troll was Minarchist.
So, Troll on the Hill, what’s with the dishonesty? Okay, I take it back. This post is the first time in this thread that I am now calling you a troll. But seeing as you are making false accusations, I think you deserve it.
Furthermore, the reason I accused Minarchist of trolling was because he was claiming to have read the thread, but it was clear he had not done so, as there were many questions of his that were actually already answered in the thread. Consider Rothbard’s definition of the will, that it is control of the mind and body. This was stated in the third post in the thread. It was after I accused Minarchist of trolling that he finally acknowledged Rothbard’s definition, and he only did that after I had to show him that JJ already posted it. In other words, he did not read the thread, because if he did, he would have already known Rothbard’s definition (and thus mine, as I stated I agreed with Rothbard).
Anyway, I did not think that I had to start in on why I thought Minarchist was trolling, but seeing as you made it relevant by falsely accusing me, I felt I needed to use an example. So, Minarchist, if you are reading this, I actually don’t think you are trying to troll me. I probably shouldn’t have said that to you. But I hope you can understand my frustration that there were many things that you were asking me that had already been answered in the thread, and you had claimed to have read the thread. I didn’t want to rehash this, but Troll on the Hill made it relevant.
Well, seeing as you have yet to actually accurately restate Rothbard’s argument, I couldn’t care less what you think of it. You have inserted your own definitions in place of Rothbard’s, and that is dishonest. But I see that you are a dishonest person, as you have falsely accused me.
See my last post to Autolykos. I explain myself better there. All I can say is what you have posted here is inaccurate. I would give you the benefit of the doubt, but seeing as you have blatantly lied about me, I think you are purposely mistating my argument.
There is nothing question begging in what you quoted. I am not assuming that voluntary slavery is aggression because it is. That is not my argument. I am stating why I believe it is aggression. That you disagree with my argument in no way makes it question begging. For it to be a circular argument, I would have to state in my premises that voluntary slavery is aggressive.
Yes, it was. You wanted to use a different definition of “will” to insert in Rothbard’s argument. It doesn’t work like that.
I am fully aware of the differences. The problem is that you are trying to prove Rothbard is wrong by using a different definition of a word he uses. You can’t do that to prove someone is wrong.
Well, now I get to belittle you. Don’t you know that arguments cannot be false? Conclusions can be false, but not arguments. Learn the difference between validity, truth, and soundness.
Well there you go again with this false argument nonsense. Arguments are valid or invalid, not true or false. Perhaps you should learn the difference between truth, validity, and soundness.
So, you can see that you accusing me of not understanding these concepts is silly, as you have demonstrated that you don’t understand them yourself. We can all be ignorant together.
Definitions do not have truth values. Whether or not it is the case that someone uses a specific definition can have a truth value. In other words, it is true that Rothbard defined will as the control of the mind and body. But there is no truth value in and of itself regarding that specific definition of the will.
Let’s look at that quote again:
First, which definition is better is a matter of subjective values, not truth values. So you cannot say his premise is false because he uses a definition that you think is worse than yours.
Second, you have inaccurately stated my definition (and Rothbard’s). So, if you cannot accurately state his definition, how can I know if you think it is a false definition? And of course, as I stated above, definitions do not have truth values.
My, my…
Hm, something here is interesting. I know what it is. I said this:
And then you said this:
Are you saying that if you disagree with someone else’s definition, that their definition is false? Because I never claimed that because you proposed a different definition, that you did not disagree. Obviously you disagree on the definition. I specifically stated:
There is a difference.
Anyway, back to your quote:
Now that you understand that definitions have no truth value, I should think you would have gone back and corrected the previous sections of your post. I wonder why you didn’t.
Anyway, you cannot insert your own definition in order to prove a proposition false. That is not how it works. I will now demonstrate the problem with this again. I say again because you conviently ignored my example about the sun and the moon in your response.
Let’s suppose that I were to state the following “poem”.
Now, let’s suppose I say that if words end in the same sound, then they are said to rhyme. So, I now make the following claim: See and pee rhyme, and do and you rhyme.
Now, let’s suppose arguendo that you disagree with my definition of rhyme. You think that it is not a true definition (or is that good definition? I can’t tell if you think definitions have truth values or are subjectively valued). You think that a better definition of rhyme would be words that have the same amount of letters.
So, using this new definition, you then say that see and pee rhyme, but the words do and poo do not rhyme. Then you say,“Aha! You are wrong, gotlucky!” Only some of those words you claimed to rhyme actually rhyme.
But you see, the thing is, you have not disproved anything. You have only shown that if you use a different definition, that different conclusions can be drawn.
We can now look at the syllogism that you provided as well:
Now, I don’t think you have a true conclusion (note how I don’t say that you have a false argument? You might want to study up on the differences between truth, validity, and soundness). So, in order to prove you wrong, I am going to substitute a better definition of the word blue (or maybe I should say a true definition? After all, it might be the case that you actually think definitions have truth values).
I suggest that the true (or is it better?) definition of the word blue is colorful. Let’s take a look at your syllogism again:
Aha! So you see, if I just redefine the word blue, we can solve your syllogism and make it a sound argument! Tada!
Now, having said all this about definitions, I want to show you an example of when it might be useful to insert definitions. Let’s take the word murder. Now, the definition of murder that I typically use is unjustified homicide. There may or may not be anything wrong with that, but it will do for our purposes. Now, let’s suppose that there is some extreme pacifist, and he defines murder as homicide. That’s it. That’s all. He makes no distinctions in the kind of homicide.
Now, let’s look at the implications. Using this definition of murder would mean that we would be calling any death of a human in self-defense a murder. I do not like that. It does not fit my conception of murder. So, anyone who believes that the word murder should not allow for that will reject that definition of murder.
But here’s the thing: it’s still not a false definition. We can merely show that it is a definition we don’t like subjectively. That is the purpose of inserting definitions. It demonstrates that we would be using words in a way that we would not like to. But it does not make these definitions false.
You can dislike Rothbard’s definition of will all you want. But if you are going to critique his argument, you must use his definition. His definition of will is integral to his argument. Changing the definition means you are no longer talking about Rothbard’s argument.
If you want to show that Rothbard’s argument leads to conclusions that conflict with the NAP, leave his definition of the will alone. I can’t believe I had to write all of this, but you were jumping down my throat on the issue. You left me no choice.
Thanks for that. It goes along with what I’ve read before about the Rothbardian position on contracts - and also with the Rothbardian notion that all rights are property rights. Unfortunately, I think I disagree with this position. A contract that stipulates A may whip B under certain conditions (such as B disobeying A) could be a valid contract IMO, but I don’t see where any title has been transferred there. Maybe a title has been transferred concerning a particular “use” of B’s body?
It’s cleared up to an extent, but see above.
I’m sorry but I still don’t see how those three different concepts of rights are necessary, whereas any other concept of rights isn’t.
That’s why I consciously use non-standard definitions for certain words, like “morality”. The standard definition of “morality” doesn’t distinguish between coercive and non-coercive activities.
Again, I don’t see how those three categories are at all necessary for viewing rights per se. Maybe you actually mean they’re necessary for viewing rights given the world as it exists today?
So you’re talking about whether a given legal code contains a specific right. That’s fine, but just because it’s written down somewhere doesn’t mean it per se obligates people to agree with it, accept it, etc.
They’re functionally irrelevant in the context of certain kinds of dispute, as no such dispute has ever arisen. But that’s beside my point, which was simply to show the independence between “is” and “ought”.
I guess I don’t fully understand what you mean when you say things like “there are (no) rights regarding […]”. People can make claims about all sorts of things. Those claims exist within people’s minds, regardless of whether the circumstances those claims concern also exist. Certainly I don’t think you’re trying to argue that it’s impossible for people to make claims about non-existent circumstances.
Well, what do you mean by “actual rights”? Phrases like that, along with talking about rights “existing” in a non-mental sense, are what lead me to keep believing that you’re trying to derive “ought” from “is”. Implicit in your position is the notion that rights can somehow be “validated” in reality. Is that a premise or a conclusion? If it’s a premise, then fine, but I don’t accept it myself. If it’s a conclusion, then I’d like to see the reasoning that allegedly leads to it.
Let’s assume arguendo that B can whip A under certain conditions. It would still be understood in terms of property rights. B has the legal right to whip A’s property. Transferring title is irrelevant here. In current law, there does not necessarily have to be a transfer of title for someone to own something. In A LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF CONTRACT: TITLE TRANSFER, BINDING PROMISES, AND INALIENABILITY, Kinsella shows the differences between modern law as it is and the libertarian conception of law as it ought to be. In current law, it is not necessary to transfer title in a contract.
So, what Rothbard and Kinsella are saying, if there is no title-transfer, then the contract ought not to be considered valid. You are free to disagree with them, of course, but I don’t see how your theory of contracts would then be compatible with the NAP.
Well my explanation of why those are necessary was elsewhere. That was just me saying why I liked wikipedia’s definition.
Fair enough, but that’s what I use the libertarian just rights for. I use the standard definition of moral, well, because I like it and I don’t want to confuse people too much with having different definitions. (Obviously, you don’t have to like it, I just happen to.) I use just rights to show whether an action is compatible with the NAP. If it was aggressive, then it is incompatible.
No, it is necessary to view rights in any context. You cannot explain a concept of male/female rights without using at least one of those 3 categories. Legal rights have to do with the world as it is. The other two categories, moral rights (you can use ethical if you prefer, but we are just referring to the same thing) and just right, explain how someone thinks the world ought to be.
If someone makes a claim regarding male/female rights, they must either refer to the world as it is is or to the world as it ought to be. There is no third option. There is no way to not refer to at least one of those three categories when talking about rights.
Regarding the rest of your post, perhaps you missed it, but I was hoping you would respond this later post of mine.
Regarding Kinsella’s article, it is quite long. A lot of it is demonstrating the difference between modern law as it is and the libertarian conception of law as it ought to be. Near the end of the article, Kinsella provides an argument regarding inalienability that is critical of Rothbard’s, so Kinsella provides a different argument for inalienability. It’s in the Clarification and Applications section.
While Kinsella is critical of Rothbard’s position for many of the same reasons that have been brought up in this thread, I actually think that this stems from a problem of definitions. Kinsella claims that the body is inalienable, and that to bring in the will confuses things. But to Rothbard, the body is part of the will, and you cannot alienate the body (as a whole) either in Rothbard’s mind. It may be that Kinsella provides a better argument, but I don’t think that Rothbard’s argument is as incomplete as he thinks (or any of you guys here for that matter).
In A LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF CONTRACT: TITLE TRANSFER, BINDING PROMISES, AND INALIENABILITY, Stephen Kinsella provides an argument for certain inalienable rights. It is in the section Clarifications and Applications towards the end. The whole essay is interesting, but you probably don’t have to read all of it in order to understand his argument. Anyway, he brings up many of the criticisms you have put forth, and he explains his reasons for certain inalienable rights. He explains his theory more in depth than Rothbard, and he considers his theory to be different than Rothbard’s.
As I just said to Autolykos, Rothbard does include the body in the will, so Rothbard does consider the body to be inalienable property just as Kinsella does (even though Kinsella is critical of Rothbard’s theory regarding the will). I don’t think Rothbard’s theory has the problems that you and Kinsella claim, I think that Kinsella explains it better and more in depth.
Is it just me, or the debate is mostly over the metaphysical view of slavery and some theoretical concept of voluntary slavery where constant consent in necessary, and when consent is gone, so is the servitude. That’s not slavery, that’s employment.
Voluntary slavery, in the sense of becoming a slave not because of direct physical coercion but of economic circumstances - existed in history, and is mentioned from Code of Hammurabi to Codex Iuris Civilis- you sell youself into slavery, real slavery, there’s no “I don’t want to be a slave anymore”, you’re a slave until your owner manumits or kills you.
It’s just you. That’s not the discussion. Slavery has most definitely existed. The question is whether or not voluntary slavery is compatible with the NAP and libertarianism.
Would you consider B whipping A to constitute B using A’s body in a certain way? If so, then a contract between B and A stipulating B’s right to whip A under certain conditions would constitute a transfer of title over A’s body, would it not?
It depends on what you think constitutes aggression. All the NAP says is that aggression is morally wrong. My theory of contracts may be incompatible with the NAP as interpreted by Rothbard, Kinsella, and yourself, but so be it. As I see it, the inalienability of the body is an additional premise above and beyond that of the self-ownership and non-aggression principles.
Oh I see. Maybe I missed that explanation.
Okay.
I can understand distinguishing rights that are declared by a body of law from rights that one declares on his own. That distinction is not necessary to make, however. A distinction of e.g. male vs. female rights in no way has to take into account that other distinction.
There is a third option - they can refer to both.
Sorry, I missed that post. I’ll respond to it.
I’ll check it out, thanks.
I think the body is alienable in the sense of a person being able to legitimately acquire rights to use another person’s body in certain ways (i.e. to take actions against the other person). Whether the other person wills otherwise is irrelevant after the contract has been made.
I think you mean we can say whether someone is acting rightfully in the situation.
Unfortunately, that’s not what my response was intended to convey. I don’t define a “right” as “saying that someone is/was acting rightfully in a specific situation”. To me, rights aren’t space/time/reality-dependent, because they’re simply claims. So it appears that our definitions for “rights” are subtly but importantly different from one another.
You mean “that is what we’re defining as ‘rights’”. Otherwise, the phrase “if this situation occurs, then this is who is acting rightfully” is in no way limited to situations that have actually occurred.
Whether anyone can be acting rightfully is one thing - claiming that someone would be acting rightfully in a given situation (however hypothetical) is quite another. Basically, the distinction between an “is” statement and an “ought” statement is this: an “is” statement is necessarily dependent on reality, whereas an “ought” statement isn’t. Strictly speaking, I don’t consider rights to constitute “is” statements - rather, I consider them to constitute “ought” statements. In other words, I don’t consider rights to be necessarily dependent on reality.
Unfortunately, I don’t think you summed up my argument accurately, and your answer doesn’t really address the argument I’m actually making. I hope what I wrote above makes my actual argument clearer to you.