It occurred to me while listening to a Herbner lecture at MU.
If preference is demonstrated by action
And indifference is demonstrated by non-action
Yet, to not act is indeed an action
How could there ever be an indifference?
By the classification of types of action, I suppose.
If you change that from “to not act is indeed an action” to “to not” move “is indeed an action”, the problem goes away. (Or, more exactly, “to not” move might “indeed [be] an action”.) It wouldn’t make any sense to say that not acting is acting, just like wouldn’t make any sense to say that a car isn’t a car, or A isn’t A.
I think that you probably are thinking of when Austrian School economists explain that acting doesn’t necessarily involve movement, because someone could be purposefully refraining from moving their body, maybe because someone asked them to remain seated to demonstrate that they agree with them or something like that.
It is important to recognize the distinction into (a) movement and (b) action.
Good point, the wording was somewhat sloppy. could I reword to something of the nature of, to purposfully not do something is in fact an act…a deomnstrated preference, not an indifference?
If you than consider being indifferent a preference, you’ve come full circle.