So are you saying that if you observe something and draw a logically invalid conclusion about it, then it can still be true?
There was a post not long ago about wave-particle duality that addressed this. I am saying that if you observe a phenomena and have no logically valid way to explain it, it is your logic that is wrong, not the phenomena.
Isn’t that a failure of observation regardless?
Not neccesarily. If I see you standing 12ft to my right, and 12ft to my left at the same time, I cannot logically explain that (assuming I know you don’t have a twin, or clone). But it is happening.
You think it is happening. There is no way to know if it is actually happening. An interesting thought, though. Perhaps this can serve as an example why claims of absolute knowledge are “nonsense”, which would place ethics and morality squarely in the “nonsense” category.
Failure against what standard? The assumed “truth” of our collective observation?
You think it is happening. There is no way to know if it is actually happening. An interesting thought, though. Perhaps this can serve as an example why claims of absolute knowledge are “nonsense”, which would place ethics and morality squarely in the “nonsense” category.
I dont neccesarily disagree with any of this. But if you are attempting to equate observable, testable, collective knowledge with faith, you are in the wrong. One is a supposition based on evidence, the other cares not if the evidence even contradicts it.
It would go; We can never know if anything is true > observable, testable, collective data > faith
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I wasn’t, but since you bring it up…
You must still have faith that what you observe, no matter how repeatable, testable, collective, etc., is a “true” representation of “reality”. The difference is that Science is a flexible doctrine (as you wrote, it’s laws are based upon the intersubjective consensus of its adherents), which makes Humanism such a well-adapted meme. It does not risk becoming an anachronism, as the rigid, codefied, divine-revalatory faiths have.
You must still have faith that what you observe, no matter how repeatable, testable, collective, etc., is a “true” representation of “reality”. The difference is that Science is a flexible doctrine (as you wrote, it’s laws are based upon the intersubjective consensus of its adherents), which makes Humanism such a well-adapted meme. It does not risk becoming an anachronism, as the rigid, codefied, divine-revalatory faiths have.
You will get no argument from me there.
‘I can say “I prefer bananas to apples” without violating value-free praxeology just as much as I can say, "I prefer not killing to killing.’
Clayton, I don’t understand how you can say you value something while still remaining value free. Now if you were talking about the values of another individual irregardless of your own then I would understand. However, the understanding component, which I think is what you are trying to deduce here is not in the realm of praxeology. Praxeology just shows action, simply what is or what would be. How we understand evaluation is in the class of thymology.
‘So, ethics is subjective and relative to the individual. But that doesn’t make it nonsense’
To play devil’s advocate, why not? If ethical theory is dependent upon the individual ‘viewer’ then why can it not be nonsense to them? Why does it follow that it has to be sensical? Furthermore how can you prove that ethical evaluations exist, which you claim, if they are completely dependent on a differing individual?
Concerning your belief about ethics being ascetic emotions, how can you come to such a conclusion whereby other individuals are governed by the same outlook? Why do you perceive that human interaction is governed by these feelings considering you admit that such interaction is completely subjective? How can these ethics evolve if they are subjective? Perhaps you are saying that there exists in humans a trait in which they desire peace, non-violence, harmony etc which demands that they acquire certain societal ethical beliefs in order to achieve goal but then such a system would no longer be subjective. It would exist regardless of what individual you are looking at.
No, I mean that value-free praxeology can encompass discussion of value statements… if it could not, we would have no praxeology of economic actions. I am then trying to make a direct comparison between ordinary economic value-statements and ethical value-statements to show that if value-free methods can be applied to discussion of economic valuations, then they can be applied to discussion of ethical valuations, as well.
Well, let me put it this way - ethical valuations are no more nonsensical than other kinds of valuation. The absurdist might argue that everything is nonsensical but so what? I am just saying that ethics is not especially nonsensical.
Well, they’re not. That’s the whole point in characterizing ethical sentiment as a kind of aesthetic sentiment.
Well, that’s not a problem; if you grant that any sort of valuation evolved, then it is possible for subjective valuations to evolve (including ethical ones).
Hmm, not quite. However, I think this may be the key to distinguishing between merely aesthetic or economic valuations versus ethical valuations. It seems that humans have an extremely powerful set of hardwired emotions and even physiological reactions (blushing) which are triggered by feelings of shame, rejection and disapproval by peers. We refer to certain complexes of these reactions as “guilt”.
Guilt is pretty important in regulating human affairs. People do many things they otherwise would not (and vice-versa) out of guilt or to avoid feelings of guilt. This capacity for feeling guilt must have evolved for a reason.
Ethical assertions can be interpreted in terms of guilt, such as, “Any normal person will feel guilty if he murders someone.” This is value-free since it is really just a conditional statement, “Either you feel guilty after murdering someone or you’re not normal.” Of course, we can substitute “good” for “normal”: “Any good person would feel too guilty to attempt to murder someone” which translates roughly to the idea that, for a good person, any attempt to commit murder would result in so much anticipated guilt that he would be unable to go through with the contemplated action.
However, my primary interest in guilt is not for its own sake but, rather to see if it provides the defining distinction between ethical valuations and other kinds of valuations. In other words, what sort of fruit I buy or what sort of music I like to listen to is not likely to evoke very strong feelings within you but what sort of sexual practices I desire just might evoke a very strong feeling in you, even if you are not a party to it. Sex - like life itself - is surrounded with extremely powerful ethical sentiments.
Please don’t mistake any of these ramblings as a cogent theory, I’m in the exploratory phase on this whole subject right now.
Clayton -
This raises an important question. Do some actions make us feel guilty naturally, and as a result begin to define ethical questions, or are we led to feel guilty after commiting said specific actions due to cultural conditioning?
Well, I think the answer is pretty clear that both are the case. The same action that is a faux pas in one cultural context (say, burping) may be acceptable in another cultural context. The person who commits the faux pas in the one cultural context will probably experience a feeling that is closely related to guilt, namely, shame or embarrassment. But what actions will trigger feelings of embarrassment clearly varies significantly from culture to culture. If you include religion in the analysis, I think you can say the same for feelings of guilt, as well.
But other actions trigger feelings of guilt in any culture. The feelings of guilt associated with these actions, then, must transcend culture and have their root in our biology. The feeling of loathing at the thought of killing another human being and the powerful feelings of guilt usually associated with killing another human being are not the result of cultural conditioning.
Clayton -
But other actions trigger feelings of guilt in any culture. The feelings of guilt associated with these actions, then, must transcend culture and have their root in our biology. The feeling of loathing at the thought of killing another human being and the powerful feelings of guilt usually associated with killing another human being are not the result of cultural conditioning.
If morality is rooted in biology I wouldn’t write it off as nonsense.
Like most things, a little bit nature, a whole lot of nurture.
Well, how and why we feel guilt about some actions is definitely rooted in our biology. But I don’t see why anything not rooted in biology is nonsense, except if you mean something that is supposed to be entirely untethered to our biology and the constraints of the physical world (e.g. an intangible soul). There are complex reasons why some people feel guilt over not attending church on Sunday. This clearly has no simple biological explanation, the explanation would be cultural. But I think that a good explanation for this kind of guilt would not be nonsense.
Clayton -
I think it is clear that morality itself is a biological things. Feeling like certain things are wrong is pretty universal for humans (like every society has an insest taboo). But the specific things that are wrong are almost entirely dependant on culture.
Most of human behavior is less the result of nurture than the last century and a half of study of human behavior would lead you to believe. Read Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate or watch this.
Edited to add: Actually, watch this first before watching the above link.
Clayton -
I loathe having to be the pedant but in this case, I will cast doubt on the ability to quantify how much guilt or how many actions give rise to guilt is or is not dependent on culture. More useful to stick to the facts and just analyze whether guilt arising from specific actions is culturally universal or culturally relative.
Clayton -
Well, how and why we feel guilt about some actions is definitely rooted in our biology. But I don’t see why anything not rooted in biology is nonsense, except if you mean something that is supposed to be entirely untethered to our biology and the constraints of the physical world (e.g. an intangible soul).
I didn’t mean to imply the inverse in my statement. I’m not claiming that things rooted outside of our biology are de facto nonsense, just that something that is rooted in our biology isn’t. I wouldn’t write off all outside factors, such as a community, as nonsense either.
As far as I am aware, the incest taboo is really our only universal phenomena, and even the specifics of the taboo are not the same. Guilt is natural, the specifics of what cause guilt are mostly culture. BUt I agree that it would be nearly impossible to quantify guilt.