- On shared reality and “sorting out language”:
Forgive me, I have to virtually parrot Wittgenstein (hopefully I don’t butcher this too badly), as I failed to explain this in my own words:
If I say “here is my hand” or “the world has existed for more than one hour”; While they may have the form of empiracle propositions, they actually have more in common with logical propositions. That is, these sorts of propositions may seem to say something factual about the world, and hence be open to doubt, but really the function they serve in language is to serve as a kind of framework within which empirical propositions can make sense. In other words, we take such propositions for granted so that we can speak about the hand or about things in the world—these propositions aren’t meant to be subjected to skeptical scrutiny. The key, then, is not to claim certain knowledge of propositions like “here is a hand” but rather to recognize that these sorts of propositions lie beyond questions of knowledge or doubt.
This isn’t a refutation of skepticism, but a side stepping of it; as a skeptic’s (or nihilist’s) doubts simply don’t work as they are intended to. “Here is a hand” is a definitive definition as the word is defined by the example. If doubted, any structure of communication collapses. There has to be a common ground between people for communication to work. In this framework skepticism, if used, undermines the very basis of doubt itself.
Doubting the existence of the external world is a philosophical activity. A skeptic can doubt away, but it is impossible to live out this type of skepticism. A skeptic can only doubt when an idea like “the external world” is abstracted from every day activity. The proposition “the world exists” has no meaning unless placed within a particular context; on it’s own “the world exists” means nothing. Only by removing language from all context, which in turn renders language uselss, can the skeptic function.
So perhaps to rephrase myself better: We can “prove” the external world to exist, if we follow a specific context and accept it. This of course, is based off of context and language.
Always a worthwhile task in philosophy (usually the only one that needs doing!).
It is funny how painfully obvious this seems now (and perhaps where my “intuitions” always were). It is not the job of philosophy to “abstract” language, but clarify it; if you do otherwise the word (and hence world) loses all meaning. One ought not be amazed at what philosophy can do, but what it can not solve (such as ethics), as it has to be passive neutral observer in things if it is to have any use.
2) This all depends heavily on how you’re defining psychological, logical, natural science, etc. On the surface, you appear to be talking about consensus reality and empiricism, quite divorced from Mises’s strict methodological individualism - but that al
Logic definition I am using (at least I hope): Not a science, nor a set of laws. There are no “objects” of logic, nor relations. Logic is 100% form 0% content. It says nothing, but determines the form and structure everything can be said. It is inherently deterministic, there can be no “accidents”.
I was mostly using the “psychological”/“praxeological” dividing line as Mises refered to it. I am very short on time for the rest of the day, if you feel as if you need anything else defined let me know, as this post may be a bit messy. I ought to be able to go into at least somewhat more detail. That said, I doubt I am willing or prepared to defend economics and natural science with psychology on this thread. I can attempt to define them in better terms if you need it though. I would much rather focus on language, logic, ethic/aesthetic, and perhaps psychology. Perhaps I unwittingly opened a bigger can of worms than I expected (much less handle) by being over enthusiastic when bringing up those examples. That was not the Long piece I read, I’ll have to give it a read before I comment.
Hopefully I am explaining myself at least somewhat clearly, and understanding your thoughts clearly as well. I have to admit, I have been “struck by lightning” these past two weeks by re-reading Wittgenstein. I think the thoughts and ideas are hitting me much quicker than my ability to express them (this is the 3rd time in a year and a half this has happened, as Stirner/Kirkegaard and von Mises had similar effects that I am still sorting out, lol). Perhaps I am a little too over enthusastic/ affected by new thought (That is Wittgenstein) to enter into productive conversation at this point.