Geoffrey,
It seems there are two conceptions of “value” one could use in this discussion.
- Value as how beneficial something is to someone
- Value as how esteemed something is by someone
For conception 1, the necessity (or even the possibility) of a “valuer” agent doesn’t seem to make much sense. Take something that is beneficial, but, to keep the two conceptions of value distinct, is unknown to he whom it benefits: like the mitochondria of a caveman. It is true that the benefit of the mitochondria depends on its relation to the caveman, so it is, in that sense relative. And the benefit to the caveman depends on the agency of the caveman, because “beneficial” means “conducive to purpose”, and purpose presupposes agency. But would you really call a caveman a “valuer” of his mitochondria? I don’t think it would make sense to; while agency is necessary for benefit to exist, the mitochondria itself is not an object of the caveman’s agency. He is merely a passive beneficiary of the mitochondria’s workings. If anything, the value of mitochondria is patient-relative, not agent-.
Value, under conception 2, conversely, is agent-relative (but not objective). Take something that is esteemed, but, to keep the two conceptions of value distinct, is not in reality beneficial to he who esteems it: like a rain dance. Now in this case, the rain dance is an object of the dancer’s agency: he esteems, chooses, and does the dance. It may not be ultimately conducive to his purpose (it will not in fact produce rain), but he thinks it will be conducive to his purposes, which is the only thing that matters regarding its relation to him as an agent. And regarding objectiveness, it may be objectively observed “from the outside” that an agent esteems something, but the esteeming itself is, by definition, subjective.
So it seems to me that value cannot be conceived as both agent-relative and objective without jumbling the two conceptions together. To take your food example, first you seem to be talking about conception 2 (esteeming)…
Food is not a value in and of itself apart from any valuer. Insofar as it is a value, it is something that is of value to someone.
Then you seem to switch to conception 1 (benefit)…
But this does not mean that food is of value to you merely because you happen to desire it. It is something that you need to survive and even to live well.
Of course, people subjectively esteem things because they expect it to benefit them. And perhaps they expect it to benefit them because they’ve seen that similar things have objectively benefited them in the past. So incidents of the two conceptions of value can be causally connected. Nonetheless, they are distinct phenomena.
Although, I’m very interested in hearing your take on this, I understand you must be super-busy with preparations for the forthcoming new little Plauche.
Best wishes!
Lilburne