The quality of my content is poor, relative to other contributors?
I am astounded I am ever called a troll; I admit that my counterarguments are presented more colorfully than others, but I never directly insult anyone.
As I’ve detailed elsewhere, though, we cannot rely on ourselves to properly differentiate deliberative processes from automatic ones.
In regard to the Austrian preference for circular reasoning, if it is true that “action” is “purposeful behavior,” then what determines the logical connection if not a definitional equivalence? If one wants to claim that “one’s highest value” is one’s observed choice, then how is that necessarily true besides Austrian makeshift definitions? I am not actually expecting answers; I’ve heard them before. But I am still befuddled by how Austrians consider their outmoded epistemology the last bastion of economic truth. The fields of neuroscience, psychology, and empirical economics have all made significant inroads in questioning our old beliefs, as all science should; to Austrians, a dictionary is all that is needed to deduce universal truths.
The Austrian argument need not rely on the ontological distinction whether a given phenomenon “really is” or “really is not” purposive conduct, just as the mathematical argument need not rely on whether 24 “really are” or “really are not” present.
If purposive conduct is present, then what formally applies to purposive conduct applies. If 24 is present, then what formally applies to 24 applies.
StrangeLoops,
The quality of my content is poor, relative to other contributors?
Um, what do other contributors have to do with standards of quality? There might be a worse troll, but that doesn’t make trolling less OK. The standard isn’t set, in other words, by the worst member of society.
As I’ve detailed elsewhere, though, we cannot rely on ourselves to properly differentiate deliberative processes from automatic ones.
Regarding that thread, we’ve already been over this before. That our rationality is the result of biology is irrelevant, and I actually addressed this in my response to you.
If one wants to claim that “one’s highest value” is one’s observed choice, then how is that necessarily true besides Austrian makeshift definitions?
It’s actually not true because of Austrian definitions, rather it is true by the definition of the person in question. That’s the entire point of the “Austrian definition”.
But I am still befuddled by how Austrians consider their outmoded epistemology the last bastion of economic truth.
Because critics, such as yourself, have yet to offer a substantive and valid criticism of the epistemology.
To be clear, when I say that rationality is normative, I’m not only refering to ethics. Ethics is included under that umbrella, but I’m also and in fact more primarily speaking about epistemic norms. Austrian methodology may rule out any consideration of specific norms when it comes to rationality, but it is not within its epistemic rights to totalize itself by claiming the authority to automatically negate all normative senses of rationality used outside of its own disciplinary scope, as if it encompasses social science as a whole or is a complete philosophy in and of itself. At a minimum, this is an issue of overextending the context of a domain.
I have a thing against particular domains making claims to universality for its modes of description, to the effective negation of other domains. Austrians (rightfully) level a charge along these lines against positivists and such ilk, who tend to do it with the natural sciences or physics. I don’t see why a similar charge couldn’t be leveled against (at least some) Austrians with respect to how Praxeology is wielded.
I don’t assert that it’s literally “meaningless” but that giving it apodictic status is problematic, and the whole house of cards can fall down the moment that the “axioms” are actually critically examined rather than being assumed to be absolutely true by definition. One bumps into all the issues surrounding foundationalism. And we learn immediately in logic 101 that if your base premise happens to be false, no amount of logical necessity has weight any more. Logical proof can be an empty excersize if what you plug into it is erroneous. This is why I consider the assertion of such “axioms” to be question-begging.
The only question begged is whether or not the premise is true. So, can you please actually respond to our posts, namely the demand for this supposed conclusive evidence in support of your thesis [that the axiom of purposeful human action is wrong]?
The point is that Austrian methodology rules out pursueing that question by giving it apodictic status. It literally defines out of existence the very possibility of it being wrong or there remotely being an exception.
Okay, again, can you please provide evidence to the contrary. That Austrians believe it to be apodictic is based on the belief that it can’t be wrong. You’re the one who challenged this notion. The burden of proof is on you. So, please stop beating around the bush, and provide the evidence.
The Austrian/Misesian concept of rationality, as distinct from other conceptions of rationality, is identical to the concept of goal-directed conduct, so in speaking of Austrian theory we could re-write your passage as:
“… when I say that [the concept of goal-directed conduct] is normative, I’m not only refering to ethics. Ethics is included under that umbrella, but I’m also and in fact more primarily speaking about epistemic norms. Austrian methodology may rule out any consideration of specific norms when it comes to [the concept of goal-directed conduct]…”
“…it [Austrian economics]is not within its epistemic rights to totalize itself by claiming the authority automatically negate all normative senses of rationality used outside of its own disciplinary scope, as if it encompasses social science as a whole…”
As I understand the Austrian method, it does not negate normative senses of rationality ontologically as you imply. It negates other senses of rationality in the sense of excluding other definitions of rationality from its rational scheme, since it chooses only one sense of the notion of rationality for its scheme. Objective/normative ethics is free to attempt to utilize a different conception of rationality. All Austrian economics will say, as I understand it, is that we are talking about two different conceptions of rationality. Austrian economics is using X concept of rationality, while objective ethics is using Y concept of rationality. The insurmountable theoretical problems that objective ethics invariably encounters in trying to establish a content-based definition of rationality is a separate issue.
“..or is a complete philosophy in and of itself.”
I believe in science the commonly used expression is “a closed and coherent set of concepts, axioms, definitions and laws…” (Heisenberg)
“I don’t assert that it’s literally “meaningless” but that giving it apodictic status is problematic, and the whole house of cards can fall down the moment that the “axioms” are actually critically examined rather than being assumed to be absolutely true by definition.”
As I understand both Mises and Menger (and I can quote Hayek in support of this view also), the “truth” of the tautological relation derives from the difficulty in making theoretical or practical sense of alternatives to it. If we say it is a tautological “truth” that in walking toward one location a person necessarily walks away from another location, what this means is that we haven’t been able to make sense of the idea that one could walk toward one location and not walk away from another location. All of our thinking and acting is based on the tautological premise that in walking toward one location we will be walking away from another location.
“But the characteristic feature of a priori knowledge is that we cannot think of the truth of its negation or of something that would be at variance with it. What the a priori expresses is necessarily implied in every proposition concerning the issue in question. It is implied in all our thinking and acting.”
“If we qualify a concept or a proposition as a priori, we want to say: first, that the negation of what it asserts is unthinkable for the human mind and appears to it as nonsense; secondly, that this a priori concept or proposition is necessarily implied in our mental approach to all the problems concerned, i.e., in our thinking and acting concerning these problems.” (Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science)
Maybe we can’t say that it is “absolutely true” that the tautology in question holds for all time, in all senses, and in all possible worlds. But the first problem is to show how the given tautology doesn’t hold now in various assumed circumstances. Until it is shown how it doesn’t hold, our belief that it does is reasonable.
The second problem is that a demonstration of how a particular tautology isn’t valid under certain circumstances may not, in the end, serve to invalidate the usefulness of tautological knowledge generally. It could be that a demonstration of a case where tautology X doesn’t hold would entail the use of a different system utilizing tautology Y (either implicitly or explicitly). In other words, it could be the case that in order to demonstrate a sense in which a particular tautology doesn’t hold, it may be necessary to utilize a separate tautological system. This is similar to what Austrians mean when they sometimes argue that one acts in trying to demonstrate that there is no action. In short, you may need a tautology to invalidate a tautology.
“Logical proof can be an empty excersize if what you plug into it is erroneous.”
Reminds me of this:
“The method of imaginary constructions is indispensable for praxeology; it is the only method of praxeological and economic inquiry. It is, to be sure, a method difficult to handle because it can easily result in fallacious syllogisms. It leads along a sharp edge; on both sides yawns the chasm of absurdity and nonsense. Only merciless self-criticism can prevent a man from falling headlong into these abysmal depths.” (Human Action)
“This is why I consider the assertion of such “axioms” to be question-begging.”
I interpret this as the assertions that tautologies are empty or meaningless. However…
The notion that the Austrian definition of rationality might be trivial or meaningless probably rests on the premise that tautologies are ‘empty’ or meaningless. But tautologies need not be considered empty or meaningless.
24 = 2 x 12 = 4 x 6 = 3 x 8 is tautological. But three groups of eight may not be immediately apparent upon an apprehension of twenty four.
Logical or tautological reasoning fleshes out the implications of given suppositions, and these ‘hidden’ implications are important for action and life.
Aprioristic reasoning is purely conceptual and deductive. It cannot produce anything else but tautologies and analytic judgments. All its implications are logically derived from the premises and were already contained in them. Hence, according to a popular objection, it cannot add anything to our knowledge.
All geometrical theorems are already implied in the axioms. The concept of a rectangular triangle already implies the theorem of Pythagoras. This theorem is a tautology, its deduction results in an analytic judgment. Nonetheless nobody would contend that geometry in general and the theorem of Pythagoras in particular do not enlarge our knowledge. Cognition from purely deductive reasoning is also creative and opens for our mind access to previously barred spheres. The significant task of aprioristic reasoning is on the one hand to bring into relief all that is implied in the categories, concepts, and premises and, on the other hand, to show what they do not imply. It is its vocation to render manifest and obvious what was hidden and unknown before. (Human Action)
In the Misesian conception, just as mathematics expounds the tautological implications of 24, praxeology expounds the tautological implications of goal-directed conduct or rationality or intentionality or human action (all terms here considered synonymous).
“The analytic method is simply a way of discovering necessary consequences of complex collocations of facts—consequences whose counterpart in reality is not so immediately discernible as the counterpart of the original postulates. It is an instrument for “shaking out” all the implications of given suppositions. Granted the correspondence of its original assumptions and the facts, its conclusions are inevitable and inescapable.”
(Robbins, An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science)
I find such a demand of negative evidence in response to the claim that one’s own knowledge claim is apodictic to be strange. Presumably you must be able to account for the apodictic status of the axioms, as well as justify the very concept of apodictic knowledge.
I’m claiming that it is impossible for such a scheme qua scheme to be “objective” or “complete”.
At least the way it sometimes is expressed by particular people, it seems to say something different than that, effectively using its own conception of rationality to counter any other usage that could function as an exception or limitation to its application. I think that this is, at a minimum, a demarkation abuse of austrian economics.
The issue, of course, is that the fact that our thinking and acting is based on something does not necessarily make it true, let alone apodictic. This could include the category of useful fictions, or perhaps evolutionarily influenced practicalities that constitute the background of a world picture.
My premise is, rather, that apodictic truth is a mistaken category to put anything in, and that a closed axiomatic system will generally be more problematic than an open one that has considerations for its limitations or exceptions.
Not exactly. A dictionary written by them.
boinks the austro-bolshevix 
Adam, excellent and elucidating posts, as usual.
Z.
How does it even make any sense whatsoever to speak of rationality without an accompanying concept of what irrationality actually is?
There is no positive without a negative.
Indeed. And in the context of Austrian economics, the opposite of rational would be not rational. Human action is rational. Photosynthesis is not rational. To quote one of my favorite posters here:
On one hand, every single person is rational in the sense that they possess the faculty of reason and are self-aware. They have the ability to freely make choices. In this sense of the word, noone can be more rational then anyone else because this is merely a description of our fundamental natures. On the other hand, in terms of their actual beliefs and choices, noone is consistantly rational if we are using rational to mean in accordance with objective reality and their actual best interest. People make all sorts of choices that can easily be demonstrated to be harmful to them, and people believe plenty of things that are not in accordance with objective reality. In this sense of the word, some people are simply more rational then others, make more coherant arguements and better choices. But when [Austrians] describe human beings as inherently being rational, we are using the first sense of the word, not the second. It would be disingenous to act as if we are argueing that everyone is consistant in their beliefs, sharp as a bell and makes wonderful lifestyle choices.
“I’m claiming that it is impossible for such a scheme qua scheme to be “objective” or “complete”.”
For me that would be a new thread.
“At least the way it sometimes is expressed by particular people, it seems to say something different than that, effectively using its own conception of rationality to counter any other usage that could function as an exception or limitation to its application. I think that this is, at a minimum, a demarkation abuse of austrian economics.”
I agree. But I consider the demarcation abuse an attribute of ‘particular people’ and not an attribute of ‘Austrian economics.’
Here are three separate meanings:
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If goal directed conduct, then XYZ (formal/epistemological meaning)
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That being over there is an acting being. (zoological or ontological meaning)
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If he does not believe that being over there is an acting being, he is a fraud and a liar. (ethical and moral meaning)
Praxeology consistently carried through only needs and only relies on #1.
“The issue, of course, is that the fact that our thinking and acting is based on something does not necessarily make it true, let alone apodictic. This could include the category of useful fictions, or perhaps evolutionarily influenced practicalities that constitute the background of a world picture.”
Perhaps. But this falls far short of a demonstration of how the tautology presented above is invalid. Thus, one is on reasonable grounds in believing that the tautology is valid. We are on reasonable grounds in believing that in walking toward one location we will be walking away from another location, until a more useful fiction (theory) is developed.
As evidence of how difficult it is to avoid referring to action and its categories, both of your proposed substitutes refer to action:
“Useful fictions” Fictions that are used (i.e. utilized) for some assumed purpose.
“Practicalities” X has been found to be a practical means to attaining Y.
Lastly, if we are arguing for fictions and evolutionary influenced practicalities in earnest (not just using them as debate tactics), then I assume these labels for the theories people develop apply to leftist, rightist, and statist theories as well ??
“My premise is, rather, that apodictic truth is a mistaken category to put anything in, and that a closed axiomatic system will generally be more problematic than an open one that has considerations for its limitations or exceptions.”
Again, perhaps. But then we need to compare the open system side by side with the axiomatic system and see which system provides a more satisfactory explanation. Austrian theory did this in supplanting the older objective or labor theory of value. Currently Austrian theory is competing with other theories to explain the current economic situation. If you believe there exists an ‘open’ theory or system that explains economic, ethical, or moral phenomena better than Austrian or formal analysis, then I assume you will be referring readers to that theory as embodied in particular essays or books.
Or you might mean that you don’t care for Austrian analysis, and you believe that in the future a normative-oriented theory will emerge that surpasses Austrian theory?
Both the limitations of Austrian theory and the acknowledgement that exact science is not the only kind of science have been acknowledged from the beginning:
“Nothing is so certain as that the results of the exact orientation of theoretical research appear insufficient and unempirical in the field of economy just as in all the other realms of the world of phenomena, when measured by the standard of realism. This is, however, self-evident, since the results of exact research, and indeed in all the realms of the world of phenomena, are true only with certain presuppositions which in reality do not always apply. Testing the exact theory of economy by the full empirical method is simply a methodological absurdity, a failure to recognize the bases and presuppositions of exact research. At the same time it is a failure to recognize the particular aims which the exact sciences serve. To want to test the pure theory of economy by experience in its full reality is a process analogous to that of the mathematician who wants to correct the principles of geometry by measuring real objects, without reflecting that the latter are indeed not identical with the magnitudes which pure geometry presumes or that every measurement of necessity implies elements of inexactitude. Realism in theoretical research is not something higher than exact orientation, but something different.” (Menger, Investigations Into The Method of the Social Sciences)
Here Menger acknowledges both that praxeological knowledge is limited to those circumstances in which its presuppositions apply, and that praxeological knowledge and research is something different than realistic or empirical knowledge and research. Menger conceives at least two orientations to the world of phenomena: the exact orientation, and the realistic or empirical orientation.
I find such a demand of negative evidence in response to the claim that one’s own knowledge claim is apodictic to be strange. Presumably you must be able to account for the apodictic status of the axioms, as well as justify the very concept of apodictic knowledge.
The case has already been made. You are the one questioning the validity of the claim, but you have so far been unable to provide a substantive argument towards this end (instead, you prefer to post cryptic responses that don’t really say anything at all).
But only on some system of valuation other than their own. Rationality is a higher-order effect or outcome of purposive action that is directed by sheer preference. Like the vast majority of people on the planet, I don’t eat to survive or even to avoid hunger pangs, I eat because I like to eat. People act rationally (that is, in their own interest) because those who didn’t value rational action died out without leaving offspring, leaving only those who did act rationally to pass on their rational genes.
I value communicating with my friends on a timely basis more than I disvalue the increased risk of collision that results from texting while driving. The benefits and costs are purely psychological. I may really underestimate the increase in the risk that results from texting while driving (I almost certainly underestimate the risk of driving itself, let alone texting while driving) but that doesn’t change the psychological calculus.
I don’t see how these even prima facie qualify as “irrational.” What are the costs?
Intervention by aliens/angels? Or just other humans? If other humans, what reason is there to believe that the ‘interveners’ will make more rational choices than the ‘intervenees’?
True, but so what? I think you’re still fundamentally confusing rationality with valuation. The two are entirely separate. Humans do not act on the basis of rationality, they act on the basis of valuation. The outcome of value-driven action is rational because, if it weren’t, our species would long ago have perished. To survive in this biosphere, you have no choice but to be rational.
“Will to power”… pshaw. Natural selection is genetic and the only traces left by natural selection are in our genes. “Will to power” sounds Lamarckian or, even worse, Nazistic. Those groups that survive and out-reproduce all other groups are the “winners” of natural selection. There is no other sense to natural selection.
Who says power is irrational?? Do not kings and generals calculate how to win and do so on the basis of cost-benefit analyses? Do not successful kings survive and accrue wealth??
Yeah, Ancient Greece was non-competitive.
C F# Bb E A D … the Rational Chord 
(inside joke for music theory nerds)
Clayton -
Using the example of texting while driving again. Though it is true that some individuals value communication over safety, decisions like these are being tried out in the market constantly (sort of liike mutations in the genetic code that will be tried out in nature) and tested for its survivability. But the difference is that it is the market/nature that selects only the reasonable behavior in the long haul.The decision of texting while driving doesn’t always end happily even though you might get lucky once in a while so it is highely iunlikely it will surive in the long run. So, nature has “weeded out” this action as unprofitable even though some humans followed this action at some point in time, despite the risks.
For example, we all eat food everyday because the benefits (fulfilling hunger, nutrition & health etc) usually outweigh the costs (time, money etc). EVERY human being does this (atleast wants to) because nature has selected this as an action that is reasonable enough to be a universal action. That is the key concept. Universal actions all tend to be reasonable in the long run because they are the only ones that work without actually having to get lucky. Unreasonable ones are kicked out even though they are tried out now and then.
We think in a similar model of equation but it is the inputs that makes us different. The one that uses the right inputs wins (most of the time).