If you believe that the end justifies the means, you might as well go for it.
I fail to see how the entries you allegedly copied-and-pasted in any way provide evidence that Shakespeare was the very first person in the history of (what could be called) the English language to use constructions of the form “X is Y”, where X is an adjectival phrase and Y is a noun phrase modified by the adjective, e.g. “Heavy is my heart.”
If you weren’t actually trying to make me shut up already, then I’ll gladly stand corrected.
See what I did there? I indicated a willingness to admit that I was mistaken about your intended meaning. While I agree that people are certainly free to interpret others’ statements, that doesn’t mean their interpretations are necessarily correct vis-a-vis those others. Of course, the waters are muddied here by the fact that it’s often difficult or even impossible to find or figure out someone else’s intended meaning.
Regarding your second example, however, I’ll submit that it certainly did sound to me like you were indeed arguing that all English-cognizant women (at the very least) are always and necessarily being told that they’re inferior. We can go back over the previous posts in this thread if you’d like.
By taking his (translated) words literally, by their commonly-held definitions, except where he specifies what he means (such as his definitions of “use-value”, “exchange-value”, and “socially necessary”). In the latter cases, I use the same process for the definitions themselves.
Here I completely disagree. I fail to see how things like the Communist Manifesto have any independent, separate meaning aside from the meaning their authors had in mind when they wrote them. So they mean the same thing now as they meant when they were written. We may not know exactly what their authors meant, of course - but that doesn’t mean we can’t have a (very) good idea of it. What you advocate is akin to ignoring the authors entirely and looking at the words per se. I find that to be ridiculous. Language is nothing without speakers and writers.
I see language as a medium through which meaning travels. That is, language is the encoding of meaning. Without meaning, there would be no language.
You’ll find no disagreement from me on whether language evolves. It certainly does. As with your example of the word “queer”, what’s typically referred to as “semantic shift” in linguistics involves changing the encoding of meaning. Using your example, “queer” originally had only negative connotations attached to it. Then some people, through “identity politics”, consciously and deliberately attached positive connotations to it instead. So here we have a case of different meanings using the same encoding. Because one side of the association has changed, the association as a whole has changed.
People are free to bring their own meanings to a reading. That’s not at issue with me, and I’m sorry if I gave you a different impression. What’s at issue is the accuracy of the meanings read with respect to the meanings written. When I read a work of non-fiction, I try to understand the meanings the author intended to convey with what he wrote. I don’t know why anyone would honestly want to do otherwise.
“I fail to see how the entries you allegedly copied-and-pasted in any way provide evidence that Shakespeare was the very first person in the history of (what could be called) the English language to use constructions of the form “X is Y”, where X is an adjectival phrase and Y is a noun phrase modified by the adjective, e.g. ‘Heavy is my heart.’”
Those OED entries demonstrate that Shakespeare, as far as we know, was the first person to publish and use certain words. As far as his liberal use of syntax, I’ve cited a book and admitted that I do not believe it’s free and available online. Unfortunately I’m a brick and mortar type. Take that for what you will.
Now if either of us are trying to definitively arrive at the conclusion that somone was the first ever to do anything, then we’re playing an endless game. I can state that as far as the totality of recorded history of which society is aware that Shakespeare was the first to do such and such a thing, but that takes into account sources we may be unaware of or were destroyed. But what was my point? Even if not Shakespeare, but say, some guy named Bob was the first to construct a sentence in such a way, does that affect the fact that new and unique sentence structure is ambiguous until its meaning is commonly reciprocated?
“By taking his (translated) words literally, by their commonly-held definitions, except where he specifies what he means (such as his definitions of “use-value”, “exchange-value”, and “socially necessary”). In the latter cases, I use the same process for the definitions themselves.”
This may interest you: http://www.roughtheory.org/wp-content/images/Disassembling-Capital-N-Pepperell.pdf
I haven’t read the whole thing, but the thesis grabs my attention and I’m excited to. But anyway, I’m not trying to say that that pdf is a correct interpretation of Capital, but that there still lies a myriad of interpretations available. If, as we both have said now, everyone is free to attribute the meaning they like to a word, then at what point does a text become decidable? Meaning may exist, but it seems as though the medium, language, is not capable of doing anything more than approaching it.
“Here I completely disagree. I fail to see how things like the Communist Manifesto have any independent, separate meaning aside from the meaning their authors had in mind when they wrote them. So they mean the same thing now as they meant when they were written. We may not know exactly what their authors meant, of course - but that doesn’t mean we can’t have a (very) good idea of it. What you advocate is akin to ignoring the authors entirely and looking at the words per se. I find that to be ridiculous. Language is nothing without speakers and writers.”
Language, indeed, cannot exist without speakers, writers, and an audience. But when it comes to things like the Communist Manifesto we have the dilemma of there no longer being an objective author in the real world. Yet, the text itself still exists, as do the readers. At this point, we are no longer reading for the sake of the author, but for the sake of the words on the page as they exist today. The only Marx we can approach is a subjective creation of our interpretations of his words, actions, and biography. So if we read for the sake of knowing what one author meant, I don’t exactly see how that is an attainable goal at all.
What I am trying to acknowledge is that reading for the sake of an objective interpretation of the meaning of the author is simply hiding behind a smoke screen or reaching for a thread that can never be touched. Any idea we have of Marx is already clouded by our interpretations of history. So it seems as though instead of reading for our subjective projection of what Marx meant, or the meaning of what the words may have meant, we may as well just read for the meaning of the words on the page as they exist right now, taking into account the context in which we are reading.
“People are free to bring their own meanings to a reading. That’s not at issue with me, and I’m sorry if I gave you a different impression. What’s at issue is the accuracy of the meanings read with respect to the meanings written. When I read a work of non-fiction, I try to understand the meanings the author intended to convey with what he wrote. I don’t know why anyone would honestly want to do otherwise.”
Well, my point is that you’re on a wild goose chase, especially in terms of writers that wrote things that were purposefully undecidable. For instance, Ezra Pound’s “In a Station of the Metro”:
The apparition of these faces in the crowd/ Petals on the wet, black bough
The literary debate around this two line poem is pretty astounding. What exactly was Pound doing? Contrasting the dull image of faces waiting in the crowd to the clinging of petals to a bough or likening the two? Or was he simply creating an image as it came to him? In terms of metaphor we’re confronted with “the binding problem.”
My assertion is that language, and especially the language that is deemed ‘literature,’ has its effects by being crafted in such a way that it is undeciable, that it impels the reader, connects with the reader, and creates a desire in the reader to “solve” the text that can never be fulfilled.
There are, of course, practical purposes of language. But that seems not to be a motivating factor in, or at least cannot account for, the continuing shift in interpretations, meanings, and significance.
My contention about Shakespeare was entirely in the syntactic realm. Surely you know that already. I have no idea why you tried to change the issue here into one of whether Shakespeare was the first to coin certain words. It sounds like a red herring to me.
Citing a book that I must pay money for is a cop-out IMHO. How do you expect it to convince me that you’re correct?
I, for one, am not sure whether that’s a fact. For example, “Heavy is my heart” is hardly ambiguous, even if one’s never heard/read it before (assuming he’s an English speaker). You made a claim about Shakespeare as evidence (not proof) of this alleged fact, and I have disputed this claim. At this point, we seem to be at an impasse, and I’m not surprised in the least.
If I say to you, “The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog,” you’re free to interpret its meaning as “The quick brown cow jumps over the lazy moon”. But that’s not the meaning I was trying to convey. Who’s to say what the actual meaning of what I said is? I am - no one else. After all, I and no one else said it, right?
What’s really at issue is whether it’s valid for you to claim that I said “The quick brown cow jumps over the lazy moon” (in terms of meaning) after I have clearly indicated to you that I did not say that. So again, it’s not about freedom - it’s about accuracy and validity.
If we listen for the sake of knowing what the speaker means, you must also not exactly see how that’s an attainable goal at all, either. None of us is a mind-reader. So we never truly know what another person means (i.e. what he’s thinking) when he says anything, because we can’t experience his own thoughts for ourselves. That doesn’t seem to be a problem most of the time. Why not? Because of shared languages. However, I think it can become more of a problem as the level of abstraction becomes greater.
Any idea we have of anyone, living or dead, is already clouded by our interpretations of reality. I fail to see how that means we should just ignore the speaker/author and treat words as if they just spontaneously appeared in mid-air/page. That sounds like navel-gazing to me. If you want to do that, fine - the rest of us will move on without you.
Science can never be fulfilled either. Uncertainty - however small - is at the heart of science and empiricism in general. Does that mean we should just interpret physical phenomena however we want? In that case, I claim that the Ptolemaic theory of cosmology is just as valid as the Einsteinian theory, because I interpret the sun, the moon, the planets, and everything else in the heavens as revolving around the earth! Who are you to tell me that I’m wrong?!
And when it comes to Ezra Pound… who the frack cares? I didn’t realize we were talking about literary works of art here.
The Communist Manifesto was hardly a literary work of art - either poetry or prose. I’ve been talking about practical purposes of language this whole time. Surely that’s been obvious to you. But I fail to see how interpretations, meanings, and significance can’t be, or aren’t, motivated by practical purposes of language. For example, many practical computer terms (“bug”, “thread”, “string”, “hang”, “leak”, etc.) were adapted from other, more primitive, usages. Many other areas of technology - an, if not the, eminently practical area of human life - also have such terms. So metaphor is hardly restricted to only the artistic domain.
“My contention about Shakespeare was entirely in the syntactic realm. Surely you know that already. I have no idea why you tried to change the issue here into one of whether Shakespeare was the first to coin certain words. It sounds like a red herring to me.”
Sorry, this threw me off:
“Please point out where Shakespeare invented a word.”
But anyway, “Citing a book that I must pay money for is a cop-out IMHO. How do you expect it to convince me that you’re correct?”
Libraries are free, as far as I know. Either way, the Shakespeare example isn’t really a pivitol part of my argument, and could just the same be taken in a purely hypothetical manner (if Shakespeare invented such and such).
"If I say to you, “The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog,” you’re free to interpret its meaning as “The quick brown cow jumps over the lazy moon”. But that’s not the meaning I was trying to convey. Who’s to say what the actual meaning of what I said is? I am - no one else. After all, I and no one else said it, right?
What’s really at issue is whether it’s valid for you to claim that I said “The quick brown cow jumps over the lazy moon” (in terms of meaning) after I have clearly indicated to you that I did not say that. So again, it’s not about freedom - it’s about accuracy and validity."
You seem to think I am saying that we can say, “well, So-and-so actually meant such and such,” which is exactly what I am arguing against! I have been arguing for text-imminent analysis, that the text exists with an author but has the ability to take on a meaning of its own. If I decide that dog means moon, that interpretation exists somewhere between the text, me, you, and the context in which it appeared, not solely to the author, reader, or text. I’m saying that the meaning does not belong to the author for better or for worse.
In terms of Marx, we’re dealing with an author who is dead. And if meaning exists in the mind, as you’ve said, it seems as though whatever meaning Marx had is dead with him. How exactly the meaning of the Communist Manifesto is approachable is something that is unanswerable by what you’ve said so far.
“If we listen for the sake of knowing what the speaker means, you must also not exactly see how that’s an attainable goal at all, either. None of us is a mind-reader. So we never truly know what another person means (i.e. what he’s thinking) when he says anything, because we can’t experience his own thoughts for ourselves. That doesn’t seem to be a problem most of the time. Why not? Because of shared languages. However, I think it can become more of a problem as the level of abstraction becomes greater.”
And this is where your assertions that definitions are arbitrary fall apart. Apparently they’re arbitrary, but not too arbitrary, but sometimes they’re arbitrary enough, but usually we can grasp it. All the while meaning exists solely within the mind and we’re using this seemingly subjectively arbitrary marker to map out our thoughts.
I do not think we listen for the sake of the speaker. I think we listen for the sake of the words and what they mean to us and the world as we experience it.
“Any idea we have of anyone, living or dead, is already clouded by our interpretations of reality. I fail to see how that means we should just ignore the speaker/author and treat words as if they just spontaneously appeared in mid-air/page. That sounds like navel-gazing to me. If you want to do that, fine - the rest of us will move on without you.”
It doesn’t mean we should ignore the author, nor does it mean that words appear out of mid-air. It means we listen, remark that someone said such and such a group of words in such and such an order, and then we interpret what those words mean in context which takes into account subjectivity. This is how people get offended even when no offense was intended, or how we pick up on irony, or sarcasm. Imagine someone is offended by the quoted use of the word faggot because to them that word can be nothing more than dergatory and hateful. In this case it was the speaking of the word by an actor that offended the listener, despite the actor’s intention.
“Science can never be fulfilled either. Uncertainty - however small - is at the heart of science and empiricism in general. Does that mean we should just interpret physical phenomena however we want? In that case, I claim that the Ptolemaic theory of cosmology is just as valid as the Einsteinian theory, because I interpret the sun, the moon, the planets, and everything else in the heavens as revolving around the earth! Who are you to tell me that I’m wrong?!”
I’m not sure what your point is here, or how anything I’ve said approaches the reductio ad absurdum at the end. Science is built off of preexisting experiments and uses, just like language, and is also continually changing. And I don’t think either of us think science is free from social power dynamics. Homosexuals were considered to have a mental disorder until fairly recently.
“And when it comes to Ezra Pound… who the frack cares? I didn’t realize we were talking about literary works of art here.”
Well, we’re having a discussion about language and authors tend to specialize in using it.
“The Communist Manifesto was hardly a literary work of art - either poetry or prose. I’ve been talking about practical purposes of language this whole time. Surely that’s been obvious to you. But I fail to see how interpretations, meanings, and significance can’t be, or aren’t, motivated by practical purposes of language. For example, many practical computer terms (“bug”, “thread”, “string”, “hang”, “leak”, etc.) were adapted from other, more primitive, usages. Many other areas of technology - an, if not the, eminently practical area of human life - also have such terms. So metaphor is hardly restricted to only the artistic domain.”
…that’s my point. That continuing shifts in interpretation have to do with meaning existing in context with the world around it, not the intention of an author. The fact that even in the most practical uses of language people still seem to stick to the use of metaphor and rhetoric just seems to strengthen my point. We’re always faced with more empty space between what is said and what is meant by the author to the point where meaning becomes a mutual process between the two as mediated by the text, not a thing to be passed from one to the other by way of a system that is “arbitrary.”
I forgot that I’d written that. In any case, just because e.g. the OED claims that Shakespeare invented a word doesn’t mean he actually did.
Then why don’t you go ahead and restate your argument in a purely hypothetical manner, so we’re all on the same page?
Please explain how, according to you, I seem to think that. Precise analysis would be appreciated here.
If meaning exists within the mind, then texts have no meanings of their own. I don’t care if this contradicts anything I claimed earlier - it’s what I’m claiming now.
If you decide that “dog” to you means what “moon” means to me, then you interpreted a meaning that I did not intend. Since I, and not you, was the one who made the statement, any different meaning you interpret is irrelevant vis-a-vis my intended meaning. You can either acknowledge that I meant something in particular (assuming you reasonably understand what I meant), or you can deny it. But to claim I meant something other than what I did mean - as indicated by disagreement from me - is to behave dishonestly.
Let’s take, as a hopefully illustrative example, the ten planks of the Communist Manifesto’s platform:
Now, just how much ambiguity do you think there really is with the above? It all seems very straightforward to me, regardless of the fact that both Marx and Engels are long dead.
At this point, I have little clue what you mean by “arbitrary”, but I suspect that your definition of it is somehow different from mine. Perhaps you can explain.
Here’s a hypothetical scenario that will hopefully illustrate where I’m coming from. I say to you, “Let’s meet at the movie theater at 1 PM tomorrow.” You immediately grab a rock and throw it at my window, breaking it. I then say, “Why in the world did you do that?!” You reply, “Because you told me to.” I say, “No I didn’t!” But you say, “Yes you did!” Where does that leave us?
Yes, and I think it’s entirely unreasonable when people are still offended by the speaker’s words even after they understand that the speaker himself intended no offense. But as far as I can tell, you think it’s perfectly reasonable for them to stay offended. I’m glad you brought this up, because I think it strikes at the heart of our dispute.
See, that’s just it: from where I am, the reductio ad absurdum seems to accurately reflect your position. I say “seems to” because there’s always the possibility that I’m mistaken. But if I am, it falls on you to clarify until we reach a mutual (i.e. agreed-upon) understanding.
… Do I need to repeat myself?
Let’s suppose I say to you, “I was on my way to work and a bug hit my window!” You respond with, “Wow, I didn’t know you were having problems with your graphical user interface!” I look at you dumbfounded.
When I say that meaning is arbitrary, I mean (no pun intended) that you’re not bound in any way to make the same associations between thought-patterns and words (i.e. sound-patterns) as I do or anyone else does. Meaning is shared by decision. We each choose to employ meanings that we believe others around us readily recognize - or we don’t. In either case, it’s entirely up to each of us as an individual. The fact that millions of people choose to speak approximately the same language to each other is immaterial.
“Please explain how, according to you, I seem to think that. Precise analysis would be appreciated here.”
With pleasure. I’ll just quote something you said later in this post.
“Here’s a hypothetical scenario that will hopefully illustrate where I’m coming from. I say to you, “Let’s meet at the movie theater at 1 PM tomorrow.” You immediately grab a rock and throw it at my window, breaking it. I then say, “Why in the world did you do that?!” You reply, “Because you told me to.” I say, “No I didn’t!” But you say, “Yes you did!” Where does that leave us?”
What I’m saying is, given certain contextual factors (let’s keep in mind that no one but you have developed scenarios in which words can unilaterally be changed based on what a reader or author thinks), people can interpret words differently than how they were intended, not claim that the speaker said something they did not or meant something they did not.
“If you decide that “dog” to you means what “moon” means to me, then you interpreted a meaning that I did not intend. Since I, and not you, was the one who made the statement, any different meaning you interpret is irrelevant vis-a-vis my intended meaning. You can either acknowledge that I meant something in particular (assuming you reasonably understand what I meant), or you can deny it. But to claim I meant something other than what I did mean - as indicated by disagreement from me - is to behave dishonestly.”
If it isn’t clear, I’m saying that nobody can say what someone else meant, but that they can say what the text meant to them. The ownership of that meaning does not lie solely with the author.
“Yes, and I think it’s entirely unreasonable when people are still offended by the speaker’s words even after they understand that the speaker himself intended no offense. But as far as I can tell, you think it’s perfectly reasonable for them to stay offended. I’m glad you brought this up, because I think it strikes at the heart of our dispute.”
Nope. Once again, I’m arguing that the text has a meaning that’s at least semi-independent of the author, and despite your claim that “meaning exists within the mind,” now you’re saying that words alone can offend someone, even after they realize the intent of their author. So while that claim doesn’t contradict anything you’ve said earlier, it certainly contradicts what you’re saying now. (I misread that part, my bad.)
But anyway, if someone says “you’re a faggot,” and a third party takes offense because of the speaker’s attempt to degrade someone even though the insult wasn’t aimed at them, I find that reasonable.
Anyway, your last paragraph:
“When I say that meaning is arbitrary, I mean (no pun intended) that you’re not bound in any way to make the same associations between thought-patterns and words (i.e. sound-patterns) as I do or anyone else does. Meaning is shared by decision. We each choose to employ meanings that we believe others around us readily recognize - or we don’t. In either case, it’s entirely up to each of us as an individual. The fact that millions of people choose to speak approximately the same language to each other is immaterial.”
And that analysis of language falls short if meaning only exists in the mind. How do you rationalize any interpretation of dead authors? And seeing as how language is a tool of communication, something that is not unilateral, it seems at least a little relevant that most people are speaking the same language. Language doesn’t exist in a vaccuum.
I don’t see how meaning can ultimately be anything but mutually determined.
Let’s say that Marx uses the term socialism in one of his works. In another work, he defines socialism as “common ownership over the means of production.” So I go back to the first work and, every time I read “socialism,” my mind substitutes “common ownership over the means of production.” So now it seems I know what Marx really meant by socialism. But what did he mean by “common ownership over the means of production?” Either we run into a reductio ad absurdum or we are forced to admit that meaning is independent of the author.
If X = Y
and
Y = mutually determined meaning
then
X = mutually determined meaning
Whenever one wishes to give an unusual meaning to a word, one must present an X = Y equation to communicate that meaning. One must accept the common ownership over the production of meanings if one wishes to be social.
Even when Marx was thinking of the word socialism he was attributing it meaning through reference to language. How can an author express a “non-language” meaning through language when the thoughts he wishes to communicate are themselves a form of language? Meaning seems to merely be an act of translation. Look at it this way, the thoughts that Marx had in his head form one text. Let’s call this the author text. Marx attempts to translate part of the author text into the intermediary text–that is, the Communist Manifesto in its physical form. The reader then tries to translate the intermediary text into the reader text–a mental form that relates the words to the reader’s own experiences. From what I gather, Autolykos is asking, “what does the author text say?” And Birthday Pony is saying that we can’t know because the text is long destroyed and no complete copies of it exist. Now of course we do have the intermediary text, which might provide us with a hint of what the author text contained. But with the author text completely inaccessible to us, we have nothing to judge whether one reader text is a more accurate translation of the author text than another reader text is. We can only judge these reader texts against each other by some other criteria (e.g. which is most “useful,” coherent, internally consistent).
That’s kind of what I’m saying. I would add the Derrida quote, “il n’ya pas de hors-texte,” there is nothing outside the text. We always read incontext of our experience and all the social, political, and economic discourse around us.
I agree that people can interpret words differently from how they were intended. I’ve agreed with that this whole time. The implication of that to me is that there is no necessary meaning for a given word. Please note that I’m considering “word” to simply mean a particular pattern of sounds. Therefore, meaning does not exist within a given word (i.e. a given pattern of sounds). If it doesn’t exist there, where else can it exist? In the mind(s).
No, the ownership of the meaning does not lie solely with the author. But certainly the author had a certain purpose in what he authored. We can’t literally experience that purpose ourselves, for we are not him. Nevertheless, it seems that we can come close to it - at least “reasonably” or approximately so.
We employ language for communication, which means we want our listeners/readers to (approximately) understand what we’re telling them. Authors may be long dead, but their published works serve as longer-lasting communications. Of course, a person is free to interpret a written work any way he wishes - for example, I could say that what The Communist Manifesto means to me is a great recipe for producing spinach dip. But that completely obfuscates the communication between the long-dead Marx and myself, because (in reality) it’s clear to me that Marx was not writing about spinach dip at all.
From what I understand, people typically listen to others and read things others have written because they want to know what those others are talking/writing about. I’m assuming that’ll also be your reason for reading what I’ve just written.
Could you explain your misreading to me? I’m curious.
By saying “the text has a meaning that’s at least semi-independent of the author”, I’m presuming (based on your other statements) you mean that others can interpret a text contrariwise to the author’s intended meaning(s). Outside of our context here, I’d take that statement to mean something different - something along the lines of there being a certain meaning that the text must have. Anyways, as I’ve stated before, I agree with you that people are free to interpret words however they want. I consider that to be the same thing as being free to assign arbitrary meanings to words. Therefore words (again i.e. sound patterns) have no inherent meanings.
Yes and I find that reasonable too. In that case, however, the third party is apparently not mistaken about the speaker’s intended meaning. On the other hand, it seems unreasonable to me to e.g. conclude that an author is racist because certain words such as “niggardly” appear in his works. There is no necessary relationship between stylistic and substantive criticisms.
At one point in The Lord of the Rings trilogy (I forget which book it was), Tolkien used the word “faggot” in describing an action of the wizard Gandalf. It’s clear from the context that Tolkien meant either “a burning or smoldering piece of firewood” or “a bundle of sticks tied together”. He certainly did not mean “an effeminate male homosexual”. Does it follow, then, that Tolkien was necessarily homophobic? If one does not like to hear or read the word “faggot”, that seems to me to be simply a stylistic criticism, not a substantive one.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by that last sentence, but I don’t see how meaning only existing in the mind means that my analysis of language falls short. Indeed, what do you think it falls short of, exactly?
Strictly speaking, people don’t speak the exact same language. At best, they may speak approximately the same language. There’s no guarantee that what one person takes a word to mean will be exactly the same as what another person takes it to mean. But yes, communication is not unilateral - it takes at least two to tango, as it were. Since communication is a shared and collaborative phenomonon, so is language. But as you yourself have noted, the existence of prior associations between meanings and words in no way a priori or prima facie obligates one to rely solely upon them in communication. By the same token, of course, his making new and different associations does not obligate anyone (let alone everyone) else to follow suit thereafter.
I don’t see how meaning is a thing that exists out there in the world. To claim otherwise seems to me an instance of the reification fallacy.
I think you mean an infinite regression, not a reductio ad absurdum. And even if meaning is assumed to be mutually determined, I fail to see how that eliminates the question of what Marx or anyone else means by e.g. “common ownership over the means of production”.
If meaning is (once again) not a thing out there in the world, then the production of meaning is individual. The fact that large numbers of people (seem to) agree on large numbers of associations between meanings and words is immaterial here. Since all action is individual (per methodological individualism), then all agreement is individual.
Presumably the intermediary text is as close to the author text as the author could make it. This, of course, assumes that the author was not trying to trick people into thinking he meant one thing when he actually meant another - that is, it assumes that he was honest in his use of language.
In any case, I think you’ve done a good job here depicting what I’ve also been trying to explain. Are thoughts themselves a form of language? I think one could say that, yes. However, assuming that (if only arguendo) simply means that the language of thought itself is inaccessible to others - hence the existence of the intermediary spoken/written languages.
The posts are getting shorter, and it seems we’re approaching some kind of understanding, but let’s see.
“I agree that people can interpret words differently from how they were intended. I’ve agreed with that this whole time. The implication of that to me is that there is no necessary meaning for a given word. Please note that I’m considering “word” to simply mean a particular pattern of sounds. Therefore, meaning does not exist within a given word (i.e. a given pattern of sounds). If it doesn’t exist there, where else can it exist? In the mind(s).”
Ah, now we at least have pluralized ‘minds.’
“No, the ownership of the meaning does not lie solely with the author. But certainly the author had a certain purpose in what he authored. We can’t literally experience that purpose ourselves, for we are not him. Nevertheless, it seems that we can come close to it - at least “reasonably” or approximately so.”
And by what measurement can you assert as much other than just because you say so? Certainly there have been mad authors that we still read, and from what I understand of Marx I wouldn’t be surprised if he was among them. Who’s to say we can come reasonably close to the original meaning intended by the author when we have no access to what that meaning was?
“We employ language for communication, which means we want our listeners/readers to (approximately) understand what we’re telling them. Authors may be long dead, but their published works serve as longer-lasting communications. Of course, a person is free to interpret a written work any way he wishes - for example, I could say that what The Communist Manifesto means to me is a great recipe for producing spinach dip. But that completely obfuscates the communication between the long-dead Marx and myself, because (in reality) it’s clear to me that Marx was not writing about spinach dip at all.”
That would certainly be one hell of a thesis, and once again, you’re the only one that is thinking up scenarios where there is no relationship between the context and the text. No one is saying that but the straw man, and he’s drunk, so quit listening to him.
“From what I understand, people typically listen to others and read things others have written because they want to know what those others are talking/writing about. I’m assuming that’ll also be your reason for reading what I’ve just written.”
I don’t know who Autolykos really is, and any stock I have in this Autolykos character is stock in what I am reading into em, especially considering this is a world that only exists in text. While I could say I’m reading for your sake, or the sake of whatever meaning is held in your mind that I have no access to, I think it’d be more accurate to say I’m reading because there’s something in it for me. Your text might evoke meaning in me.
“Could you explain your misreading to me? I’m curious.”
Read ‘unreasonable’ as ‘reasonable.’
“By saying “the text has a meaning that’s at least semi-independent of the author”, I’m presuming (based on your other statements) you mean that others can interpret a text contrariwise to the author’s intended meaning(s). Outside of our context here, I’d take that statement to mean something different - something along the lines of there being a certain meaning that the text must have. Anyways, as I’ve stated before, I agree with you that people are free to interpret words however they want. I consider that to be the same thing as being free to assign arbitrary meanings to words. Therefore words (again i.e. sound patterns) have no inherent meanings.”
Good thing for context. What I’m saying is that the author is simply part of the context in which we read, and the way we build an author, what an author means to us, is (in most cases) derived from what we read of their work. So in order to know an author and judge what they mean we must read their work, but in order to read their work for the sake of their intended meaning we must know what they mean. Whatever we think they mean is just a projection of the meaning we took out of a text anyway. Is that clear?
“Yes and I find that reasonable too. In that case, however, the third party is apparently not mistaken about the speaker’s intended meaning. On the other hand, it seems unreasonable to me to e.g. conclude that an author is racist because certain words such as “niggardly” appear in his works. There is no necessary relationship between stylistic and substantive criticisms.”
I agree that meaning occurs in context, you could say I’ve been saying it all along. The point of my example was that despite the author not intending to offend the third party, they did. There may be other instances where an offensive word is used lightly, maybe not even to insult someone, but someone is still offended. I think its reasonable. Doesn’t mean I’m easily offended, but I could see why someone might get upset by something like, “quit acting like a bitch,” when the speaker just meant, “quit whining,” even if the speaker explains their intended meaning.
“I’m not quite sure what you mean by that last sentence, but I don’t see how meaning only existing in the mind means that my analysis of language falls short. Indeed, what do you think it falls short of, exactly?”
Explaining anything once an author is dead, or even when we cannot call up an author and ask them about their work. And even when we can, we’re just confronted with another text that doesn’t give us access to their mind. It’s just a secondary text.
If w read for the sake of the original meaning of the author, and the author is dead, and their meaning exists in the mind, then the meaning of their work is dead. All we have the text and context. That’s where we produce meaning. Even if it subsequently exists in our minds, we’re no longer reading for the sake of someone long since dead. I frankly don’t think Marx givesa damn what we say about the Communist Manifesto.
“Strictly speaking, people don’t speak the exact same language. At best, they may speak approximately the same language. There’s no guarantee that what one person takes a word to mean will be exactly the same as what another person takes it to mean. But yes, communication is not unilateral - it takes at least two to tango, as it were. Since communication is a shared and collaborative phenomonon, so is language. But as you yourself have noted, the existence of prior associations between meanings and words in no way a priori or prima facie obligates one to rely solely upon them in communication. By the same token, of course, his making new and different associations does not obligate anyone (let alone everyone) else to follow suit thereafter.”
With that said, imagine an author who for whatever reason we have no access to in any way other than their text and the world in which we read it, and their text has no name on it. Are we still reading for their intended meaning or are we reading for the meaning we take out of it?
My use of the phrase “the mind” was implicitly plural to begin with. Obviously more than one mind exists. I’m sorry if my usage wasn’t clear to you.
Again, by presuming that the author acted in good faith, making his best effort to ensure that his text would communicate the meaning he wanted it to communicate. There’s also logic to take into account. Does he seem to equivocate in any of his word usages? On the syntactic level, does he seem to make any non sequiturs?
If one is free to interpret words however he wishes, then he’s free to change/drop the context, isn’t he? On the other hand, I agree that there certainly is a context for every text, and the most important - indeed, the primary - element of the context seems to be the author himself.
Obviously there being something in it for you is implied by the notion of you wanting to (approximately) know what I’m writing about. I’m hoping that the meaning my words invoke in you is the meaning that I intended for them to invoke. Does that make sense?
Ah okay, thanks.
I’m assuming that by “build an author” you mean “build a conception of an author”. Obviously authors aren’t literally build by their readers. 
To say that the author is part of the context in which we read seems to contradict the whole notion of reading a text “for its own sake”. To me that notion means reading a text without any consideration for the context in which it was written. So no, what you wrote above is not clear as far as I’m concerned.
In that example, it seems to me that the person simply doesn’t like the word (i.e. sound pattern) “bitch” because of the default meaning he associates it with. Again, this seems to be a stylistic criticism, not a substantive one - that is, a criticism over how someone said something, not what he said. On another note, when you say that “meaning occurs”, I hope you’re not implying that meaning is some phenomenon external to the mind.
Well, I have no guarantee the meanings I infer from what you write are exactly the meanings that you intended for me to infer. The same is true vice-versa. But for most words, each of us seems to associate meanings which are approximately the same as those that the other associates with them. I’d say that the evidence for this is the apparent lack of disagreement over our respective usages of most words. Basically, just because definitions exist entirely within the mind doesn’t mean that all definitions are equally ambiguous.
But you said above that the author is part of the context. Even though Marx is dead, I feel comfortable in presuming that he made a best effort in ensuring that what he wrote captured his intended meaning to the fullest extent possible. The alternative would seem to leave me with no basis by which to infer what he meant by what he wrote. Hopefully that makes sense.
I’d say we are indeed reading for the anonymous author’s intended meaning - at least I certainly am.
A few things are still unanswered:
How can we ever know what the intended meaning of an author was based on anything other than assumptions that are based on our subjective readings of a text that render what we think the author meant as not much more than what we got out of the text? That is, how can we separate what we think the author meant and what we took the text to mean?
Why should we read anything for the sake of what Marx meant since he is long since dead? A number of reasonable approaches could be taken to the Communist Manifesto, and none of them have access to what Marx meant. At what point does this cease to be a wild goose chase? And at what point does one person’s assertion that Marx meant X amount to anything more than the meaning they got out of the reading?
I should note that I am not suggesting that texts have an objective meaning to them. The meaning of the text is subjective, and belongs to the reader in context. The “dishonest” reading comes into play when one is aware of their context, aware of the effects of their interpretation, yet insists on another meaning for political or aesthetic purposes. For instance, if I were to conciously alter a few definitions to support a position for political or aesthetic reasons, then I’m being dishonest. To say that I’m right because words can mean whatever I want them to despite context would be the dishonest thing to do. Remarking that I have no access to meaning outside of my own subjective interpretation is not the same thing.
We’re free to interpret (i.e. associate meanings with) words however we want, right? That doesn’t mean that there aren’t commonly accepted definitions for most, if not all, words in a given language. Is that what you mean by “context”? In any case, the idea is that there’s a fundamental premise in textual analysis - namely that, if a word isn’t explicitly defined in the text, its contemporary default definition is to be assumed for it. Without this premise, it seems to me that there’s no way to judge the validity of a given textual interpretation - all interpretations are equally valid and thus validity loses all distinctive meaning.
I’d say that happens when he abandons the fundamental premise that I explain above.
Interestingly enough, “objective” seems to have two flavors. One flavor is the notion of “external concreteness”, which is what I typically mean by “objective”. The other flavor is the notion of “factual”. So, for example, the default definitions of English words are objective in the sense that people do commonly adhere to them, but they’re not objective in the sense that they’re somehow embodied in the words (i.e. sound patterns) themselves. Does that make sense?
I fail to see how openly and straightforwardly insisting on another meaning of a word is necessarily dishonest. There is no deception going on there. It’s when a person implicitly assigns a word a different meaning from the one that he knows his listener(s)/reader(s) expect that I’d say is behaving dishonestly. And what do you mean by “the effects of their interpretation”?
“namely that, if a word isn’t explicitly defined in the text, its contemporary default definition is to be assumed for it. Without this premise, it seems to me that there’s no way to judge the validity of a given textual interpretation - all interpretations are equally valid and thus validity loses all distinctive meaning.”
And that’s something you have to reckon with in the majority of literature, fiction or non-fiction, prose or poetry (at least in English, the language with which I’m familiar). Does this then mean, that the majority of literature written in English is just invalid crap that we shouldn’t deal with?
“I’d say that happens when he abandons the fundamental premise that I explain above.”
And that’s something you have to deal with in most cases of what we call writing.
“So, for example, the default definitions of English words are objective in the sense that people do commonly adhere to them, but they’re not objective in the sense that they’re somehow embodied in the words (i.e. sound patterns) themselves.”
Definitions come about by use, not the dictionary people assigning them meaning. So the ‘default’ definitions are only default for as long as people use them in one such way. It’s why I’ve always like the OED as opposed to Webster’s or other dictionaries. The OED gives root words and the changed definitions over time, as well as changed spellings and so on. Words falling to ‘default’ definitions is certainly not what happens in most cases, rather, it seems as though people rely on that implicit method that you find dishonest. If what you were saying were the case, then how could people ever grasp that ‘queer’ was at one point deragatory without it being explicitly explained? The default definitions is something like, “awkward, strange.” Rarely does someone say, “He was queer, you know. And by that I mean a flaming homosexual in a deragatory sense. And by flaming I mean to evoke an association between his behavior and how we used to burn homosexuals at the stake.”
“I fail to see how openly and straightforwardly insisting on another meaning of a word is necessarily dishonest. There is no deception going on there. It’s when a person implicitly assigns a word a different meaning from the one that he knows his listener(s)/reader(s) expect that I’d say is behaving dishonestly. And what do you mean by “the effects of their interpretation”?”
I didn’t make a distinction between straight forward and implicit.
What I mean is, say, using the word fat to mean ugly and stupid, and insisting on using it in such a way despite knowing how everyone else uses it for one’s own political gain. Say there are Nazis that are obsessed with fitness, so they start talking about fatness in a newly deragatory way. Implying that definition, knowing that it will lead to people associating the definition of fat they know with the definition of fat they hear, all just to inspire hatred of fat people is what I consider dishonest.
It’s a double sided coin of course. I call myself an Anarchist despite the common association for political reasons, but my guess is that ‘they’ used Anarchist improperly to discredit us first.
In all honesty (I hope you believe me here), I have no idea what you mean by the above aside from maybe trying to say “Shut up and deal with it already!” I say “maybe” because I hope I’m wrong about that.
So what if it’s (allegedly) rare? When I talk about making different associations between meanings and words than the contemporary default associations, obviously I’m talking about doing so by use. That is, the person who makes a different association presumably plans on using it. Otherwise, why would he bother?
The treatment of the word “queer” is actually evidence in favor of my point. Certain people in the LGBT community consciously and deliberately started using it in a way that deviated from the contemporary default. In other words, they purposely associated a different meaning to a word.
I know, but I did.
I don’t see how talking about e.g. fatness in a newly derogatory way will necessarily lead to “people” (who, exactly?) making that association. On the other hand, does this mean you don’t think anyone should be allowed to talk about anything in a derogatory way?
How could “they” use the word “anarchist” improperly if they used it first?
I think you mean an infinite regression, not a reductio ad absurdum.
Ah, you’re right. And I appreciate your repeated references to logical fallacies. It’s helping me learn their names and improve my discourse.
I don’t see how meaning is a thing that exists out there in the world. To claim otherwise seems to me an instance of the reification fallacy.
Let me try to explain myself better. We have two things: subjects and objects. When one sees red in an apple, that redness is mutually determined by both the subject (person) and the object (apple). The subject has certain faculties without which she could not see red. The apple has certain characteristics without which it could not project red. So it seems that the redness has both a subjective and objective component that mutually determine it. Now transfer this to a conversation: you are the subject and he is the object. When he says “apple,” your mind immediately conjures up the concept of an apple (that is, the meaning of the word). This meaning is subjectively determined in that you couldn’t have realized the concept of the apple without previously knowing the word. This meaning is objectively determined in that you couldn’t have realized the concept without him speaking the word. If he had said “horse,” you would not have thought of the concept of an apple. You could not even have chosen to assign the concept of apple to the word horse without being dishonest to yourself. So while meaning might not exist in the outside world, the outside world plays an equal role in determining the meaning that exists in your head.
Anyway, it doesn’t seem that our disagreement is that significant. I already said that I agreed with you about the Soviet Union not meeting Marx’s criteria of communism (by which I mean that I think we interpret Marx’s use of the word communism in the same way). And yet I also agree with Birthday Pony that Communism also means the system that the Soviets use. If I hear someone mention the word communism, chances are that I will think they’re talking about the Soviet system.
“In all honesty (I hope you believe me here), I have no idea what you mean by the above aside from maybe trying to say “Shut up and deal with it already!” I say “maybe” because I hope I’m wrong about that.”
What I’m saying is that this is where your analysis falls short. If you hold that new menings must be explicitly stated in order to gain traction then you’re either going to have to deal with the majority of writing being “dishonest” or believe that the majority of literature is absolute garbage that we can never get anything from because it’s too implicit.*
"So what if it’s (allegedly) rare? When I talk about making different associations between meanings and words than the contemporary default associations, obviously I’m talking about doing so by use. That is, the person who makes a different association presumably plans on using it. Otherwise, why would he bother?
The treatment of the word “queer” is actually evidence in favor of my point. Certain people in the LGBT community consciously and deliberately started using it in a way that deviated from the contemporary default. In other words, they purposely associated a different meaning to a word."
In regard to the word “queer,” my point is that there are so many meanings, apparently one default meaning, and most of the time people are not explicit on how they are using it and are instead implicit (the thing you find to be dishonest). Further it just looks like you didn’t really comprehend what I said at the end of my post, that using implicit meanings is a double sided coin (if that metaphor isn’t clear I can be explicit about it). I think it’s dishonest to use words for one’s benefit and the cost of others. But I believe politics always infiltrate language, and it’s just something you’ve got to look out for. Dictionary definitions, the supposed ‘default’ definitions, are hardly objective in that they usually correlate with some kind of ideology.
“I know, but I did.”
Yes, but I don’t have much to say on the explicit/implicit divide.
“I don’t see how talking about e.g. fatness in a newly derogatory way will necessarily lead to “people” (who, exactly?) making that association. On the other hand, does this mean you don’t think anyone should be allowed to talk about anything in a derogatory way?”
It might not (second to last paragraph has a relevant answer) and no. I think to some extent everyone makes use of language politics. And at the same time I think it means everyone can be called out on it. For example, our crypto-fascist friend Monk-Eye has redefined Muslim to basically be the antithesis of anything libertarian or good, while maintaining the common association of Middle Eastern folks with certain religious beliefs. I think that’s an instance of language politics aimed at discrediting certain people by associating them with things we find distasteful. Whether or not he it’s been a success isn’t the point.
“How could “they” use the word “anarchist” improperly if they used it first?”
What I meant was that ‘they’ misused it before we used it. That’s not true though, after I think about it for a second. But, the fact that most people hold onto the archaic definition after anarchists have proven to be part of a centuries old social movement is an example of the language politics I’m talking about. And that Proudhon decided one day to be provocative and declare himself an anarchist made the word stick out quite a bit more.
Either way, what I’m saying is that reliance on so-called default definitions doesn’t get you very far, especially considering different dictionaries have different definitions. Of course there are more conventional uses and less conventional ones, but the important thing to look at is why or rather how a word is used. What effect does the use of the word have on what the text is actually saying? There are instances when words are used as tools of oppression, which the 19th century medical word has done more than enough to prove. There were a number of things labeled originally as diseases which had not yet even entered the human conciousness until talked about as such. Hysteria originated as a disease in which a woman’s uterus somehow “broke loose” and traveled all around her body causing her to act erradict and strange. Not surprisingly, a symptom of female hysteria was a “tendency to cause trouble.” Now that there was a word to define it as a disorder it was easier to shut them up.
*(I would argue that all language is implicit and that’s what makes it fun, active, and a collective experience)
No problem. I’m glad I’m helping.
Before I address what you write above, I’d like you to explain what you mean by the sentence I emphasized. I fail to see how defining a word in an unconventional way would be dishonest to myself.
My entire point has been that just because some people call the Soviet Union “communism” doesn’t mean I have to call it that. And as far as I can tell, I’m certainly being honest with myself in doing otherwise.
However, it seems to me that the conventional meaning of “communist” is actually “a person or group who advocates communism”. In that sense, the Soviet Union certainly claimed to be communist, but was it actually so? From what I understand, it wasn’t - at least not after 1928 (at the latest). But even so, given the conventional definition of “communist”, a country doesn’t have to already have communism in order to be validly called a “communist country”.