It seems that, partly, it is the definition of what we want to call economics that is in contention. It seems that StrangeLoop wants to include non-telelogical prediction as part of the field of economics, but the Austrian tradition does not.
Your mistake seems to be that you are treating the fact that the sound/string-of-letters “action” is sometimes used to describe two different conceptions as if it means that the two conceptions are really one conception treated differently.
To be honest, I don’t think it’s that obvious. Some schools of economics seem to consider numbers (e.g. prices, profits/losses, interest rates, growth rates, etc.) as the fundamental units of economic analysis, rather than human individuals.
It’s not “non-telelogical prediction” if it is attempting to predict teleological events (which all market phenomena are). And neuroeconomists do want to predict market phenomena (prices, interest rates, etc).
But what are the actual observable human behaviors behind the market phenomena?
If the AE people want to try to explain or predict them by modeling them on themselves, while the neuroeconomists want to do so by modeling them strictly as 3D objects, that’s fine, right?
Maybe they’re using a different definition of “market phenomena” than you. Maybe you’re using that word to refer to the teleological model for those observable human behaviors, while perhaps they’re using the word to refer to any model for those observables.
Interesting way to define it. I would choose to define it, “the science that attempts to explain or predict market phenomena”.
I don’t have the time (or the urge) to read through that entire document, could you point out the particular section that talks about why it is reasonable to restrict the definition of economics so much?
I am saying that the sound/string-of-letters “action” is used in two different ways: one to describe a bodily movement with the connotation that it is being analyzed in terms of it being purposeful behavior, and another to describe a bodily movement without that connotation. For example, even if I don’t ever consider the school bully’s fist coming toward me as purposeful behavior, I will still in some quite meaningful everyday sense want to call it human action. The Austrian sense really requires that it be considered in terms of being purposeful behavior.
It is like with coins. To speak of money in the Austrian sense requires that I perceive the coins as a medium of exchange. Yet the everyday sense of the word coin does not require that. I may say to the train conductor, “Watch out for that coin on the tracks up ahead!” I don’t need to be intending anything to the conductor other than that there is a round metal disc on the track ahead (you know, the kind that people shuffle back and forth at shop counters), but I will still call it a coin. Hence coin (or at least money) in the Austrian and everyday sense are different.
This post would be more useful for that purpose.
I would restrict it from any way to explain or predict market phenomena (modeling other people on yourself, modeling them strictly as 3D objects, or whatever) to the teleological way to do so (only modeling them on yourself) simply because one of the classic mistakes in trying to model human behavior is to confuse those two methods.
It would be useful to make sure that we know that modeling other people on ourselves is a whole different science than doing so strictly as 3D objects. It has an entirely different method etc. Mises argued that the economics of his time was totally messed up because of that confusion, I would argue that the linguistics of our time is completely screwed up for the same reason, etc.
The only “observables” for a drop in an interest rate are teleological observables. There is nothing in bodily movements alone that says “drop in interest rate”.
Then what’s a “teleological observable”? A few examples might help.
In this case, credit transactions.
But what’s there to a credit transaction besides a bunch of bodily movements?
But if teleology is just a mode of analysis - a perspective to take - then prices [in the everyday sense] don’t need to be teleological. Indeed I can see a price as just another feature of the world, no different than a rock that happens to be in my path. The bottom line is I want to predict what number I will have enter into a text box on a web form in order to buy a bar of silver tomorrow. It may be most useful for me to predict that number using teleology, and hence to be viewing it as a teleological phenonenon, but that doesn’t all by itself preclude the possibility that I could predict it to some useful degree without doing any teleological analysis, and never once considering it as a teleological phenomenon.
Maybe then you wouldn’t want to call it a price, because again the Austrian meaning requires that the actor consider it a teleological phenomenon in order to consider it as a price. But I would still want to call it a price in everyday talk, as the word is still useful in conveying the meaning of “the number I have to enter in the text box on the web form in order to ensure that a bar of silver shows up at my door.”
One person purposively putting money in the control of another person in the anticipation that the other person will purposively put more money in his control at a later date: plus the second person purposively making known to the first person that he intends to do so.
But do you actually observe their thoughts (e.g., their intentions)? All you observe are a bunch of bodily movements.
If you want to try to explain or predict those bodily movements (the only actual observables here!) by modeling them on the example of your own consciousness, while the neuroeconomists want to do so by modeling them strictly as 3D objects, that’s okay, right?
More to the point of the OP - is it just me, or does the action axiom depend upon an even more fundamental axiom, which I’d call “the teleological axiom”? Maybe others in this thread have already said this, just not in the same way?
Someone punching a number into a computer and pressing the Enter key?
If those bodily movements alone are not enough, it could only be because a drop in the interest rate is only a drop in the interest rate in AE if a given observer considers it in that fashion - just like a coin is only money if the actor whose perspective we are considering views it as a medium for trade (rather than a metal disc). In that case, we again have a split where the term “drop in the interest rate” is interpreted as either (1) the everyday sense of bodily movements (or Ben Bernanke’s lips flapping) without any teleological view necessarily being taken, or (2) the Austrian sense where it only really qualifies as a “drop in the interest rate” if the actor in question perceives it as the purposive action of another actor.
All you sense are bodily movements. Strictly speaking you don’t even sense that. All you sense are blobs of color moving in 2D space.
The neuroeconomist in trying to predict similar bodily motions (or color blob movements) isn’t predicting anything credit transaction-y or interest rate-y. A nearly identical credit transaction will almost certainly be associated with a vastly different set of particle motions and color blob movments. And neureconomists aren’t interested in bodily motions and color blob movements simply for their topographical or spectographical natures.
And I don’t want to predict bodily movements by my modeling them on the example of my consciousness. If I want a loan, I’m not concerned with whether the lender is visible in profile or not, wearing a red sweater or a green sweater, giving it to me with a swipe of a card or a click of a button, or if he’s clicking a button on his computer while he’s at his desk or tapping the screen on his iPhone while he’s on a stairmaster. I am concerned with the action of lending me money, which can only be apprehended teleologically.
There is nothing novel about teleological language. Again what you keep calling the “Austrian” sense is the everyday sense of these ideas.
And see my response to I. Ryan. Without the teleological view, there is absolutely nothing “drop in the interest rate”-ish about the mere visuals associated with a bald bearded man’s lips flapping.
I might want to drive a car without caring about its color or whatever.
And why would you want the loan in that example? Maybe so later you could type a number on your computer and then the next day find a box of stuff on your front step?