I haven’t seen any discussion on Hoppe’s view of argumentation ethics, so I’ll post a few links (first two are PDFs):
Justice of Economic Efficiency, by Hoppe
The Ethical Foundation of Capitalism and Why Socialism is Morally Indefensible by Hoppe
A Defense of Argumentation Ethics, by Kinsella
What is everyone’s thoughts? It seems to me that this is the ultimate proof of natural rights and that by arguing against it you are ultimately proving the ethical theory.
I think Hoppe is spot-on, but I also like Narveson’s contractarian ideas for the simple fact that I think it describes the instantiation. To be sure, Hoppe’s idea is the ground.
When I asked Hoppe about Narveson, I got the feeling that he wasn’t keen on Narveson.
Narveson likewise admitted ignorance to Hoppe’s argument in an e-mail I sent him. I hope he looks into it in the future. BTW, to the OP, Hoppe’s argument is a negative test: it is not a natural rights theory. It’s a purely transcendental proof.
-Jon
I’ll be writing an essay critiquing Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics sometime within the next year or so. I think it is severely flawed. For one thing, it is not a full ethical theory. It doesn’t even offer a positive defense of libertarian ethics. What it is is a test of other ethical theories. This becomes more obvious when one studies the discourse ethics of Habermas and Apel, from which Hoppe’s theory is descended. All AE does is test whether a particular theory or claim, according to its rules, can in principle be justified. If a theory fails the test, by evoking a performative contradiction, then the theory or claim is shown to be in principle unjustifiable (according to the rules of AE’s test). If a theory or claim passes the test, by not evoking a performative contradiction, then according to the rules of AE’s test it is in principle justifiable. Another test could still rule it out as in principle unjustifiable. Moreover, some positive argument is still needed to justify it. Furthermore, AE does not provide a proof for libertarian ethics. Strictly speaking, a proof is a deductive argument; the performative contradiction that AE depends upon is not a proof, it is merely what Aristotelians call a negative demonstration or practical contradiction.
I also don’t think Hoppe offers sufficient argument for the premises of his theory. I have some other criticisms, but I’ll offer a brief sketch of just one more: Hoppe believes that the is-ought gap is unbridgeable and accepts a strict fact-value dichotomy. Now, I think that this dichotomy is false and that in light of this the is-ought gap is bridgeable. While AE doesn’t itself take a stance on the fact-value dichotomy, it does depend upon whether the dichotomy is true or false. If the dichotomy is true, then facts are not values and values are not facts. Values then have not truth-value. They cannot perform their usual function in logical argumentation. Thus, if the fact-value dichotomy is true, then the performative contradiction that AE requires to work simply cannot get off the ground. No contradiction can happen. Norms are merely ways of expressing arbitrary subjective preferences like “Yay!” or “Bleh!” If the fact-value dichotomy is false, then I think AE is not necessary because it can no longer claim to be the only possible option for defending libertarian ethics. People could still adhere to AE or find it useful, but I think AE has other flaws that undermine it. And I think an Aristotelian-libertarian theory of virtue ethics and natural rights is far superior.
I think that while argumentation ethics is a brilliant way to reveal opposing arguments to property rights as self-contradictary, it is incomplete as a proof of property rights. It doesn’t really justify an “ought” by itself. For example, while someone argueing against self-ownership is actively making use of their own bodies and hence contradicting themselves in this sense, pointing out the contradiction does not establish that others “ought” not attempt to control their bodies. It only establishes that the person does, in fact, have conciousness and willpower over their bodies. To demonstrate why others should not invade their willpower over their own bodies or why the person should not do likewise to others requires much more than a performative contradiction argument.
Stefan Molyneux’s “Universally Preferable Behavior” is similar in that while it provides a brilliant method to deconstruct ethical propositions, it actually provides no ethical justification or theory itself per se. It isn’t an ethical theory, it’s a method for analyzing ethical theories. In many ways it is similar to arguementation ethics.
I’ve only read the second article you linked. It’s not helping that I find it riddled with false presumptions about social morality. Interesting choice of words, by the way. I’ll comment in length once I get to the other two articles.
Point taken, Jon, Geoffrey, and Brainpolice. I’ll be looking forward to that essay, Geoffrey.
You’ve missed the point entirely. It is not the fact that someone argumenting controls his own body that makes argumentation ethics valid, it is the fact that, to have his argument heard, he must concede to others the right to control their own bodies.
The very fact that someone argues means that he must accept that reason is the only way to deal with other human beings.
So why bother arguing? Instead, they can just decide what they think is right and use force to bring it about–AE doesn’t show any contradiction there.
The point is if they do argue then they cannot justify agression.
That is in fact a point that Hoppe makes clear, that an argument is not the same as making sounds like ‘grrr’ or simply hitting someone to get one’s way. By the very nature of argumentation, if one engages in argument, one must support property rights.
If I could just interject about the is-ought “dilemma.” It’s not unbridgeable, its just that those who present the argument phrase it very carefully. Goal orientation is the bridge it needs to be solved. Just a small example, killing ends a human beings ability to live or proceed in life therefore one ought to not kill. Flawed right? The change needed is “therefore one ought to not kill in these circumstances if their goal is X.” So if X was liberty, I would say the circumstances would be self defense.