Yes,
Correction is done in argument, the NAP is then presupposed (and all the violent norms are shown to be incorrect as they contradictory to basic presuppositions of argumentation). There are no “norms” in objective existence (that are metaphysicaly “true”) but think about it and It’s an incredibly powerful and clever argument. No one can logically dispute the NAP, very hardcore…
So you are also using the term “correction” in a broader sense? So if we discuss beauty and have a disagreement and then try to make our cases to each other, we are engaging in a process of “correction”, even though there is no “correct” answer to be found?
So you are also using the term “correction” in a broader sense? So if we discuss beauty and have a disagreement and then try to make our cases to each other, we are engaging in a process of “correction”, even though there is no “correct” answer to be found?
By correction I meant to show that the norm you opponent propositions are inherently contradictory. Opinions about beauty, however are not contradictory to any norms of discourse… (So this is somewhat orthogonal to the subject at hand)
That’s not what Conza said a few posts back. He said that all discussions, not just arguments about truth-claims, necessarily involve and presuppose self-ownership. Perhaps you two differ on this point.
What about if I made the statement “I think socialism is beautiful” and we then proceed to discuss the relative beauty of socialism vs libertarianism. Would you then say that because this conversation is about opinions about beauty, neither one of us is presupposing any norms, so neither one of us is making a performative contradiction?
Maybe you should read them again? Truth claims - universalizibility… did you watch the Hoppe video I have linked to several times… and AJ refuses to comment on? Again, how is “I like Picasso” not a truth claim. It is a claim to truth, but for that individual. From the epic quote about “objective” at the top of the page, AJ also chooses to ignore (since it shatters his flawed paradigm).
“In this model, an interior–exterior axis crosses with an individual–plural axis to create four quadrants of possible perspectives. These are the interior-individual (subjective), interior-plural (cultural), exterior-individual (objective), and exterior-plural (social/natural-science/systems). Various fields of knowledge are most at home in particular quadrants, while each quadrant is associated with distinctive forms of knowledge. In this view, human beings, for example, stand as both wholes and parts (“holons”)—both individuals and components of plurals—with both exterior and interior aspects. These aspects are both discrete and inseparable—all of them must be present for us to be the kind of beings that we are.”
In the same way we say that the subjective theory of value is objective.. it is for that of value preferences (but individualized for that person). Notice the consistency aye?!
This is from the rest of the quote above I snipped [..].
"“The law of contradiction is one such presupposition. One cannot deny this law without presupposing its validity in the act of denying it. But there is another such presupposition. Propositions are not free-floating entities. They require a proposition maker who in order to produce any validity-claiming proposition whatsoever must have exclusive control (property) over some scarce means defined in objective terms and appropriated (brought under control) at definite points in time through homesteading action. Thus, any proposition that would dispute the validity of the homesteading principle of property acquisition, or that would assert the validity of a different, incompatible principle, would be falsified by the act of proposition-making in the same way as the proposition ‘the law of contradiction is false’ would be contradicted by the very fact of asserting it. As the praxeological presupposition of proposition-making, the validity of the homesteading principle cannot be argumentatively disputed without running into a performative contradiction. Any other principle of property acquisition can then be understood - reflectively - by every proposition maker as ultimately incapable of propositional justification.”
“(Note, in particular, that this includes all proposals which claim it is justified to restrict the range of objects which may be homesteaded. They fail because once the exclusive control over some homesteaded means is admitted as justified, it becomes impossible to justify any restriction in the homesteading process - except for a self-imposed one - without thereby running into a contradiction. For if the proponent of such a restriction were consistent, he could have justified control only over some physical means which he would not be allowed to employ for any additional homesteading. Obviously, he could not interfere with another’s extended homesteading, simply because of his own lack of physical means to justifiably do anything about it. But if he did interfere, he would thereby inconsistently extend his ownership claims beyond his own justly homesteaded means. Moreover, in order to justify this extension he would have to invoke a principle of property acquisition incompatible with the homesteading principle whose validity he would already have admitted.)”"
Who is this I who is going to do the stabbing, and who is this you who is to be stabbed? Clearly the person so saying that the person will be doing the stabbing admits to directly controlling him or herself. Which then brings up why the stabbee wouldn’t directly control him or herself.
Again - http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=e5z94YJsS84
7:04+
Discussion is a two way street. Those who don’t engage in this activity, don’t deserve an answer. I think this may clear some things up and hits at the core of this ‘discussion’ ;). Note “ethics” here is the same as ‘action-based jurisprudence’.. a point cleared up earlier.
"Ethics - the validity of the principle of self-ownership and original appropriation - is demonstrably not dependent and contingent upon agreement or contract; and the universality claim connected with Rothbard’s libertarianism is not affected in the slightest by the circumstance that moral discussants may or may not always come to an agreement or contract. Ethics is the logical-praxeological presupposition - in Kantian terminology: die Bedingung der Moeglichkeit - rather than the result of agreement or contract. The principles of self-ownership and original appropriation make agreement and contract - including that of not agreeing and contracting - possible. Set in motion and stimulated by the universal experience of conflict, moral discussion and argument can discover, reconstruct, explicate, and formulate the principles of self-ownership and original appropriation, but their validity in no way depends on whether or not this is the case, and if so whether or not these formulations then find universal assent." - Hoppe, Intro to TEOL.
Excuse me? We made the exact same point. It is in the ‘background’ so to speak - it remains true and valid. But when speaking about ‘beauty’, the ‘weather’ whatever… THERE IS NO CONFLICT BEING PROPOSED. The question of rights etc is pre-supposed but it’s not being discussed, it’s not being challenged, it has been accepted by the participants actions whether they know it or not. So in actuality, your scenario is IRRELEVENT. It’s a non-event. As I said before:
“They are only engaged in a performative contradiction, if their ACTIONS [run at you with a knife etc.] contradict these pre-suppositions/facts. So if they try to justify non-libertarian norms in argumentation. That means be it past, present, or future actions. Their words (argumentation is also action), showcase its invalidity. Because they have to admit that others control themselves by the mere act of discourse.”
For your ‘I think socialism is beautiful’ issue above, the norms are still pre-supposed. You’re still completely stuck on thinking that it all must be debate.
I think we might be missing the core point here. Ownership is relevant only in the context of some conflict… This is why we discuss communism vs. property-rights vs. syndicalism, other ethics, ext… I don’t see why should we even examine a discussion about whether socialism is “beautiful”?
Gumdy,
All I am doing at this point is trying to understand the definition of argument. That is, I am trying to work out what is in the set of actions that pre-suppose inter-personal norms. Once I understand what it is in this set and what is not, then I will go on to consider whether a discussion about ethics / rights is in this set. Because logically speaking, it could be the case that some activities pre-suppose interpersonal norms, but that a discussion of ethics is not among these, and I need to rule out this possibility before I can accept AE. I hope that is clear. I appreciate the time both of you are putting into this discussion, by the way.
It still feels to me like you are disagreeing with Conza about what activities pre-suppose interpersonal norms. To recap:
This is pretty clear. Grunts and nonsense don’t pre-suppose interpersonal norms, but all discussions do, including discussions about beauty.
But then…
This really feels like a different answer to Conza’s. Because opinions about beauty are discussions; they are non-violent, and they are not grunts or nonsense. So it seems to me like you (Gumby) have fewer elements in the set ‘activities which pre-suppose interpersonal norms’ than Conza does. Is that an unreasonable interpretation of this statement?
Gumdy,
All I am doing at this point is trying to understand the definition of argument. That is, I am trying to work out what is in the set of actions that pre-suppose inter-personal norms. Once I understand what it is in this set and what is not, then I will go on to consider whether a discussion about ethics / rights is in this set. Because logically speaking, it could be the case that some activities pre-suppose interpersonal norms, but that a discussion of ethics is not among these, and I need to rule out this possibility before I can accept AE. I hope that is clear. I appreciate the time both of you are putting into this discussion, by the way.
It still feels to me like you are disagreeing with Conza about what activities pre-suppose interpersonal norms. To recap:
This is pretty clear. Grunts and nonsense don’t pre-suppose interpersonal norms, but all discussions do, including discussions about beauty.
But then…
This really feels like a different answer to Conza’s. Because opinions about beauty are discussions; they are non-violent, and they are not grunts or nonsense. So it seems to me like you (Gumby) have fewer elements in the set ‘activities which pre-suppose interpersonal norms’ than Conza does. Is that an unreasonable interpretation of this statement?
It’s not a different answer at all. Any discourse + Question of body ownership = Self Ownership.
When you say self-ownership is presupposed you thereby implicitly acknowledge that it’s in question. So it doesn’t matter how you categorize the discussion in general (about beauty, weather, whatever…). Be that as it may, I think you’re not focusing on the right place- focus at the context of social order- this is what ethics is about. Start from there (as in my introduction).
Let’s take a step back and ask, is politics a discussion about what is “beautiful”? Why should we care about such discussions in the first place…? It’s just not very relevant…
OK, let’s take a step back. I’m a big Hoppe fan and I think he makes a superb case for libertarianism is the first 10 mins of that talk you posted. In particular his argument that the purpose of norms is to avoid conflict, and libertarianism is the only norm that does not make conflict inevitable. So all non-libertarian norms are a perversion of what it means to be a norm. (He elaborates this here (PDF) or here (audio)).
He does not talk about AE in that lecture and I don’t see what AE adds to the case for libertarianism. What does AE tell us that we didn’t already know? Or what ammunition does it give us in the ideological struggle for liberty?
Well that is the question. I know in my conversations with people I use both economic and ethical arguments, and when I use ethical arguments I am trying to appeal to their innate sense of right/wrong, in a similar way to when I’m selling a piece of art and trying to appeal to their innate sense of taste. It could be said that my message is “liberty works and it’s beautiful!”
AE shows us that the NAP is the only norm valid in argumentation, and all other ethics cannot be argued for without contradiction.
Nobody cares about discussions of beauty. It’s not relevant to our discussion. I don’t see why you are considering it so much. We are discussing conflict resolution.
Am I making sense? Maybe someone else will be clearer?
You need to define “valid in argumentation” and “argued for without contradiction”.
As I’ve said before, in a conversation about beauty, “validity” doesn’t come into it, and nor does contradiction. Your opinions about beauty are what they are. I do not know what it means to say “valid norm” unless you acknowledge that norms have a purpose: to help avoid conflict. Then you could say that libertarianism is the only “valid norm” and mean it is the only norm that is capable of achieving this purpose. I don’t know what it means to say “valid norm” without reference to an end that the norm is being used to achieve.
I do not know what it means to say “valid norm” unless you acknowledge that norms have a purpose: to help avoid conflict. Then you could say that libertarianism is the only “valid norm” and mean it is the only norm that is capable of achieving this purpose. I don’t know what it means to say “valid norm” without reference to an end that the norm is being used to achieve.
Agreed. (and this aim is the demostrated preference of arguing).
But then we already know what you say AE shows us. Hoppe’s argument that I linked to shows us this. The supporter of a non-libertarian norm is not supporting a norm, but a perversion of a norm. If you want to use the words “invalid” and “contradictory” to apply to this then you have already shown that it is contradictory to argue for a non-libertarian norm.
Just calling something a preversion does not proove anything. This preversion being a performative contradiction means it cannot be logically held-which is quite a lot for ethics. It is contradictory in a very real sense.
Contradictory in the sense that “I am currently dead” is a contradictory statement?
What statement in ethics, exactly, is contradictory in this sense?
Contradictory in the sense that “I am currently dead” is a contradictory statement?
yes.
What statement in ethics, exactly, is contradictory in this sense?
“Your body is owned by society/government/me/any-other-unrelated-person.”
“Late comers called tax-man own property you have aquired.”
“Rocks have rights” (and so, I can punish you for stepping on a rock)
Argumentation is not the only morally correct way to deal with disputes.
Argumentation is not the only morally correct way to deal with disputes.
So stop doing it.