Are you going to do an AJ as well? And as I’ve said before:
"Again, how is “I like Picasso” not a truth claim. It is a claim to truth, but for that individual. From the epic quote about “objective” at the top of the page, AJ also chooses to ignore (since it shatters his flawed paradigm).
“In this model, an interior–exterior axis crosses with an individual–plural axis to create four quadrants of possible perspectives. These are the interior-individual (subjective), interior-plural (cultural), exterior-individual (objective), and exterior-plural (social/natural-science/systems). Various fields of knowledge are most at home in particular quadrants, while each quadrant is associated with distinctive forms of knowledge. In this view, human beings, for example, stand as both wholes and parts (“holons”)—both individuals and components of plurals—with both exterior and interior aspects. These aspects are both discrete and inseparable—all of them must be present for us to be the kind of beings that we are.”
In the same way we say that the subjective theory of value is objective.. it is for that of value preferences (but individualized for that person). Notice the consistency aye?!"
With the addition of:
"And there is a further point: the very existence of a difference of opinion seems to imply that there is something objective about which disagreement can take place; for otherwise, there would be no contradictions in the different “opinions” and no worry about these conflicts. For a similar argument in refutation of moral subjectivism see G.E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford, 1963 [1912)), pp. 63ff”
— The Ethics of Liberty by Murray Rothbard, Chapter 2, Footnote 22.
When you say own, I presume you mean in the normative sense, i.e. “ought to have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over”.
To say that these statements are contradictory in the same sense seems a little odd to me. “I am currently dead” is an is-statement, but the other is an ought-statement. How can contradictory mean the same thing for both these types of statement?
I don’t see how this follows from AE. I mean, if P implies Q it does not follow that not-P implies not-Q.
Well, actions (as opposed to movement in general) also have underling norms (I ought to achive the goal of the action). If the content of the proposition contradicts the goal of proposing the proposition, the proposition is contradictory in a performative way. One cannot also hold he wants to peacfuly resolve disputes.
I don’t see how this follows from AE. I mean, if P implies Q it does not follow that not-P implies not-Q.
This follow from the application of a consistant moral standar, towards moral agents.
… And so it’s only fair to ask the golden question of political philosophy- How should conflicts be resolved?
At the most basic level, humans have two options:
Fight for control.
Talk it over.
Now, if one chooses to engage in violence against his girlfriend, over the use of the car, not much to say. If someone decides to act as in the animal realm, he can expect to be treated as an animal, and that’s it. Only if the participants choose to avoid violence and instead engage in discourse to resolve their dispute, the question of what is justified arises. They are then engaged in an interaction. A goal oriented peaceful corporation, which we can now examine.
Trade is said to be mutually beneficial because by choosing to trade *both willful participants* demonstrate their common preference for the post-trade state of affairs over the pre-trade state of affairs. Otherwise they wouldn’t have voluntarily traded. Underling every voluntary corporation is some common goal. Lets reflect what goal then, is implied by choosing argumentation as means to resolve a conflict. The implied goal is that participants prefer to resolve their dispute without resorting to violence. (Also implied is that they are civilized man).
So violence-aversion, i.e achieving peaceful conflict resolution is the presupposition or demonstrated preference of the participants of an argument. The act of Argumentation, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution. In real terms, an actor engages in argument by speaking, expressing a proposition (by use of sound, hands ext.). An argument is nothing but an exchange of verbal propositions. Thereby, it is by the very act of expressing a proposition that one demonstrates his preference to resolve the given conflict without the use violence.
But then, a crazy professor like Hans Hermann Hoppe might ask, what if the actual content of your proposition is in direct contradiction with what is implied by the act of expressing it (the demonstrated presupposition of argumentation)? What if the content of your proposition is something like- “I don’t care about what you have to say, violence is the only way to resolve disputes…”?
In philosophy propositions that contradict what is directly implied by the very act of expressing them are called performative contradictions. Propositions such as- “I can’t express propositions”, or “I am currently dead” are performative contradictions. An attempt to argue them is by itself contradictory. From very act of arguing them implies they are false. A participant who by expressing a proposition argues for violence is thus engaged in such a performative contradiction.
Contemplating such propositions will make their incoherence clear. What point is there to argue with someone who openly states the result of the argument is of no interest to him? That argumentation has no bearing on how the conflict should be resolved? And so, the presupposition of argumentation- violence-free conflict resolution, cannot logically be denied. From this first presupposition we can derive other, directly derived presuppositions, which also cannot be denied. For example, it is presupposed in argumentation that- “Claims need justification”. Trying to deny this- “I don’t need to justify my claims…” contradicts the underling first presupposition of achieving conflict resolution based on non-violent, i.e verbal means. If anyone can just claim whatever nonsense he wants, with no need to provide justification, the dispute cannot be peacefully resolved on the basis of nothing but claims. So we can also say that “Claims need to be justified” is another, derived, presupposition of argumentation. We can see that argumentation is not random, free floating statements, but a practical affair with guiding underling presuppositions which cannot be rationaly denied.
Imagine someone dening he favoured the good he traded ex-ante..
I’m not sure about that. Action implies the actor had a preference for the goal, certainly. But isn’t it possible to do something that one believes one ought not to do?
Gumdy, your article is well-written but it lacks an explicit definition of argument at the beginning and at times as I’m reading I’m left wondering whether a slight change to your definition has crept in. Would you accept this definition of argumentation… the act of participants engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict as an alternative to violence.
OK, that is a far narrower definition than I have considered so far. It’s only discourse engaged in with the goal of resolving a conflict. And conflict refers to a dispute about a scarce good. So an aggressor making a verbal case to try to avoid a punishment is arguing. The scarce good there is whatever the aggression was about. What of non-libertarian political philosophers? Are they arguing when they talk favorably of e.g. socialism? I suppose since political philosophy is all about ‘who owns what scarce goods’ I can accept this. But what else counts as an argument? Not two physicists “arguing” about whether String Theory has merit. Not two film buffs “arguing” about the greatest film ever made. It seems to me that neither of these are arguments by this new definition (Where’s the conflict? What scarce good is involved?). Do you agree?
OK, that is a far narrower definition than I have considered so far. … I suppose since political philosophy is all about ‘who owns what scarce goods’ I can accept this…
It is not narrow nor wide- it is precisely the relevant scope. This is just what is at the core of politics…
It seems to me that neither of these are arguments by this new definition (Where’s the conflict? What scarce good is involved?). Do you agree?
I agree, but I’m not interested in who is right about string theory. I am interested who is right about capitalism.
Wrong. We can not drop that suffix because we do not know the intentions of the people who are engaged in argumentation. We do not know what their next move will be. Furthermore, most violence starts with a little bit of argumentation anyway. You know that.
Actions logically imply intentions. Trade implies intentions as well as argumentation. If they deny they want to peacfully resolve the dispute the can also (of course) deny the NAP, but no point in justifying anything to them, of furthr talking, because just like animals they don’t hold it to be relevant.
It’s narrower than the commonly-used definition. I mean, most people would say its possible to “argument about how to resolve a conflict”, whereas to us, now, that is a pleonasm, because all “arguments” are about how to resolve a conflict. There are things that everyday people would describe as an argument, that are not arguments to us. “Argument about physics” and “argument about films” are now contradictions-in-terms to us.
There are some places where I feel you might have reverted to the commonly-used definition…
You may have intended this as a pleonasm, or you may have meant ‘choosing discourse’.
This is problematic to me because you’re using the term ‘proposition’, which, like argument, usually has a broader meaning than just relating to conflict resolution. You could narrow the definition of proposition down to only refer to statements made during arguments. Or you could keep the conventional definition of proposition, but then your last sentence is not true. Not every act of expressing of proposition demonstrates that; only propositions expressed during arguments; only propositions expressed during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict.
I am not saying these are irreconcilible problems, but it’s worth getting these things cleared up.