If you are being inconsistent with definitions, then there may be an equivocation fallacy there.
If you are being inconsistent with definitions, then there may be an equivocation fallacy there.
Where (equivocation)?
I don’t know. It depends on how you reconcile the problem I already pointed out.
Since I’m not sure if it’s a problem, or if I understand, lets say I don’t. What than is the equivocation?
Why should anybody waste effort finding a logical fallacy unless the premises used in that logic are justified? You did not justify your premises and you never showed where Hoppe did – assuming he did.
You said actions logically imply intentions but you never proved that. [You never will be able to prove it because it is a false statement by the way.] When I pointed that out, you ignored it and just said “Yes, they do.” If that is what you pass off as argumentation, then you should bow out of trying to convince people that there is anything in AE that is worth considering.
Charles,
Human action is purposeful and so, purposeful action betrays preference. Trade betray preference, eating a banana betray preference, and discourse betray preference. This is why the actions of an actor imply his demonstrated preference. This is the bases of both Austrian Economics and ArgEthics. The question of free will, and praxeology, I wish not to debate here. I recommend reading Rothbard clear words (which I linked to in the article as well). If you have questions regarding praxeology, I recommend opening a new thread.
Gumby,
Stop being disingenuous. Praxeology is not the failure in your attempt to defend AE. Your premises are the achilles heel. What you quoted from Rothbard does not prove that:
person arguing = person wants to avoid violence
If you can show where Hoppe proves that false statement, please offer it. Long-winded videos of Hoppe saying essentially nothing do not count as proof of the above premise.
Charles, let me try to boil the point down one last time.
An argument where two people put forward ideas and try to get at the truth, is different from a situation where someone is using force to coerce someone else to say some words in english that sound like you win the argument under threat of force.
Do you dispute this ?
Charles,
I have also written about this in the article (as this is the base). See paragraphs 3-11.
Do you or Hoppe have proof of it?? is the right question. If so, where is it???
Whether I dispute it or not is irrelevent. You are passing this fleetingly-convincing argument off as objective proof – that is not good enough.
Just in case it matters, yes, I dispute it because it is a stupid false statement. Nobody has the capacity to know what the intentions are of a person, for goodness’ sake. Without an intelligent definition of arguing from you AEadvocates, I see no reason to even pay attention to what you said.
Nobody has the capacity to know what the intentions are of a person, for goodness’ sake.
actually this is irrelevant. because we can still posit that IF intentions are to ‘mouth words that one doesnt mean’ then X and IF intentions are to mouth words that one does mean’ then Y .
The hypothetico-deductive constructions are how we do economics? do you have a a problem with it? Do you say intentions are impossible to discern therefore Misesian Economics / Praxeology is not worth anyones attention?
I’m cool with you disputing it, but not for such paltry reasons… c’mon…
Still no proof.
Finally, you admit that you are assuming AE to be true without being able to prove your premises.
That is not what I said. Misean economics does not depend on knowing what the intentions are of human action. Hoppe’s AE does. There is a huge difference. Nice try at moving the goal post, though.
so you can do economics without appeal to the notion of exchange? because exchange would require that you allow that the agents have certain intentions…
Still no proof.
That is not what I said.
The equivocation of definitions was raised and never addressed. I think I know why. Equivocation is the method of argumentation in favor of AE or possibly, AEadvocates do not have the capacity to see their leaps in logic.
Others may have equivocated can you put that on me. When I asked you my question I was trying to find out whether her you could or would make conceptual distinctions. I expects that you might given that you are comfortable enough to consider praxeology of merit.
What a men internally feels/realy believes/thinks is simply irrelevant. To deny the presupposition is to void the argument.
Gumdy, just work it through. If ‘proposition’ is ‘a statement made during an argument’ and ‘argument’ is as we agreed above 'the act of participants engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict’, then ‘to express a proposition’ means ‘to make a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict’.
Now here’s your paragraph:
Substituting in these definitions, we get:
Now, the first sentence is false, unless you consider actions in general to presuppose norms, which they don’t, they only demonstrate preferences. The second sentence is false, because speaking is not equivalent to making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict. The third sentence is false, unless you consider discourse to be limited to verbal exchanges, and if you do then the sentence is tautological. The last sentence is trivially true, because all actions demonstrate that the actor had a preference for the goal of the action.
Does this make the problem clearer to you?
Yes, thank you, I now understand what you are talking about.
The act of {engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict}, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution.
Now, the first sentence is false, unless you consider actions in general to presuppose norms, which they don’t, they only demonstrate preferences.
This is just semantic. Discourse is non violent, once it is violent, it’s not discourse. so if you want to resolve an argument via discourse it also is presupposed (by the nature of discourse) that you want to resolve it in a non-violent way.
an actor engages in {discourse to resolve a conflict} by speaking, {making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict} (by use of sound, hands ext.).
The second sentence is false, because speaking is not equivalent to making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict.
No, again, this is only talking about waht it physically means to engage in argument, I don’t see anything false here.
{Discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict} is nothing but an exchange of verbal {statements made during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict}.
A proposition is not nessaseraly expressed in an argument, it’s a more general term which is relevant and is a part of an argument. From the begining you are fusing definition and context. This isn’t a big deal, just I think this might be confusing when you substitue things…
Yes. “Want” being the operative word. It’s a preference being demonstrated; a goal being presupposed, not a norm. If you had said “ought” instead of “want”, you’d have been claiming that a norm was being presupposed, and I would have disagreed.
Well if it’s not false, it’s tautological. Depends how you meant the comma. You’re not really saying anything here, except that ‘discourse can include speaking’. Well, thanks!
That’s the point I made initially, and your response was that we’re talking only about propositions in the context of argumentation. But this needs to be made clear. You can’t alternate between the normal definition of proposition and your “in context” definition of proposition.
You missed my substitution of your fourth sentence, the one that is true.
This whole paragraph can be reduced down to: “When we engage in discourse to resolve a conflict, we demonstrate a preference for engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict.” Which means the paragraph can be removed completely, since that is exactly the conclusion you reached at the end of the paragraph immediately before it! (“The implied goal is that participants prefer to resolve their dispute without resorting to violence.”)