A friendly introduction to Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics

But my claim is perfectly justifiable. I believe that a world in which good chess players own everyone else is better than any alternative. I subjectively value the norm more than any other. Who are you to reject my justification as not legitimate? Who annointed you with the exclusive power to make objective valuations such as these? How is your valuation of my subjective valuation any less subjective? Please answer the question above.

So says you. My justification looks perfectly legitimate to me. I do have a justification. Btw, please note that: (1) we are arguing, (2) I claim that you are, or ought to be, my slave, and (3) I have yet to perform a contradiction.

Man…

But my claim is perfectly justifiable. I believe…

You’re missing the point. If you deny claims need objective justification, and what I want or believe is justified- and so you can be logically claimed- how can argumentation resolve disputes?

So says you. My justification looks perfectly legitimate to me.

pure subjective thaught is not justification, to claim so is voiding the argument. (argumentation is not free floating isolated statements. it has underling norms as it is a practicle activity)

Define “objective” justification. You again avoided answering my question: “What preferences other than subjective could anyone possibly hold?”

What is justification?
Let me simplify things and cut to the chase. Each of us can be perfectly logically consistent and yet we could arrive at opposing claims if we start from different premises. Where do you get your premises and how are they more “objective” than mine? The whole ArgEth argument boils down to: “If you presuppose that no one should be anyone’s slave, then you can’t argue that I should be your slave without contradicting yourself.” Ground-breaking!

I didn’t mean to suggest that it is reasonable to believe that eskimos, blacks and barbarians are less than human. The point was that holding such a belief allows an individual to suggest a norm that would appear to be arbitrary from your perspective, but would be universalizable from his. Its completely within the bounds of argumentation that those involved hold incorrect beliefs, in fact, it could be necessary - how could an argument arise if both parties already agree? And by holding a belief I mean actually holding it, not just saying it. Its not a denial that truthood is better than falsehood because it is believe that the position i**s true.

The distinction between being justifiable and being justified is similar to the difference between proving that something can’t be x and proving that it must be y. Given (x or y), if not x, then y; this is a sound syllogism. Where AE is different from this, is that the valid justification of a norm might not exist at all, regardless of the existence of the norm itself. Even if we accept that there is no third way regarding norms (its either NAP or everything else), we cannot come to the conclusion that the inability to justify any non-NAP norm constitutes a logical proof of the NAP.

To be honest, I don’t believe that any norms can be justified outside of a means-end analysis. AE basically says: “if norms in general were able to be justified, these norms in particular wouldn’t be eligible.”

z123,

Please be more civil while attacking something you obviously haven’t taken the time to read. If it wasn’t so, I wouldn’t have minded. This is directly referred to in the article. Please take a few minutes to read it in order to know what your attacking.

What preferences other than subjective could anyone possibly hold?"

This is at the beginning. Arguers, by engaging in discourse, a form of interaction, demonstrably show their preference to resolve a conflict without violence. Please read the article. to deny this would void the argument.

What is justification?

A fact that is intersubjectivly ascertainable, and both arguers should acknowledge as true.

I didn’t mean to suggest that it is reasonable to believe that eskimos, blacks and barbarians are less than human. The point was that holding such a belief allows an individual to suggest a norm that would appear to be arbitrary from your perspective, but would be universalizable from his. Its completely within the bounds of argumentation that those involved hold incorrect beliefs, in fact, it could be necessary - how could an argument arise if both parties already agree? And by holding a belief I mean actually holding it, not just saying it. Its not a denial that truthood is better than falsehood because it is believe that the position i**s true.

The distinction between being justifiable and being justified is similar to the difference between proving that something can’t be x and proving that it must be y. Given (x or y), if not x, then y; this is a sound syllogism. Where AE is different from this, is that the valid justification of a norm might not exist at all, regardless of the existence of the norm itself. Even if we accept that there is no third way regarding norms (its either NAP or everything else), we cannot come to the conclusion that the inability to justify any non-NAP norm constitutes a logical proof of the NAP.

To be honest, I don’t believe that any norms can be justified outside of a means-end analysis. AE basically says: “if norms in general were able to be justified, these norms in particular wouldn’t be eligible.”

mika- leave asside the semantical distinictions- Only NAP is compatible with argumentation (all others don’t) and so it is presupposed in argumentation, a resolution of conflict in argumatation therefore can only logically use the NAP. This is the QED, no need for other words. no norms are objectivly justified as they don’t objectivly exist.

As far as holding false belifes-it can happen.

Ultimately the Argumentation Ethics proponent will admit that it only purports to show that “there can be no other objective ethics than the NAP,” which of course devolves into a non-statement if there are no objective ethics.

It’s an argument intended for people who already believe in objective ethics. Since “objective ethics” is an incoherent notion (because “objective value” is), Argumentation Ethics would at best be a tool for convincing people who already buy into the objective ethics nonsense. Unfortunately, it fails even at that, due to equivocation.

Hence Argumentation Ethics is fatally flawed twice over.

Long on outrage, short on arguments.

The claim of AE is that the NAP is presupposed in argumentation and so denying it is a contradiction. It shows this preety clearly, there is a reason why the NAP is coherent and intuitive.

? I (and others) have read and debated plenty (more than enough) on ArgEth over the last couple of years, thanks. Search the forums.

The article adds nothing to the old, known ArgEth proposal.

How about two people peacefully eating cereal together? Wouldn’t they be presupposing peaceful consumption of cereal by doing so? Would one of them be performing a contradiction if he suddenly smacked the other on the head with a spoon? I just introduced Cereal Ethics as proof of NAP. QED.

A justification is a fact? Aren’t you performing a fallacy (begging the question) by demanding that arguers must agree a priori as a precondition for them to have a “proper” argument? Why can’t I argue (attempt to convince you) that you are, or ought to be, my slave? Perhaps I’m persuasive, and I’ll convince you.

Finally – and not that I need this – what if we both agreed before the chess game that the winner would legitimately enslave the loser? Or what if we lived in a society where chess was intersubjectively valued/preferred as a legitimate determinant on who could/must enslave whom? Wouldn’t you be contradicting yourself if you argued against being enslaved after you lost?

Ultimately the Argumentation Ethics proponent will admit that it only purports to show that “there can be no other objective ethics than the NAP,” which of course devolves into a non-statement if there are no objective ethics.

It’s an argument intended for people who already believe in objective ethics. Since “objective ethics” is an incoherent notion (because “objective value” is), Argumentation Ethics would at best be a tool for convincing people who already buy into the objective ethics nonsense. Unfortunately, it fails even at that, due to equivocation.

Hence Argumentation Ethics is fatally flawed twice over.

reading you’r post- very unimpressive, complete strawman.

Reminds me of this.

I rest my case.

How about two people peacefully eating cereal together? Wouldn’t they be presupposing peaceful consumption of cereal by doing so? Would one of them be performing a contradiction if he suddenly smacked the other on the head with a spoon? I just introduced Cereal Ethics as proof of NAP. QED.

coaporation praxeologicly does presupposes a common goal:

We state that trade is mutually beneficial, because by choosing to trade both willful participants demonstrate their preference for the post-trade state of affairs over the pre-trade state of affairs. Otherwise we wouldn’t have voluntarily traded. Underling every voluntary human corporation is such a common goal. What goal, then, is implied by choosing to argue as means to resolve a conflict? Well, it means participants demonstrably wish to resolve their dispute without resorting violence. It also means they civilized man.

So we say that violence-aversion, i.e achieving peaceful conflict resolution is the presupposition or demonstrated preference of the participants of an argument. The act of Argumentation, presupposes the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. An actor participates in an argument by speaking- expressing certain propositions (by use of sound, hands ext.). An argument is nothing but an exchange of propositions. Thereby, it is by the very act of expressing a proposition that one demonstrates his preference to resolve the given conflict without the use violence.

Discourse, but not other kinds of interaction presuppose the NAP (such as coaporating to kill someone).

Gumdy, your efforts are valiant but in vain, I think. Most people on this forum are committed to an unflinching belief that anyone talking of “objective” morality is some kind of wild nutcase, even though there are sound reasons for taking that position. (Including some, in my opinion, presented by Ayn Rand and her followers.) The attempt to convince anyone here is probably futile.

Impatient, crude mockery like this is a case in point.

The sad thing, tunk, is that they don’t even understand what the word objective means. >_>

Because definitions can only be subjective, right?

Alright, RD, what is “objective”?

Thank you. I think Ayn Rand type arguments are not throughly analytic (like Hoppe’s). I don’t think “norms” are self evident and exist objectivly. They are however a part off human acition, and this is what AE points to. Norms are presupposed in actions and to deny this is to deny human action. Argumentation Ethics is another part of praxeology.

Alright, RD, what is “objective”?

Wheylous, I’m not willing to get into an argument about this. That being said, objective means “that is or belongs to what is presented to consciousness, as opposed to the consciousness itself; that is the object of perception or thought, as distinct from the perceiving or thinking subject.”

So the definition of objective is objective, as well as any moral theories, regardless of whether they are right or not. The socialist theory of altruism is an objective theory.

z1235 has forgotten Nir’s Regression theorem of anti-chess property.

Good find, nir. Good times.

Ha, we go way back. Nostalgia ftw.

Also I think anyone wrestling with hoppe’s AE would benefit from DeJasays writings on the necessity of presuming freedom