I must repeat that the revelation of someone’s hypocrisy by itself does absolutely nothing to prove or disprove either side of the formula. For example, if a pacifist supports the state, yes, this makes them a hypocrit, but pointing this out in no way constitutes a logical disproof of either pacifism or statism. So my point still stands that other people’s hypocrisy doesn’t make a logical proof for libertarianism, let alone anything else.
It would disprove pacifism if it would be logically impossible for anyone to positively argue for pacifism without contradicting themselves.
It so happens that in the case of pacifism, it is not logically impossible for anyone to positively argue for pacifism without contradicting themselves. Therefore some people might argue without contradiction and other might argue with contradiction.
The issue is not about any one person hypocrisy.
The point is that there are a class of statements that no-one could positively argue for without contradicting themselves. This is another way of saying that they cannot be argued for. If you want to believe that what cannot be argued for, can be argued for (and that you simply call such a mess ‘hypocrisy’ and don’t judge whether they are actually being argued for or not, then I suggest that might be a problem for you
Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s “Natural End Ethics: A Rejoinder to O’Neil and Osterfeld” contains a reply, from an Aristotelian natural-rights perspective.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s “Natural End Ethics: A Rejoinder to O’Neil and Osterfeld” contains a reply, from an Aristotelian natural-rights perspective.
Osterfeld is wrong on page 106 in that his syllogism is not formally correct. The one I am referring to is
-
Ultimate ends E1, E2, …, En can be attained only through means m. (is)
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Everyone desires or values ends E1, E2, …, En. (is)
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Everyone ought to adopt means m. (ought)
He is slipping in a hidden ought statement by assuming but not stating that everyone ought to attain ends that are desired or valued.
While such reasoning is certainly persuasive to those involved, he is using ought in the sense of a moral obligation.
zefreak = broken record.
I think you’ve hit the heart of the matter. If one reads such theories with a critical eye toward conflations and equivocations, the errors jump right out at you.
http://www.hanshoppe.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/econ-ethics-appx.pdf
Hoppe answers his critics.
excerpt:
Arguing is an activity and requires a person’s exclusive control over
scarce resources (one’s brain, vocal chords, etc.). More specifically, as long
as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other’s
exclusive control over such resources. It is this which explains the unique
feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been
said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there
is disagreement. (Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims,
however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of
control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs: Whatever - such as the law
of contradiction, for instance - must be presupposed insofar as one argues,
cannot be meaningfully disputed, because it is the very precondition of
meaningful doubt, and hence must be regarded as indisputable, or a priori
valid. In the same vein. the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological
precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything
must in fact be a self-owner. It is a self-contradictory absurdity then to ask
for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by
all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately
justified fact.)
But that’s not what’s going on. Since your screed rests upon that strawman, we can end this here.
I stopped reading on page 2:
“A major portion of O’Neil’s argument is based on the fallacious assumption that a choice at t is necessarily about the future. In fact, on the contrary, the correct way to describe any choice we make is that it involves bringing the present into the future. What and where we are at present is as important to an accurate description of choice-making as is the future. Thus, it is incorrect to say all choices are about the future.”
If this is the standard of discourse we can expect from the rest of the essay, I think the argument is already over.
Substantiate. Their discourse seems fine.
There is always a delay between choice and action, even if only a few seconds.
Re-read the passage, as they’re not denying that. They are saying ommitting the present in regards to choices renders an incomplete picture of them; the way I read it is translating present wants into future realities.
It isn’t a strawman that argumentation ethics is essentially claiming that libertarianism (or a particular conception thereof) is inherently proven (or at least presupposed) by the mere act of argueing against it, on the grounds that any argument against it is automatically falsified due to something that is implicit in the very act of argumentation. That’s basically the central thesis, and I just explained what’s wrong with such a thesis. The problem could not be more obvious.
Yes,it is. You explained that you don’t understand argumentation ethics. Fine. No problem. Refrain from discussing it until you understand it.
Hint: it’s about having a baseline.
So far so good.
Here Hoppe can charitably be interpreted in one of two ways:
- Recognition = acknowledgment of the fact of “each other’s exclusive control over such resources.”
- Recognition = acknowledgment of each other’s right of exclusive control over such resources.
Note that this implies Interpretation (1) above, and does not imply Interpretation (2). So far he consistently means (1); no equivocation yet.
This still implies Interpretation (1), and not (2), because at best only the fact of “each other’s exclusive control over such resources” need be presupposed, and only that fact cannot be meaningfully disputed. One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right. All that is actually required is presupposition of the fact, not the right. Lomasky may be wrong (or not), but in any case Hoppe must still intend Interpretation (1) here if Hoppe is to be interpreted charitably.
Note that switching to Interpretation (2) without explicit reference to that switch would be a bald equivocation. So far, Hoppe is in the clear.
If his argument is to coherently follow from what he wrote above, Hoppe must here define “the fact of self-ownership” as “the fact of ‘each other’s exclusive control over such resources’.” And he must define “self-owner” as “one who has ‘exclusive control over such resources’.”
Hoppe still clearly means Interpretation (1) above. Still no equivocation.
From above, all Hoppe is saying here is, “each other’s exclusive control over such resources” is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. But the dear reader will note that this statement - taken at face value - does not imply Hoppe’s argumentation ethics (right to exclusive control), only argumentation facts (fact of exclusive control).
No, for Hoppe’s purposes, the sentence will have to carry the implication that “the right of self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.” Sadly, Hoppe can only achieve this by pulling the old switcheroo, by equivocating between Interpretation (1) and Interpretation (2).
If only it wasn’t necessary. Is it my fault that discourse among natural law philosophers are prone to similar errors?
Insofar as they’re not denying that, they’re not successfully refuting O’Neil.
Excellent post AJ. I see similar equivocation among many natural rights philosophies.
in fact, he is not switchign from 1 to 2, but everywhere using 2. because argumentation is something different from two tape machines with different ‘arguments’(sic) loaded in set up to sound off with each other in a room. there are norms to argumentation. its called the apriori of argumentation
Frank van Dun,
The key to understanding the argument from argumentation is, first,
that when they are told or asked (not) to believe, say, or do something people
are likely and in fact entitled to question why they ought (not) to believe, say,
or do it; and second, that an exchange of arguments is a justificatory
argumentation only if all the participants acknowledge certain facts and abide
by certain norms—norms that no one can argue are invalid because
adherence to those norms is a necessary condition of engaging in
argumentation. In short, argumentation does not and cannot take place in a
normative void:
any truth claim […] is and must be raised and decided upon in the
course of an argumentation. And since it cannot be disputed that
this is so, […] this has been aptly called “the a priori of
communication and argumentation.” Now, arguing never consists of
free-floating propositions9 claiming to be true. Rather,
argumentation is always an activity, too. [… It] follows that
intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist—precisely those
which make some action an argumentation—which have special
cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of
objectivity and truth. Hence […] norms must indeed be assumed to
be justifiable as valid. It is simply impossible to argue otherwise,
because the ability to argue so would in fact presuppose the validity
of those norms which underlie any argumentation whatsoever.10