What separates “moral” values from other values?
All beliefs are not facts.
I never said they were separate.
All beliefs are not facts.
I agree, maybe I used the wrong word. I agree that morality cannot be objectively defined as factual. But, given their nature, I think they can be true insofar as the individual is concerned. You can’t deny to another individual his conviction that murder is immoral, even if you yourself don’t agree with the proposition.
So, not to put words in your mouth, but it would seem you’re saying that empirical truth of a specific moral tenet is impossible to determine? However, it is possible to empirically determine (though not necessarily so) that a person holds to a specific moral tenet?
If so, I tend to agree.
(Hooray for first posts!)
Was that necessary?
Apparently you know enough about the word to say that it probably describes you “closely enough”.
What is that interpretation?
They concern how to interact with other people instead of with something else.
I think that he meant that we shouldn’t refer to something depending just on “subjective fancy” as “morality”, because it wouldn’t have the “powerful thrust” which seems to be pretty important to the definition.
He meant that the existence of the belief could be a fact. It could be a fact that you believe that “murder is immoral”. But that doesn’t mean that the belief itself is true. And, in that sense, all (existing) beliefs are facts (because they exist).
Ladyphoenix,
So, not to put words in your mouth, but it would seem you’re saying that empirical truth of a specific moral tenet is impossible to determine? However, it is possible to empirically determine (though not necessarily so) that a person holds to a specific moral tenet?
I’m not sure, it could be that you and I are saying the same thing. I believe that if a specific moral proposition is held by every individual on the planet it is because every individual on the planet subjectively believes that proposition to be true, not because the proposition is inherently or objectively true as a matter of prescribed natural morality. Or, in other words, morality is a belief.
I. Ryan,
Apparently you know enough about the word to say that it probably describes you “closely enough”.
Ok?
What is that interpretation?
Inherent as in objective.
I don’t intend on sounding hostile, but maybe it’s because I’m not sure if you are building up to make a point.
SL and I are struggling to reach an understanding about this in another thread.
That explains why, despite what you said, it was reasonable to ask for the definition.
I was just trying to understand where you were coming from.
Which one?
Fair enough. 
I apologize.
I see very little reason to argue about morals; I would only correct mistakenly-believed consequences from proposed rules or acts (e.g., advocating a minimum wage, on the basis of moral superiority, can lead to unemployment, and I would highlight that unintended consequence).
To the extent that I normatively define “morality,” I would consider it to be behavior an actor ought to obey. And, although an individual might consider an act immoral for himself, I would still bet he prescribes that same behavior to others.
Insofar as a person prescribes behavior to others, I believe that person cannot factually ground the moral commands; that is, the moral propositions possess no truth-values. Although I don’t fully agree with moral noncognitivists, I do believe that, more often than not, claiming “murder is bad” is akin to an aesthetic reaction.
When you claim “they can be true insofar as the individual is concerned,” I would agree, but then the word “true” becomes superficial.
I see very little reason to argue about morals; I would only correct mistakenly-believed consequences from proposed rules or acts (e.g., advocating a minimum wage, on the basis of moral superiority, can lead to unemployment, and I would highlight that unintended consequence).
I’m not debating whether or not it’s useful to argue about morals; I gave my view on the nature of morality. For what it’s worth, obviously I don’t approach economics from a moral perspective either.
To the extent that I normatively define “morality,” I would consider it to be behavior an actor ought to obey. And, although an individual might consider an act immoral for himself, I would still bet he prescribes that same behavior to others.
I agree, but my point is more to the tune that how people ought to be act (in accordance with any morality) is subjective to any given individual. The moral is true only to the extent that it exists as a subjective belief; the entire point of my original post, in any case, was to present my perspective as one which disbelieved in the objective truth of any moral code (including natural law).
I’m cool with all that.
I would only add that if morals are only non-factual beliefs, then there is no rational, deliberative process to arrive at conclusively true morals.
Why do people usually have that “aesthetic reaction” instead of a different one?
Natural selection. I believe fundamental parts of our psyche are generated by genetic adaptations.
It’s a lot of mindless back and forth over definitions and who gets to own David Friedman’s intellectual legacy , but I could use some backup wrt to the difference between a moral subjectivist and a moral nihilist.