If I say that A requires B to be A or without B A would not be A and then proceed to give a deductive argument like this:
If B exists then A exists.
B exists.
Therefore, A exists.
Is this sound?
Obviosly the conclusion necessarily follows the premises but is the first premise based upon the previous stipulation circular or a tautology? Or perhaps some other fallacy? It would seem so to me but I am no expert.
Much appreciated.
I may not understand the question, but part of it isn’t accurate.
The stipulation that A requires B (let’s say cake requires an oven to exist) contains the premise:
If cake (A) exists then an oven (B) exists, not that an oven requires cake.
What if A or B cannot exist without each other. I do not want to prejudice the arguement with the real terms just yet but the person making such would adhere to the stipulations set forth.
Yep, that’s Modus Ponens, a logically valid form of deductive argument.
A requires B, but it may require other things too. So B existing may not prove that A exists
Yep that’s ‘Yep, that’s Modus Ponens, a logically valid form of deductive argument.’
Yes, but given the stipulations surrounding A and B is the 1st premise valid?
No. it’s not. You say “if A then B,” but not the reverse.
Wait a second can you clarify - are you saying ‘No’ to the OP or to my last post?
Sorry. The fisrt premise is not valid given the stipulations by themselves.
Ok! So would you agree that the first premise is a tautology, and because of that, the argument is circular?
A = AB.
B exists. But we don’t know if, therefore, AB exists or CB exists.
Because as far as I understand your stipulation, only fitting relation of A and B is if “every A is some B” but “not every B is A,” in which case there is also C = CB, at least, so if B exists, either A or C exists.
(Source: Leibniz 1690; Jevons 1874)
Let me be more clear.
A and B are unique
B is subsumed under/in/part of A (In other words B is an attribute of A)
A as defined cannot exist without B
B as defined cannot exist without A
To me this like saying:
If human language exist then humans exist.
Human language exist.
Therefore, humans exist.
To me the antecedant and the consequence are just saying the samething in a different way given the stipulations.
In otherwords if we were to find a person that did not have any language ability they would not be human and if we were to find something using human language it would not be human.
Is the first premise fallacious - a tautology?
In that case, now that you’ve clarified it:
Yes.
There is easy way to prove your work.
Input: B = AB.
In 2-term system, there are Ab, or aB, or ab, or AB. Select all those that B which are also A. Select those which are not-B.
Output: ab, AB, Ab.
Input: B.
In 2-term system, there are remaining ab, AB, Ab. Select those that are B only, since no new proposition has been entered.
Output: AB.
Therefore, its true, according to your last post, if “B is subsumed in A,” and if also B itself is true, then indeed A also is true.
Ok! Would you all like to see the actual argument and it’s definitons? It is a religous argument. I think it is fallacious
Look. The argument is valid but not sound. and it’s not circular. “A If B then A. B. Therefore A” is a tautology. But tautologies are not generally circular.
"A as defined cannot exist without B
B as defined cannot exist without A"
This was not in the original post and changes everything. If you include this as a stipulation, the argument becomes sound.
Just tell us the actual argument and its definitions. Don’t worry so much about bias, I think we can handle it.
Ok it’s a moral argument for the existence of God.
If Objective Moral Values exist God exist
Objective Moral Values exist
Therefore, God exist
Now the the definition for Objective Moral Values are those values that are binding despite what any one person believes and which are grounded in the nature of God. (This is obviously to avoid the Euthyphro Probelm).
God is defined as the greatest Conceivable Being (Type of Ontological Argument) and therefore is the greatest good - He is the Good. God is the locus and paradigm of value and His moral attribute, ontologically, is along the same lines as omniscience, eternality, ect. as part of the greatest conceivably Being.
My problem is that he ties objective morals to God’s nature along with all other attributes that make up God - God by definition is the Good - the Good is God.
To me there is something wrong with this but I can not put my finger on it. It almost seems like the first premise would read - If God exist then God exist. Although I know that identity is not quite right. God cannot be anything other than all of His attributes and all of these attributes would make God.
I am probably wrong but it seems tricky to me to define Objective Moral Values as haveing their locus in the ontology of God and then using them to prove God.
This argument has other problems so it is no big deal either way - it just seemed odd for him to define it like that.
P.S. - I might add that if Objective moral values existed an a seperate thing apart from God then you would have the Euthyphro problem. In other words according to the Christians God cannot be made up of parts like omniscience, omnipotence ect. He just is always who he is.
There is way too much in there that seems totally incoherent definition-wise to even start to look at the deductive aspects of the argument.
First of all, I have no idea how to interpret the term “binding.” What would it mean for values to be binding? Also, who is doing the valuing? God?* And if the claim is that there is something called “value” without any entity doing the valuing, then we have to ask what on earth the noun values even means here.
Finally, whatever values turn out to be, it is unclear what it would mean for them to be “grounded in the nature of God” (this looks like an attempt to beg the question, which is probably the problem you can’t put your finger on**, although there are some others, as noted above).
*If God, then this is question-begging also; the very notion of “objective moral values” as here defined would be smuggling in the existence of God through the back door.
**EDIT: Actually you pointed out the question-begging when you said, “God is by definition the Good.”
Why are objective moral values grounded in nature of god? Why do you know there are in fact objective moral values?
You know, any proposition of form B is in A is judgment that is unproven, unless you have other propositions that make it necessary.
That is, B = AB is contingent because (A or B) = (A and B) or (A not B) or (B not A). AB is only one possible, but not necessary fact.
Only additional premises can make it necessary. (You have to prove that B not A is some kind of contradiction, with these additional premises?) These, however, according to your later post, were not provided deductively. So there is no problem, since you asked something about contingent premises if they were true, but never proved these premises themselves.