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Supernatural: Theological noncognitivist/ignostic, meaning I don’t know what “omnipotent” or “omniscient” could even mean.
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Philosophy of Mind: There’s nothing to say about my mind; it is merely given. As for the minds of others, well, they’re a useful model.
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Causality: Free Will and Determinism are both meaningless. All there is are successions of phenomena, and we can find more or less useful regularities among those successions. See here for more.
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Meta-Ethics: A useless field, unless it merely means looking at how moral sentiments and traditions evolved. There are no objective ethics, but of course there can be subjective moral feelings that are broadly similar among the population. Short answer: like Mises, but I wouldn’t call it “utilitarian” as that often implies collectivism. Mises’s utilitarianism was subjective and purely individualistic, so it was something so obvious that it is meaningless to even comment on: we act to do what pleases us, including what feels morally good or bad to us. Time structure often confuses the language, which obscures this fact. See my various past posts on lesswrong.com and on these forums.
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Political: Anti-statist, meaning I think it’s a bad idea to let any compulsory organization grow much larger than the size of a family. This remains the best encapsulation of my political philosophy and what I think the fate of states will be.
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Epistemology: If we go deep enough*, “knowledge” can mean nothing other than guideposts directing me to pain and pleasure. I say me because it is meaningless to speak of other people or of objective reality at a deep level of analysis. All I know are my sensations; every “thing” or “belief” is just a set of sensations tied in various ways to satisfaction or dissatisfaction.
*Why else have a field called epistemology unless you’re going to go really deep?
Most importantly, language is a terrible system for representing thoughts, which is why there is all this confusion. Nearly all of my philosophical observations came straight from clearing up semantic ambiguities, reifications, word-thought overwrites, and other word-based errors. Essentially, I think the praxeology of communication (praxeology of intellectual discourse) holds the key to clearing up most of philosophy: simply the idea that intellectual communication is about trying to get thoughts from the mind of the speaker to the mind of the listener. Keeping that ever in mind clears things up so-incredibly-much, because so much of the use of language in philosophy ignores that obvious point, instead asking things like, “What is X?” The question is, “What are we trying to convey when we say X (if anything)?”