Agreed, but that’s not the way he was using purpose. He thought that my actions were separate from nature, and somehow the mystical “me” was the basis of purpose. I was attempting to respond to that, thus my qualifications of my “prove it”.
That ‘free will’ stuff is a bunch of crazy talk. I got banned from Freedomain radio for arguing with Stephan Molyneux about it.
I would love to read how that went. I’m sure it completly anoyyed him having to argue against something that wasn’t based off of his glorified youtube psychological babbling.
Liberte wrote "
I have never denied that people have a complex of signaling, emotional and associational cues that they are apt to give the name ‘morality’. What I do deny is that these have any philosophical significance, since they have no cognitive content. How and whether one’s moral sentiments are adjusted or affected by actual knowledge of the sciences is totally beside the point, like whether one’s feelings about banks are affected by knowledge of economics.
Morality is, to its core, nothing more than a game of self-advancement and manipulating the psycho-emotional states of others through complex rationalizations and signals. Whatever that’s worth, it is certainly not philosophy any more than seduction is."
(the quote function is not working properly)
Liberte - have you read Ayer’s views on ethics, aesthetics and theology? They seem to mirror your views exactly, with which I agree wholeheartedly. You may also be interested in a previous post of mine which roughly illustrates my thoughts of moral realism being based on a confusion of language:
You may also be interested in the following conversation between lilburne and myself regarding the psychology of moral sentiment (lilburne’s responses are quoted):
Let me know what you think
I am mainly familiar with Ayer for his work on logical positivism, some of which was good but none of which I agree with wholeheartedly.
Which books of his does he talk about his views on ethics, etc?
No, I’m saying that the totality of my actions are not directly determined by chemical reactions. Again, the materialists never make their case, or provide any solid/concrete evidence. We have to accept their position on faith. I have to just agree that chemicals are causing me to type this right now.
Liberte -
Chapter 6 of Language Truth and Logic
I think that much of logical positivism was a failure, such as the attempt to reduce all language to that of sense-content. Much of it is salvageable, however. Ayer’s ‘weak verification criteria’ is essentially a non-formalized version of Bayesian and Solomonoff Induction. The positivist criterion for meaning has never been adequately formalized, as seemingly every member of the Vienna Circle disagreed on its tenets. However, I believe the approach is generally correct. I think Ayer said it best when he admitted late in life that the strengths of logical positivism were almost entirely negative. The movement was important in what it cut away from philosophy.
Which probably is just metaphysical speculation.
You used the phrase “my theory” to refer to two different things in your post. Above you are saying you don’t know what my theory is, implying you and I might not have the same theory. And yet:
So we need to be clear on what theory we are referring to. Theory about what? Our theories on the content of ethical statements are the same: don’t invade property rights. I have been asking you about your theory on the nature of ethical statements - namely, are they objective or subjective. Now, in your response to me and to others, you’ve said some things that make me think you are an objective ethicist and some things that make me think you are subjective ethicist.
If I. Ryan’s statement about you is correct, you are a subjective ethicist. When you say ‘natural law’ you really just mean libertarianism. You are expressing a preference with regards to the content of ethical statements. To me, a natural law theorist is something much more than a libertarian, it is someone who believes that ethics is an objective discipline and that libertarian ethical statements are correct. Clearly, many people have very different interpretations of the term ‘natural law’. Using this term is surely only adding confusion. Heck: you might even get lumped in with Hobbes!
This is a strange statement. You “use” objective ethics but you regard ethics as a preference. It’s confusing. As far as I can tell, you are here saying you are actually an objective ethicist, but your choice to be an objective ethicist is a subjective preference. In the field of physics, I make a subjective choice to be objective physicist. In the field of film criticism, I make a subjective choice to be a subjective film critic. But these are not difficult subjective choices, they are subjective only in the most trivial sense: I mean, physics is an objective subject, and film criticism is a subjective subject. It would be weird/impossible to be a subjective physicist or an objective film critic.
I would avoid using the term conflict here, because a conflict usually refers to a property violation occuring. This is not that kind of conflict. It’s a philosophical argument: an argument about which ethic is better.
It may not be possible to “resolve” this argument. It depends, again, on whether ethics is objective or subjective. The argument Flat-Earth v Round-Earth can be resolved objectively. The argument The Godfather v Jeepers Creepers can’t be resolved objectively, although it could be resolved in the sense that the two people may be able to reach agreement, by one person convincing the other to change his subjective preference.
Now you seem to be asking about my theory about something else altogether: not the content, or the nature, of ethical statements, but rather how to convince someone else to adopt my ethic, what strategy to use. I’ll leave this for now.
I don’t know what you are asking me in your first sentence. As for humans being social animals, it depends on your definition of social, of course, but yes, being a social animal is one of the reasons we are such a successful species. I don’t see where you’re going with this though.
That’s fine that you don’t know because I don’t know either. I don’t know whether the is-ought gap can be bridged, has been already, or is really just an illusion. But this is the crux of what we’re talking about. Is there any way that we can objectively derive from the ways things are, how they ought to be? If yes, you are an objective ethicist. If no, you are subjective ethicist.
A year ago, I would have described myself as objective ethicist, having just read Rothbard and Hoppe’s arguments for ethics being an objective discipline. But about 6 months ago, when this subject was being discussed here frequently, I began to have my doubts about objective ethics, in no small part due to the arguments of AJ, Grayson, I. Ryan, et al. I now tentatively consider myself a subjective ethicist. In my arguments with statists these days, I do not think of my task as being convincing them that my ethic is correct and their ethic is incorrect. My task is to get them to re-assess their ethical preferences and hopefully change their preferences in light of new knowledge. I find it easier this way, because as an objectivist ethicist I was not only trying to get the statist to change his theory about the content of ethics, but also change his theory about the nature of ethics as a discipline (since statists generally consider ethics to be a subjective discipline, even to the point of mocking anyone claiming to have a “correct” theory of ethics).
Which probably is just metaphysical speculation.
It is metaphysical, but I wouldn’t consider it ‘speculation’. I base it on Aristotle’s elentic proof of non-contradiction, that if things were not either the case or not the case then the logical non-contradiction (p or not p) could not be possible. Since there is logic, there is ontological non-contradiction. That combined with Aristotle’s materialism, that for a thing to exist is to have properties (if it had no properties it would not be the thing that it is, and therefore nothing at all, i.e., law of excluded middle).
No offense taken. I myself might have come off a bit rough in my initial post; if that was so, I’d like to apologize.
I’m sorry, but you are shifting the burden of proof, Sir.
I’m arguing the default position, i.e. “The physical world behaves according to the law of cause and effect. Humans, being part of the physical world, are also subject to this law, as is the human will. There’s no ‘freedom of choice’ for you, only the illusion of choice presented to you by the ultra-complex machine that is your brain.”
You’re arguing “Not all of my will is the result of deterministic forces. I have some free will!” It is up to you to provide evidence for your statement; as it stands, you have declared an article of faith whereas the determinists have soundly applied a physical law to the human body.
You seem quite confused. Armstrong wanted to know why/how people act purposefully, and how human action differs from the spatial trajectory of comets, for example, or the occurrence of earthquakes. I answered that question (others did as well). Next, I told him that he needs to actually support his materialistic position; put forth some kind of argument.
You, then, came along and told me that I denied causality. But that statement presupposes the validity of your argument, namely that only chemicals can cause human action. I haven’t made a single argument. In fact, this is what I said:
Your position, as it stands right now, requires pure faith, that is, it’s no different then saying “Satan made me do it,” where “me” would be the soul. In both cases, there is a cause.
See your conversations. I’m confident I agree with however you would answer these questions.
Why?
Read this. I’d say it is pretty much required reading to discuss libertarianism.
I don’t know how you read through your posts and then respond. I usually respond point by point without reading the whole post first. I suggest this time around, if you don’t already, to read through first because I believe some of the early points you brought up I may not have answered in full. Yet further on in the post it appears I answer some of your earlier points in this post better.
I meant in my first usage that I would like to explore what you think/theory, but then later on in the post my theory agreed with your theory on that particular subject (invasion of private property is unethical). My first usage was in general theorizing, because there might be a point we potentially cross where we find disagreement. I was leaving it open-ended. The second was where were crossed paths and did find actual agreement. First included an emphasis of potential. Second actual.
I want to leave it open that we may possess knowledge that one or the other may not yet possess.
Very perceptive. The objective/subjective is a false dichotomy. They are contraries, but contraries are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is when any particular person believes they are mutually exclusive that’s when they may end up finding another person that also believes they are mutually exclusive yet each person holds the separate contrary from the other. This creates unnecessarily philosophical tension when in essence each person might actually be possessing in substance the same position as the other person because eventually it might be the case the word becomes more important than the underlying meaningful substance the the two sides share. Contraries can actually be not conflictive but complimentary. Of course it depends on the meaning of the terms in use because at essence the two possibly are disagreeing. I can use both terms without conflict because the way I define the terms is in a complimentary way.
I believe we had this conversation before and I tried to find our previous conversation on this because you had agreed with me. I can’t find it though. Do you remember that conversation we had?
I believe my preference is correct. I assume both of those terms into my theory.
This is the way I am using the terms.
That is true. It does make, in my opinion, the conflict between subjective and objective trival. The terms are toned down a notch as they find complimentary, harmonuous qualities when used together. I am rather used to understanding it this way and for me this comes very natural.
When I read that all I see is a physicist who is using his own individual means to study physics. Subjective in this sense means individual.
When I read that all I see is a film critic who has made their knowledge about a film certain.
Though (1) and (2) are by no means mutually exclusive, the way I see this. Being objective is based on what a particular individual (the subjective factor) asserts as being real in this world.
Some philosophers have choosen to use terms to get around this subjective/objective haggling by using other terms such as: agent-relative, agent-neutral, and ontological realism.
Ok. That’s what we are discussion. I was also assuming that Person-A and Person-B were already involved in the physical conflict. I am assuming that the philosophical argument is being demonstrated by their actions taking place. But I see what you mean and we can stick to that.
I think a society that maintains private property and thus, human existence will resolve this argument by maintaining the law of such a society that prefers this kind of law to other types of laws (non-protection of private property). I think the philosophic argument is already a done deal by negative demonstration and special pleading.
But I also think philosophy is practiced in body and not only a mental exercise. When my actions and things in the world can be conceptualized and made into terms. Those terms are evidenced in the world and they also are a name that is abstractly made. So what the term evidences, that evidence is what the term refers to and the term is also a name and names are mental abstractions.
For instance, Some people live in New York
That is a proposition based on evidence and it is a mental abstraction. It is not Platonic because the evidence is grounded in there actually being factually some people that do in fact live in a place that is in fact New York. And on the other hand, it can be shifted into describing an abstraction because those are names that I mentally formulated since being human involves the capability is be an artist and name things. It’s a shift of focus on what is being commented on in reference to the abstraction. The is based on the evidence and the other is based on this proposition being in my mind and now written here in this post. I say this because philosophy involves not only the mental abstraction being exercised but also involves knowing the evidence and when it comes to certain kinds of thoughts it involves living those thoughts. A society can not only dream about maintaining private property but a society also in bodily demonstration by some individuals in that society to carry forth the arguments into actual bodily demonstrations. I theorize a living philosophy.
I apologize. I didn’t make that very clear. What I meant was in order for a society to be based on possessing a law that maintains economic action and private property (human existence) such a society of individuals are to be willing to maintain a society that has these attributes. A society is possible to not involve itself as a civilization but may become more tribal. Not that it would necessarily wrong to live that way but it is a matter of preference by the individuals in any one society as to how they want to live. Would you agree?
Yes we can derive from the way things are how they ought to be. But “the way things are” still requires a starting point. For a tribal or socialist society the “way things are” can start very differently. For such a society, ie. tribal or socialist, the way things are may start from thinking that monetary transactions and living on housing plots on private land is minimized and not desirable so their starting point for a society originates with simply barter, exclusively hunting and gathering, and a village community. I don’t think there is anything morally wrong with wanting to live that way. But that is their axiom or starting points. Whereas the civil society I am referring to the starting point or axiom is private property which originates in each person possessing ownership over their own actions and ceterbris parabris the law maintains this (the individuals in the society representing the law maintain this). Different starting points/axioms.
The last paragraph that you wrote isn’t about subjective ethicists or objective ethicists. It is about how to persuade others. I don’t focus on objectivist or subjectivist methodology in trying to persuade somebody because again I don’t think these two are mutually exclusive, thereby, I undoubtedly use both methods. That doesn’t mean that my ability to persuade is grand or anything. I know I’m lousy at times to demonstrate what I mean. That is a completely different topic though.
What does “coherently object” mean?
A person’s beliefs with regard to questions of fact which bring a person to form a preference can be correct or incorrect, but a preference itself can neither be correct nor incorrect.
What does “coherently object” mean?
Presumably he means something along the lines of “if you start by assuming an objective ethical principle (universalizability) you can’t coherently object to objective ethics” which is true I suppose.
Read this. I’d say it is pretty much required reading to discuss libertarianism.
I agree, it’s indicative of a lot of the bad philosophy that surrounds libertarianism.
Are you saying that you believe objective ethics to be true because you prefer it to be true? If so, how is that not faith?
Or are you saying that you prefer objective ethics to other ways of conceiving ethics because you think it is the most accurate conception? If so, what are your criteria for that?
Great. Is this relevant to anything in particular? truism are awesome!
It’s relevant to the sentence of yours that it is responding to. You said you believe your preference is correct. I said preferences can be neither correct nor incorrect. Now you say what I said is a truism. So I suppose that means you now recognize your error.
First: What do you mean by objective and what do you think realism means? I answer your questions below, but without your assumption as to what these terms mean I will not know if we are on the same page when we exchange words.
I am saying that I believe objective ethics to be true because I as an individual know by evidence that they are true. It doesn’t mean you will believe the evidence of what is demonstrated, but until you can show me what an axiom is without reverting to logical deductions I don’t think I continue this discussion as it is a key term.
question 1: I do think it is the most accurate conception, but I think a subjective ethicist can make the same claim. The objective/subjective dichotomy is false. question 2: Depends on if the person knows what a negative demonstrations is.