I’ve been reading Atlas Shrugged and really like it. Just curious to see the community’s critiques b/c I know there will be criticism 
There’s tons, I just don’t feel like doing it.
Morality as a normative statement is not objective. It may, however, be objective as a positive statement.
It’s objective in the sense of saying “A believes that X is (im)moral”.
Rand actually distinguished between intrinsic value and objective value, which puts Objectivist ethics more in line with subjectivism than its name suggests. Like Mises, Rand would say “If you want to achieve Y, you ought to do X.” However, Rand also believed that we all hold an ultimate end, a rational life, and as such, could objectively rank value according to that end.
Anyway, the whole objective-subjective divide is not nearly as clear cut as everyone makes it out to be, and probably isn’t that important either. Take a phenomena like Pain: it only exists for the subject, yet we (on the outside) are able to know that it exists without experiencing it. Its ontologically subjective and epistemically objective.
I’m not sure where you stand, but I definitely disagree with Rand on this. We’re certainly capable of holding something other than “a rational life” as an ultimate end. As Exhibit A, I present people committing suicide.
Is pain an objective phenomenon in the sense that we can quantify it by some empirically rigorous standard?
On the other hand, I wouldn’t even say that we on the outside are able to know that pain exists for the subject - because we don’t experience his (alleged) pain ourselves. We merely assume that the subject is in pain based on what we observe him doing.
I’m not an Objectivist, but I’m sympathetic to the Aristotelain-naturalistic approach. And by sympathetic I mean that I’m more apt to ask “how can I make this work?” than “how can I prove this wrong?” So, my response to the suicide thing is that it might throw a wrench in the specific arguments of Rand, Rasmussen and Den Uyl, but it doesn’t address the root – whether or not there is some universal and ultimate end against which we can judge values. At the very least, there must be an ultimate end for each individual, and personally, I think enough individuals share the same ultimate end (the good life), that we can talk about it as if it were universal.
No. There’s a significant difference between being able to know if someone is in pain, and being able to know how much pain they are in.
Well this might come down to us disagreeing on what counts as knowledge. If I run a controlled experiment to test the hypothesis that event X will be followed by event Y, how many times do the results have to conform to my hypothesis before we can know that Y does in fact follow from X?
Its not that we always correctly identify pain, but that we are capable of doing so often enough that it meets the epistemic standards that we generally hold for other things that we call knowledge.
With all due respect, I don’t think you’re being consistent in the above. Either there exists an (i.e. a single) ultimate end for all people (i.e. that they must/necessarily hold to) or there doesn’t. To talk about “enough individuals [sharing] the same ultimate end… that we can talk about it as if it were universal” is to adopt an empirical rather than a strictly logical (i.e. deductive) methodology. I, for one, am not adopting an empirical methodology. Nor do I think was Rand.
Okay, I think we’re in agreement here, at least. Pain, like value, is subjective.
Mathematically speaking, I’d say an infinite number of times.
I don’t think I’m a part of that “we”. Then again, I think all epistemology is ultimately about the definition of the word “know”.
But even if there isn’t a single (i.e. shared by everyone) ultimate end, there’s no reason to reject the idea of ultimate ends altogether. It’s completely reasonable to assume that everyone has an ultimate end, but that exactly what it is might vary between people. Insofar as more than one person holds the same ultimate end, then we can talk about right and wrong values within that population. And I think that population is a significant enough portion of all of humanity that it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to be overly concerned about the 3% or whatever that doesn’t fit it.
This isn’t empiricism, at least not in the modern sense. I’m not talking about running tests to determine what ultimate ends people hold. But Rand did think that the way we come to know anything is through experience, so she was probably more of an “empiricist” than you might think.
I use “we” to be congenial and illustrate common ground over diference. If you seriously can’t identify if someone is in pain, and have such strict epistemic standards that you don’t claim to know anything by way of inference, then… I don’t believe you. There is no way that you go through your life ACTUALLY treated the word “know” in the sense that you want to here.
I guarantee that you have said “I know” and meant a number of different things depending on the context. You know that your parents love you, You know that 2+2=4, you know that the sun will rise in the east. You aren’t changing the definition in each case, you are changing the standards according to which belief becomes knowledge. And you are changing the standards becuase it is appropriate to do so.
I didn’t say I was rejecting the idea of ultimate ends altogether, and I’m not rejecting it. I’m rejecting the idea that everyone necessarily has the same single ultimate end (“a rational life”). That’s the idea that you initially put forth. You’ve changed it twice since, and that’s fine. However, it’s not logical to assume that everyone necessarily has the same single ultimate end when not everyone does. If you’re going to not be “overly concerned” about the counter-evidence, that’s fine too, but I see no logical basis for that.
I was using “empirical” in the same sense as “inductive”. You can replace the former with the latter, if you so desire. My point was to contrast what you were doing with (deductive) logic.
Claiming to know something and actually knowing something are two different things, IMHO. But I also think there’s a difference between everyday colloquial discourse and the kind of discourse I thought we were engaging in here (i.e. logical discourse). When it comes to logical discourse, I don’t think it’s appropriate to equivocate. That’s because equivocation is a logical fallacy.
Now, do I know that my parents love me? Strictly speaking, no. I haven’t experienced their own thoughts. Do I know that the sun will rise in the east? Strictly speaking, no. I haven’t experienced a future event (yet). Do I know that 2+2=4 (in base-10 arithmetic)? Yes, because I’ve experienced it.
Rand’s ethics are perfect imo. As for her epistemology, I need to research it more. My concern is that is takes induction and attempts to equate it with deduction. One cannot say they know the future because the future has not occurred. Then again, I’m not going to step off a cliff like they do in the cartoons because every time I’ve seen something go off a cliff, it fell. That’s inductive (empirical) experience, although since I have only witnessed it 999 times, who is to say the 1000th time it will be for sure? Again, with experience, one only knows what has happened and what is happened, not what will happen (although prediction systems like science is the closest the infallibility we will ever get imo).
The definition in concern surrounds knowledge. What is knowledge? It’s certainty. When a system holds things called anomalies, it means the system is incomplete. That is a fact. Then again, there is no reason to doubt my sense experience, for what I am experiencing is as real as anything. I would have to make a concerted effort to doubt reality as I perceive it, thus I am an empiricist. While Objectivist empiricism whereby A is A (really it’s Aristotelianism) makes sense, causation is always uncertain because it involves something we haven’t yet experienced.
As Exhibit A, I present people committing suicide.
So what is this supposed to be proof of?
It’s not proof, but counter-evidence to the notion that everyone always values “a rational life” as his ultimate end.
It’s not proof, but counter-evidence to the notion that everyone always values “a rational life” as his ultimate end.
What makes you think committing suicide runs counter to valuing “a rational life”?
“A rational life”, as a kind of life, can’t be obtained or maintained if one is dead.
“A rational life”, as a kind of life, can’t be obtained or maintained if one is dead.
Whether one dies doesn’t enter into it, if one is capable of making a rational decision to end their life, then that decision is consistent with valuing “a rational life”.
I don’t see how that follows. Can you elaborate?
I don’t see how that follows.
As a follower of Austrian economic philosophy who (presumably) believes that every action man makes is rational by the Austrian definition, you must thus concede that killing yourself is rational, yes?
I never said that committing suicide is irrational, and I don’t think it is, so I have nothing to concede there.